On the morning of July 28, a convoy of soldiers from the United Wa State Army (UWSA) drove through Lashio, the capital of the northern Shan State and home of the Myanmar military’s Northeastern Regional Command, taking control of the administration under the pretext of peacekeeping. This occurred amid renewed fighting in northern Shan State, as the Three Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armed groups launched the second phase of its Operation 1027 offensive, massing their forces around Lashio. Without firing a single shot, the UWSA has gained control of three additional townships in Shan State since October 2023 – Hopang, Pan Lon, and Tangyan – and likely more in the coming weeks.
Sources in Naypyidaw indicate that the military State Administration Council (SAC) has agreed to have the UWSA and Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) step in as peacekeepers to prevent the renewed conflict from spilling over into other parts of Shan State. This indicates the SAC’s inability to maintain control and the potential total collapse of its authority in northern Shan State. The key question is: what are the strategic aims and implications of the UWSA’s entry into Lashio? To answer that question, here are five things you need to know about the UWSA, what it stands to gain from the northern conflict, and the broader regional implications.
A Role Model and Political Leadership
As the largest of Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups, the UWSA, which controls two non-contiguous territories in Shan State and has as many as 30,000 soldiers under arms, is widely viewed as a model and a source of inspiration for other ethnic organizations in Myanmar. “We have ambitions that are nothing less than Wa State,” said Twan Mrat Naing, leader of the Arakan Army (AA), during celebrations marking the 30th anniversary of the UWSA’s founding in Pangsang, the UWSA’s capital, in 2019. Newly formed ethnic armed groups are now drawing similar inspiration from the AA and its battlefield successes in Rakhine State since the launch of Operation 1027.
The UWSA has also established itself as a political leader among the 20-odd ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in Myanmar. At the 21st Century Panglong Peace Conference convened by Aung San Suu Kyi’s government in 2017, the group submitted a proposal for a confederation model as part of an ethnic coalition known as the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC). Led by the UWSA, the FPNCC’s policy reflects the interests of the UWSA in two key ways: first, it advocates self-determination and authority over local security forces within designated areas until the establishment of a future federal system; and second, it advocates the creation of a security system that prioritizes local authorities and the self-defense of autonomous states through the formation of ethnic armies. This forms the foundational document of its political leadership. This significant demand for a parallel peace and political dialogue process in 2017 seemed ambitious at the time. However, seven years after the proposal, with the central administration at its weakest in decades and ready to negotiate, it appears achievable.
The FPNCC, which also includes the AA, SSPP, Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), is now Myanmar’s largest ethnic coalition. It includes more than half of all EAO combatants in Myanmar and operates from the banks of the Mekong River to the Bay of Bengal. The FPNCC has held regular meetings since the 2021 coup, with a clear framework and vision and clear political demands. Since the military takeover, no other ethnic coalition has hosted summits or regular meetings on this scale or presented a clear political position like the FPNCC. De facto leadership of the FPNCC has made the UWSA the most politically influential armed group in Myanmar, a role historically contested by the Karen National Union and the KIA.
The existing FPNCC’s political framework differs significantly from the federal charter formulated by the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) and National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC). This difference is evident not only in the political process, but also in terms of fundamental visions, security arrangements, and relationship with the union administration. With its strength and influence, the FPNCC is unlikely to agree to participate in either junta or NUG processes, instead choosing to chart its own course.
Wa State and Vision
Using the FPNCC as a platform, the UWSA has aligned its political aspirations with the FPNCC’s principles. In addition to this, the UWSA submitted two other documents in 2017: a proposal for a consultation process with the Myanmar government over the creation of an autonomous Wa State from the territories under the UWSA’s control and a proposal for a new ceasefire agreement. These documents illustrate the UWSA’s inspiration and vision for Wa State.
These proposals left open the question of what exactly constitutes Wa State. This has again become a live question in the current context, which the UWSA is hoping it can use to extend its territory as much as possible. Taking advantage of the weak central administration, it has already created buffer areas around UWSA-administered areas. The critical issue is whether it can link the central Wa State, which lies along the border with China, with southern Wa State, along the Thai border, over which it established control in the 1990s while fighting against a Shan insurgency alongside the Myanmar military. In its 2017 proposal for a new Wa State, the UWSA requested the inclusion of Kengtung township in eastern Shan State. This would link the southern and central Wa States, turning the eastern part of Shan State into an exclave under direct UWSA control. The UWSA attempted this territorial expansion in 2016. In September of that year, a force of 1,000 UWSA troops marched toward Mong La, an area under the control of the NDAA, creating tensions with the NDAA. A settlement with the NDAA was reached following talks between the UWSA leadership and Aung San Suu Kyi’s government.
