Tensions and distrust between Washington and Beijing will not improve anytime soon; hence, the U.S. military is preparing for a worst-case scenario should an armed conflict break out in the Indo-Pacific. These preparations include modernizing the armed services’ inventory. For the U.S. Air Force (USAF), the critical Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program, aimed at building a sixth-generation combat aircraft that can ensure air superiority for decades to come, is a cornerstone of this modernization effort.
Critically for Washington, USAF is not the only service across the Indo-Pacific acquiring new combat aircraft. Moreover, adversaries and allies are scrutinizing the U.S. capital’s myriad military procurement debates.
The United States’ Indo-Pacific adversaries are already working on their next-generation fighter jets. China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is developing a sixth-generation warplane. As Rick Joe recently wrote in The Diplomat, the new aircraft could be in service by the mid-2030s.
Moscow is keen to show that, despite two years of war and international sanctions, its defense industry remains efficient. Russia is developing a sixth-generation combat jet, called the Mikoyan MiG-41 fighter or Prospective Air Complex for Long-Range Interception (PAK DP, ПАК ДП). Reliable details are scarce, and the war with Ukraine is obstructing the MiG-41’s production. Media reports suggest that a maiden flight is expected in 2025, and production could begin by the decade’s end.
For U.S. allies and partners, Washington’s strategic posture and procurement policy are existential considerations. Japan is part of the Tempest stealth fighter program, a joint program between London, Rome, and Tokyo. South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) announced the start of the construction of a fleet of KAI KF-21 Boramae fighter jets. Japan and South Korea are also purchasing the Lockheed F-35 Lightning II fifth-generation warplane – the U.S. State Department approved the sale to South Korea of 25 F-35-A warplanes in 2023. Finally, Taiwan’s Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (AIDC) is developing the Advanced Defense Fighter (ADF) warplane.
India, which has a complex partnership with Washington, despite its antipathy toward China and its close ties with Moscow, is also considering next-gen warplanes. The state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) aerospace company will manufacture a fifth-generation warplane for the armed forces, the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA). Moreover, in January, a delegation led by Defense Minister Rajnath Singh visited the United Kingdom, prompting speculation that New Delhi could join the Tempest stealth fighter program.
As next-generation combat aircraft development and acquisition programs exist across the Indo-Pacific and Europe, the U.S. Air Force cannot afford to fall behind in this highly complex and contested space. The United States needs not only to compete with adversaries, but to outperform them, while supporting allies.
In May 2023, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall explained that “the NGAD Platform is a vital element of the Air Dominance family of systems, which represents a generational leap in technology over the F-22, which it will replace.”
The combat aircraft, intended to replace the Lockheed F-22 Raptor fighter starting in 2030, will engage in counter-air missions, air-to-surface attacks, and air-to-air strikes. Its foundation is the Loyal Wingman program, which envisions an AI-powered UAV flying alongside the next generation of crewed combat aircraft.
The USAF is considering purchasing as many as 200 NGAD aircraft at around $300 million each, with a program price tag of around $28 billion over the next five years, if committed. As with other U.S.-manufactured defense systems and platforms, the NGAD will eventually be sold to Asian and European allies.
But the future of NGAD is currently in doubt.
In mid-June, when discussing the program at the Air & Space Forces Association, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin acknowledged the need to make choices and decisions “across the landscape” of the NGAD program over “the next couple of years.” These statements caused defense news and analysis agencies to question whether the program is in jeopardy.
The problem for the USAF and Washington’s partners is that the bloated F-35 program has not generated confidence that the force can maintain air superiority during wars with other peer military powers. According to the Government Accountability Office, a single F-35 originally cost $130 million for 8,000 flight hours. That number then ballooned to $450 million. Less than one-third of the F-35s produced are in combat-ready condition, with the Project on Government Oversight characterizing it as a “part-time fighter jet.”
The F-35’s dismal record does not inspire confidence among U.S. allies, either. Attempts to rectify this situation with upgrades and retrofits have also met problems. Initial attempts to fix numerous technical issues contributed to bloated costs and mission creep. Subsequent attempts to streamline and rectify these issues revealed to Congress that upgrading the backlog of F-35s could take over a year. Now, the Pentagon has again halted upgraded F-35 deliveries amid software difficulties. It is safe to assume that the intelligence services of U.S. adversaries, like China, are monitoring the status of the F-35 program, if recent scandals of military secrets sold to Beijing are any indication.
Deterrence does not rely exclusively on the technical specifications of any weapons platform or system – logistical strengths and economic utility must be weighed as well. The F-35 program excels in none of these categories. When an F-35 cannot even fly and ends up costing the equivalent of dozens of Chinese aircraft or thousands of cheap Chinese drones, Washington’s adversaries in the Indo-Pacific will not be deterred, and U.S. allies will not be reassured.
As tensions mount in the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. military is working on new platforms and systems to address tomorrow’s conflicts. Unfortunately, the F-35 has not provided the confidence and efficiency the USAF and the armed services of other U.S. allies and partners require.
As U.S. adversaries (and allies) in the Indo-Pacific are developing next-gen combat aircraft, among other weapons programs that will make the region much more contested, Washington is supporting an unreliable program like the F-35. In doing so, worthy programs such as drone modernization, surface-to-air upgrades, and NGAD, which all have the potential to succeed, are slowed down or worse. This is not the time to neglect better alternatives.