BRICS began as an excellent investment opportunity since it comprised some of the world’s fastest growing economies — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. They belonged to four continents and the fact that all of them were non-Western economies gave them a geopolitical identity as the leading lights of the developing world.
Even after its expansion in January 2024 with the addition of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Iran (Argentina expressed initial interest in joining but subsequently opted to withdraw), the core purpose of what BRICS seeks to achieve lacks clarity.
BRICS’ statements critical of the governance of multilateral institutions and groupings like G-7 and the UNSC P-5 indicated that the grouping was seeking changes in global governance. With the establishment of the BRICS bank, New Development Bank, it appeared that these rising powers from the Global South were perhaps seeking to create an alternate global order.
A joint statement of the BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations issued in Nizhny Novgorod, Russia on June 10, 2024, offers more substantial insights into BRICS’ vision not for an alternate but a reformed global order. The 54 carefully articulated points address issues ranging from international security, sustainability and climate change, human rights, the conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine, and the position of Africa in the world, among many others. The joint declaration constitutes, so far, the clearest statement produced by BRICS showcasing their shared vision and worldview beyond economic cooperation. We now have a much better idea of what BRICS wants.
However, there seems to be a fil rouge running through the language of the joint statement: a persistent exceptionalism toward developing countries and the need to consider the structural inequalities of the global order in the BRICS’ perception of the world. This idea is clearly manifest in the proposal of “a more agile, effective, efficient, responsive, representative, legitimate, democratic and accountable international and multilateral system,” which is supposed to lead to a “greater and more meaningful participation of developing and least developed countries, especially in Africa, in global decision-making processes and structures, and making them better attuned to contemporary realities” (point 4 of the statement).
BRICS nations are united in their perception that despite changing geoeconomic and geopolitical realities their voices remain marginalized and real power in multilateral institutions is in the hands of the Global North. Today in purchasing power terms BRICS has a greater share of the global GDP (32 percent) than the G-7 nations (31 percent). The balance of economic power is moving away from the Trans-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific region.
However, the power over institutions of global governance remains centralized in the Global North. This ensures that rules that govern the global economy are skewed in favor of the north at the expense of the Global South.
BRICS appear to be committed to a multilateral order in which institutions play a central role in the decision-making process. The statement rejected unilateralism and unilateral actions as outside the UN Charter and in breach of international law (point 15). The statement blamed unilateral sanctions for having a negative effect on trade, health, energy supplies and food security of the developing world.
The legality of unilateral sanctions by a state or a group of states without U.N. authorization is a contested issue. The joint declaration of the BRICS ministers opens the door to brand sanctions by the United States, the European Union and allies as incompatible with international law. The joint declaration in the same vein also condemned unilateral, punitive and discriminatory protectionist measures that disrupt the global supply chains and distort competition (point 16).
The key to the success of the BRICS is the rapid decline of the current global order. As the system and its rules are challenged by wars, pandemics and economic shifts, the system becomes unstable and allows emerging powers to act independently of the will of dominant powers and enables change. We are currently witnessing two wars, one in Europe and another in the Middle East, and both are directly challenging the U.S.-led order. Leading members of BRICS are directly or indirectly helping the challengers. India and China are shoring up the Russian economy by circumventing the NATO-imposed anti-Russia sanctions. And China with its diplomatic outreach to Hamas and South Africa with its legal actions against Israel are working hard not only to upset the status quo but also to enforce the rules of the rule-based order in such a way that for once it helps the Global South.
But the joint statement on these two wars (see points 32-35) is a hodge-podge of standing for principle while also making compromises in the interests of member countries. It may also be an attempt to gloss over the fact that BRICS members do not have a unified stance on the Russia-Ukraine war. But the comprehensive statement on the Israel-Hamas war, while clarifying the BRICS unity on the issue, also highlights the absence of consensus on the Russia-Ukraine war.
BRICS have taken what can be described as a copybook Global South perspective on Palestine. They criticize Israel’s conduct of the war, call for a Palestinian state, support the two-state solution and support the measures taken by the International Court of Justice. Indeed, the longest statement in the entire declaration is on the Palestine issue. But on the Ukraine issue, one can sense a double standard as they make a rather vague reference to the national positions taken by members in other international fora. But they do not refer to the judicial proceedings before the World Court concerning Russia or the International Criminal Court’s investigations on Russian nationals. However, they do appreciate proposals for peace and mediation like the joint proposal by Brazil and China.
Our reading of the statement suggests that BRICS are unhappy with the systemic bias against the Global South in the current global order, but we also sense that they are not seeking to establish an alternate order but strengthen and reform the current one such that mutually agreed upon norms are applied equally and justly to all nations. An example of this posture can be seen in the statement about the G-20 forum (see points 6 and 7). All the founding members of the BRIC nations are part of G-20 and now even the African Union. It allows nations of the Global South to set the agenda and the fact that it has in recent years been led by Indonesia (2022), India (2023), Brazil (2024), and South Africa (2025) makes it more appealing to BRICS. Unlike the UN Security Council and IMF where power is unevenly distributed, at the G-20, decision-making is based on equality and consensus building.
We believe that the BRICS forum promises a new multipolar world order where the Global South truly matters. It seeks to achieve that goal through reform not replacement of the existing order. Forums such as G-20 can be the vehicle for the reforms that BRICS seek. But there are internal conflicts such as those between India and China and Saudi Arabia and Iran and to a lesser extent Egypt and Ethiopia, which reduces the forum’s ability to act more decisively. BRICS will have to either limit its membership to nations that are not hostile to each other or develop a robust internal system of conflict resolution. But the fact that BRICS has emerged and is being taken seriously clearly indicates that there is a need and an active demand for change and for the moment there is no better hope than BRICS to bring about that change.