All of this is to say that the UWSA’s territorial ambitions extend beyond the current status quo. Linking the southern and northern parts of Wa State is a crucial aim. Having been granted permission by the SAC to mobilize in northern Shan State, the UWSA will undoubtedly seize the opportunity to expand its areas of influence and control. Given these territorial aspirations, and the UWSA’s influence over the Three Brotherhood Alliance, particularly the MNDAA, since the start of Operation 1027, the UWSA now exerts possibly decisive influence in a long arc from the China-Myanmar border in the north of Shan State to the Thailand-Myanmar border in the south. This makes it the most influential and capable EAO in Myanmar’s modern history.
The Strategic Stalemate
In making its decisions, the UWSA has tended to act cautiously. In general, it has sought to maintain the status quo between the central administration, rival EAOs, and China. This strategic posture has been evident in its response to the coup and Operation 1027 offensive. While not directly involved, the UWSA has indirectly supported the MNDAA during the operation, for which the MNDAA leadership expressed gratitude in January.
By avoiding conflict with the SAC and maintaining its distance from the NUG, the UWSA has upheld its neutrality, at least officially. This neutrality has allowed the UWSA to increase its influence amidst the stalemate in the Shan State, not only among FPNCC members but also with those in southern Myanmar that are seeking supplies and arms. By preserving a relationship with the military junta and avoiding outright conflict, the UWSA’s strategic approach seems to have paid off, positioning it as a leading political entity in northern Myanmar. This unique position allows it to mediate the relations between various EAOs and the junta administration, as evidenced by the SAC’s request for the UWSA to deploy its forces in Tangyan and now in Lashio.
Despite the UWSA’s entry into Lashio, its FPNCC allies, particularly the MNDAA, are continuing their siege of the city, and the TNLA persists in its offensive in northern Shan State and parts of Mandalay Region. The critical question is whether the UWSA will allow its own alliance to become uncontrollable, potentially challenging its political influence and disrupting the new status quo. Alternatively, the UWSA might seek to maintain a stalemate in northern Shan State. Regardless of its chosen path, it is certain that the UWSA will continue to have a significant impact on Myanmar politics for the foreseeable future.
New Leadership, Rising Kingdom
The UWSA’s strategic shift is being driven by a new generation of leaders. Young and energetic leaders in their 30s and early 40s, including Zhao Ai Nap Lai (son of Zhao Nyi-lai) and Bao Ai Kham (son of Bao Youxiang), were introduced in strategic meetings with the MNDAA in April. Zhao Ai Nap Lai has succeeded his father as general secretary and head of the Politburo, while Bao Ai Kham is the UWSA’s new deputy general secretary.
These leaders, part of the generation that witnessed the fall of the Communist Party of Burma (from which the UWSA was created in 1989), bring different visions, views, and objectives. They lead the UWSA with heightened nationalism, seeking to preserve their legacy while seizing any opportunities that present themselves. However, their political ambitions may necessitate a recalibration of the UWSA’s decades-long strategy of maintaining the status quo and stalemate in the region, given the evolving political and regional context.
As China’s power grows and Myanmar’s central administration weakens, the UWSA is actively seeking a new status quo that can maximize its influence. This context is reminiscent of the rise of new kingdoms. With substantial tin deposits, rare earth elements, control over a critical juncture of Southeast Asia’s largest drug trafficking route, and the ability to produce small arms, the UWSA possesses the resources needed to achieve its strategic goals. Importantly, the Wa State territories straddle the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and are relevant to the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation platform, both of which are crucial to China’s strategic expansion in mainland Southeast Asia.
Influencing and Threats to Thailand
Given that it is considered a natural ally of China, the UWSA maintains a close relationship with Beijing and the provincial administration in Yunnan. The UWSA’s influence in the heart of the Mekong region extends Chinese influence deep into Myanmar and down to the border with Thailand.
As the UWSA grows more powerful, its political model will become more attractive to other EAOs. If Chinese efforts to mediate the current conflict secure formal autonomy and territorial concessions for the UWSA, other groups along Myanmar’s borders might adopt the UWSA’s approach and choose to come under greater Chinese influence. This development could undermine all dialogue processes initiated by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the establishment of local administrative processes by the NUG and other ethnic Interim Executive Councils, which enjoy the backing of Western countries. The UWSA’s expansion along the Thai-Myanmar border means that states and entities influenced by China could soon surround Thailand. This new player in the region poses a critical question: Is Thailand, the last remaining U.S. ally in mainland Southeast Asia, prepared for this expansion?