East Asia is witnessing seismic geopolitical shifts. The June summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, culminating in a heightened military partnership, sent shockwaves across the globe. In the lead-up to the meeting, North Korea steadily increased hostilities in the region while abandoning its long-time pursuit of reunification with South Korea.
So far, South Korea’s response has been fighting fire with fire. President Yoon Suk-yeol has implemented decisive measures to strengthen military cooperation with the United States and Japan to curtail Kim’s reckless pursuits. The Yoon administration remains steadfast in supplying weapons and humanitarian aid to Ukraine.
Caught in the whirlpool, China faces a delicate situation reconciling its leadership ambitions and hegemonic aspirations. Beijing’s decision – whether to mediate global conflicts or leverage them for regional dominance – could ultimately redefine the contours of the emerging world order.
In an interview with The Diplomat, Dr. Cho Sung-min discussed East Asia’s precarious geopolitical landscape and its influence on the Korean Peninsula. Formerly a professor at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies under the U.S. Department of Defense, Cho will assume a tenure-track position in the Department of Political Science at Sungkyunkwan University in Seoul, South Korea, starting this September.
Tensions along Korea’s demilitarized border spiked in May and June as North Korea launched hundreds of trash-filled balloons into the South. In June, on at least two occasions, North Korean soldiers crossed the demarcation line, prompting South Korean forces to fire warning shots. These incidents have heightened anxiety over further aggravation.
While North Korea’s military drills, missile launches, and nuclear tests are expected to persist, Cho says a greater concern lies elsewhere.
“Even without Putin’s support, Kim has ample motivation to escalate provocations,” Cho told The Diplomat. “But with Kim now emboldened, the prospect of unconventional acts like terrorist attacks on South Korean infrastructure and civilians, or one mirroring the 2010 Yeonpyeong bombardment and sinking of the Cheonan battleship, is a real possibility.”
Cho noted, “As Victor Cha says, North Korea’s sending trash-filled balloons is a form of ‘soft terrorism.’ Reportedly, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service also confirmed North Korea has been preparing for terrorist attacks against South Korean embassy staff or citizens living abroad.”
The specter of irregular attacks is partially driven by North Korea’s evolving domestic political situation and efforts to combat foreign interference. And they are unfolding amid echoes of the tumultuous events in 2010.
“In my view, what’s really threatening for the Kim regime is South Korea’s resumption of information operations and President Yoon’s focus on North Korea’s human rights violations,” Cho said. “For the last three years, new laws such as ‘The Law on Ensuring Education of Young People’ and ‘The Law of Protecting the Cultural Language of Pyongyang’ were enacted under Kim Jong Un to suppress foreign influence and prohibit South Korea’s ‘reactionary’ culture from being consumed by the public.”
During the previous Moon Jae-in administration, sending anti-Pyongyang leaflets to the North, often accompanied by USB drives containing South Korean dramas and songs, were banned. But with the resuming of these activities, North Korea has intensified crackdowns and imposed harsh punishments against lawbreaking citizens.
Cho contends that the Kim regime’s decision to abandon reunification should not be viewed as a mere tactical or rhetorical maneuver but as a continuation of these internal struggles.
“Kim Jong Un didn’t need to renounce [the] reunification goal to achieve his security objectives,” Cho said. “But the surprise decision to relinquish his father and grandfather’s historic mission of Korean unification underscores broader identity politics in play within North Korea.”
“In 2010, Pyongyang launched attacks on Yeongpyong Island and sank the Cheonan battleship during the power transition from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un. What concerns me now is that the current domestic political situation in North Korea could lead to similar unconventional attacks.”
To be sure, there are similarities with 2010, but also crucial differences. In 2010, the United States’ military commitments in East Asia and its ability to come to allies’ aid were largely taken for granted. However, things have changed dramatically in a decade and a half. Elevated regional tensions and ongoing wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have caused a growing number of South Koreans to scrutinize the United States’ extended deterrence.
Particularly worrying to South Koreans is the nuclear asymmetry on the Korean Peninsula, where Pyongyang actively expands its nuclear capabilities while Seoul is left out. The angst is reflected in the numbers. In a 2023 poll, over 76 percent of South Koreans advocated securing nuclear weapons, even if it meant pursuing indigenous development. The question remains whether the South Korean government is willing to align with public sentiment.
“If Donald Trump wins the election in November, a dialogue in that direction is possible,” Cho predicted. “But it would first require revising the South Korea-U.S. Nuclear Agreement to enable nuclear fuel reprocessing and production of necessary materials.”
While Washington often dismisses the idea of South Korea obtaining its own nuclear weapons, Cho says a gradual shift within U.S. policymaking circles and scholarly communities may bring a renewed opportunity for South Korea. He identifies three primary reasons for this shift.
“First, with North Korea’s advancing nuclear capacity and missile technologies capable of penetrating our defense systems, the regional balance has been disrupted. Next, both China and Russia are enhancing their nuclear capabilities, bringing the threat of nuclear conflict closer today. Finally, Trump’s potential return could open the door to renegotiation. In discussions over defense cost-sharing, Seoul could assert its need to balance power dynamics by acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities or even nuclear submarines.”
With the U.S. presidential elections closing in, the future of U.S. military deployment in South Korea is also becoming a subject of heated debate. Although it remains uncertain whether Trump is serious about withdrawing U.S. troops from the Peninsula, Cho asserts that the sudden vacuum such an action would create in East Asia, coupled with cultural and economic implications, would likely prevent it from happening.
Even if South Korea goes nuclear, Cho argues that from a security standpoint, the U.S. presence remains necessary. “Experts suggest that developing nuclear weapons [in South Korea] could span anywhere from six months to five years. South Korea faces a need for deterrence against potential surgical strikes on its nuclear facilities in this period,” he explained. “Moreover, maintaining a regional balance of power necessitates the continued presence of U.S. forces.”
“If South Korea were to acquire nuclear weapons, a huge assumption here is that Seoul would do it under the agreement with Washington,” Cho continued. “However, South Korea’s road to nuclear armament does not lead to the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Korea. In truth, it’s the opposite.”
Of course, the U.S. military is only one of many factors contributing to security calculations on the peninsula. Notably absent from expert discourse is Beijing’s perspective on the swiftly changing geopolitical situation.
“Subtle signals reflect Beijing’s dissatisfaction with the recent Putin-Kim Summit and reluctance to fully endorse it,” Cho said. “But given China’s economic struggles and the provisions of Taiwan’s TSMC, it’s improbable that Beijing will seize the current situation to invade Taiwan or impose a military blockade.”
As Cho noted, the semiconductor giant TSMC, based on Taiwan, is a hub of major global commerce. Disrupting a major semiconductor supply chain could have economic consequences in China that far outweigh the gains realized by subsuming the island. In a nutshell, Cho said, “It’s like shooting itself in the foot.”
That said, in a scenario of simultaneous conflict erupting in both the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, Cho suggests that South Korea would be ill-prepared to handle a two-front war and be restricted to offering rear-area support for the United States. Nevertheless, this does not imply South Korea’s outright passivity. According to Cho, Seoul’s current stance on a Taiwan contingency is “not a denial of South Korea’s involvement but rather a deliberate policy of ambiguity.”
He cautioned that delving into hypothetical scenarios could disrupt the status quo and potentially accelerate the onset of crises.
“Let’s say Seoul makes a full and clear commitment to the defense of Taiwan. It’s about a future scenario, but Beijing will most likely retaliate today. Then Seoul has to respond, and Washington would support it. This way, an actual crisis can unfold today due to worries about a potential crisis tomorrow.”