The situation in Myanmar has drastically intensified in the past year, which has seen significant military victories by the revolutionary coalition involving People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) and ethnic revolutionary organizations (EROs). Geopolitical risks are also increasing, with China, India, and the United States supporting different factions. China is hedging its position by holding talks with EROs active along its border; India maintains ties with the Myanmar junta, while the U.S., despite Washington being preoccupied with its own upcoming elections, has policy circles actively calling for support of the pro-revolutionary side, mainly the National Unity Government (NUG). This geopolitical maneuvering risks sidelining the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a development that would be detrimental to the region, the organization, and arguably Myanmar itself. Compounding this situation, Malaysia is encouraging ASEAN states to bilaterally engage with the junta, a stance some states have already adopted, further undermining regional cohesion.
ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus, agreed two months after the February 2021 coup and much criticized as “dead,” now requires a bold and creative reinterpretation in order to effectively respond to the dramatic shifts in Myanmar’s power dynamics. ASEAN’s current approach is akin to the Burmese saying, “trying to get the snake out without breaking the cane.” Which is to say, it is not working. As Malaysia assumes the ASEAN chairmanship in 2025, there is an urgent need to revisit and rejuvenate the Consensus. We outline three critical actions ASEAN must take to address the evolving crisis in Myanmar: expand engagement with the non-junta actors in an official capacity; broaden humanitarian assistance beyond the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance; and appoint a consistent ASEAN Special Envoy for Myanmar.
Expand Official Engagement with Non-Junta Actors
The ongoing strategy of primarily dealing with the military State Administration Council (SAC) is misguided. It has only granted the junta the semblance of the legitimacy it so desperately seeks. Instead, ASEAN must broaden its engagement to include non-SAC actors such as the National Unity Government (NUG) and EROs, and to do so in an official capacity. These groups have built increasingly capable institutions and administrative structures in the territories under their control. The significant shift in the military balance in favor of PDFs and EROs, some of which now control international borders, underscores the urgency of this strategy.
Engaging resistance stakeholders in an official capacity is crucial not only to pressure the junta but also to counter China and India, which are already engaging with these actors officially. There is no reason ASEAN should and cannot do the same. Furthermore, engaging with the stakeholders in the pro-revolutionary side would generate goodwill with the Myanmar people, which ASEAN has ignored in favor of a state-centered approach. Former Malaysian Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah and Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi were both appreciated for their support for and efforts to listen to Myanmar civil society, while former Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen was criticized during his ASEAN chairmanship in 2022 for giving legitimacy to the junta by only meeting with its leaders.
This approach is in line with the Five-Point Consensus, which calls for constructive dialogue among all parties and the mediation process facilitated by an ASEAN special envoy. By engaging non-junta actors in an official capacity, ASEAN can adhere to its own framework while adapting to the changing realities on the ground and putting much-needed diplomatic pressure on the generals, who have refused to work with the international community in good faith.
Broaden Humanitarian Assistance Beyond AHA
The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) is a key component of the Five-Point Consensus but has significant limitations. By channeling funds through junta-controlled organizations such as the Myanmar Red Cross, the AHA inadvertently strengthens and legitimizes the military regime. More importantly, these channels are not effective. To address the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, ASEAN must expand its assistance mechanisms beyond the AHA.
Supporting and prioritizing locally-led and implemented humanitarian aid is essential. Local organizations have a deeper understanding of the local realities and can provide more targeted and effective assistance. Expanding ASEAN’s humanitarian assistance beyond the AHA would reduce the amount of funds flowing to the junta, prioritize the needs of all Myanmar citizens, and activate “Resistance Humanitarian” organizations that have demonstrated their capability to reach hard-to-access populations.
Furthermore, ASEAN should explore partnerships with organizations in India and Bangladesh to facilitate aid through Myanmar’s western borders. Regions like Chin State and Rakhine State, which have suffered some of the most significant post-coup hardships, are currently beyond the reach of AHA’s assistance. By working with neighboring countries, ASEAN can ensure a more comprehensive and effective humanitarian response.
In the same spirit, ASEAN should collaborate with the NUG’s ministries. Many medical doctors in the Civil Disobedience Movement work for the NUG’s Health Ministry. Funding and supporting these efforts would not only be effective but also generate significant political capital for ASEAN. This would demonstrate a commitment to the well-being of the Myanmar people and strengthen ASEAN’s credibility in any further process.
Appoint a Consistent ASEAN Special Envoy for Myanmar
The role of the ASEAN special envoy, as envisioned in the Five-Point Consensus has been undermined by its execution. The role has been typically filled by the foreign minister of the ASEAN chair or another senior diplomat, but the position’s annual rotation hinders the development of lasting relationships and continuity in addressing Myanmar’s crisis. To rectify this, instead of the Malaysian foreign minister taking the post in 2025, ASEAN should appoint a long-term, well-resourced special envoy to Myanmar, independent of the rotating chair.
An effective ASEAN Special Envoy should have the independence and resources necessary for thorough research, travel, and engagement with a range of diverse and relevant actors. This includes pressing the envoy to work with the pro-revolutionary side in an official capacity, ensuring their involvement in any peace meetings initiated by China, Thailand, India, the U.S., or the European Union. Collaborating with like-minded international partners requires a consistent and dedicated envoy capable of fostering long-term relationships and maintaining a focused approach.
Conclusion
As Malaysia takes on the ASEAN chairmanship, it brings an opportunity for a much-needed shift in approach towards the crisis in Myanmar. By expanding engagement with the pro-revolutionary actors in an official capacity, broadening humanitarian assistance beyond the AHA, and appointing a consistent, well-resourced Special Envoy, ASEAN can reaffirm its commitment to resolving the crisis and supporting the people of Myanmar.
The geopolitical risks are escalating, with major actors like China, India, and the U.S. potentially sidelining ASEAN. If this happened, it would be detrimental not only to Myanmar’s democratic movement but also to ASEAN’s relevance and effectiveness in a volatile international environment. A creative reinterpretation of the Five-Point Consensus is not only timely but essential if ASEAN is to remain a significant regional actor in these challenging times.
It’s time for ASEAN to step up.