Nguyen Phu Trong, who was elected chief of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in 2011 and steadily established himself as the top figure in Vietnamese politics, was confident in the CPV’s divine mandate to help the one-party state achieve internal stability and, ultimately, broad prosperity for the country. In a 2014 article for The Communist Review, the mouthpiece of the CPV, Trong, who died last week at the age of 80, argued that “the leadership of the Party is the decisive factor of all successes.”
While Chinese emperors counted on the “Mandate of Heaven” to legitimize their absolute power, the CPV combines a sense of “historic mission” to bring happiness to the Vietnamese through revolutions against foreign invaders and its “absolute, direct, and comprehensive leadership” over the party-state system in order to justify its authority.
Though viewed as opaque and bewildering in the eyes of liberal democrats, Trong’s steadfast confidence in the CPV’s leadership and resilience is not inexplicable. The fundamental drive behind a ceaseless struggle for self-mastery and self-transformation, as articulated in Friedrich Nietzsche’s “Will to Power,” could offer some insight into decoding Trong’s ideological vision – or, as I would like to name it, the “Mandate of Party.”
The philosophical engine of Trong’s ardent devotion to the CPV is his genuine belief that socialism and communism would provide “a truly free, prosperous, and happy life to the Vietnamese,” for global history “exposes the economic, social and ecological unsustainability of capitalism.” He once expressed his suspicion towards Western democracy by stating that the principles of liberal democracy “do not ensure that power truly belongs to the people, by the people, and for the people.” On Trong’s watch, the CPV has sought two forms of legitimacy: performance-based (i.e. economic) legitimacy and ideological and personality-based legitimacy. After being reelected to lead the party in 2016, Trong noted that “a country without discipline would be chaotic and unstable.” Given his Soviet-educated background, he felt compelled to crystallize the party’s leadership into enforced principles and actions that adhere to Marxist-Leninist ideals.
Being cognizant of the instinctive threat of selfishness and greed, the hardline general secretary urged his party juniors to exercise self-mastery through self-discipline while avoiding wrongdoing and moral misconduct. In an interview in 2015, Trong stated with both warning and yearning that “cadres and party members, particularly leaders and managers, must lead by example, speak with action, say less and do more. Success is only possible with capable officials who are backed by a strong political ideology, impeccable morals, and a virtuous way of lifestyle”. Since then, party-affiliated outlets in Vietnam have frequently referenced his contentious mantra, “To make our Party forever live with the nation.”
Things look grim for the party leader’s steady and homespun belief. According to the Party Central Committee’s Inspection Commission, since 2021, nearly 100 high-ranking members of the Party Central Committee, including five out of the 18 members of the CPV’s Politburo, were consumed by the “blazing furnace,” the sweeping anti-graft drive engineered by Trong. With corruption within agencies and localities gradually ravaging the country, Vietnam ranked 83 out of 180 countries on the 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index issued by Transparency International. The Supreme People’s Procuracy reported that 468 corruption cases, many of which were serious and sophisticated, were filed from October 2023 to March 2024.
Hundreds of military officers, diplomatic officials, banking magnates, and high-ranking political figures have been charged with graft, illegal commercial deals, and other misdeeds. The corrupted elites’ steady ascent to riches and power has upset the public and cast a shadow over the party’s legitimacy, calling into question whether Trong’s “Communist triumph” thesis is any more than a utopian dream.
The absolute political dominance of the CPV has become contested since the state’s endemic corruption stems from individual ambitions, bureaucracy, interest groups, and the party’s lack of competence. Given the extent to which graft is an offspring of the CPV’s form of unaccountable one-party rule, both individuals and the party system are responsible for this quandary. Yet, “collective leadership and individual responsibility,” as Trong once argued, form the cornerstone of Vietnamese political culture. While corruption in the Southeast Asian nation is intrinsically a structural issue, systemic inadequacies and a culture of impunity help graft flourish unchecked. With the anti-corruption drive, Trong sought to root out rotten individuals; however, the responsibility and accountability of the system as a whole are often overlooked.
To address this lingering issue, Vietnamese leaders are expected to take great pains to embrace political and social reforms, such as improving internal inspections, maintaining a balance of power among the party’s different factions, encouraging constructive criticisms and reformist incentives among party members and those within the liberal intelligentsia, issuing protection policies for whistle-blowers, and raising wages for public sector employees in order to discourage bribery and fraud.
Following Trong’s death, the party’s leadership is unlikely to remain stable. His legacy seems set to fade given the uncertain state of the country’s leadership. Prior to his death, Trong was unable to name a successor who could steer the party wheel with the same unparalleled resolution as he did. Despite his endeavor to find an heir characterized by moral responsibility and self-cultivation, Trong failed to pin down a “truly socialist man” who met the standard of being “both red and expert,” which necessitates both a strong commitment to communist ideology and technical know-how. Some scholars have noted that it will be difficult to fill the void left by Trong’s passing given his “clean reputation, seniority, and long stewardship.”
The crucial question at this point is: who is the next in line to the throne? Trong’s death will undoubtedly create a power vacuum at the top of Vietnam’s political system. The general secretary position is important since the person who fills it wields significant power in Vietnamese domestic politics while bringing authority to other important areas, such as defense, security, and economy. There may not be an overt leadership contention; however, compromise and trade-offs might happen behind closed doors.
To Lam, the incumbent president and “a rising star within the party,” may assume more authority in the midst of internal unrest since he is acquiring more power. Lam is the interim party leader in charge of overseeing the Party Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Secretariat, putting him in a strong position to succeed Trong. Lam’s ascension is likely given that the Ministry of Public Security, which he led from 2016 until his appointment as president in May, has been a key player in Trong’s Vietnamese anti-corruption drive.
Though disputed, Trong’s legacy deserves some credit, as his directive to steer the party towards transparency and good governance has resonated with both domestic audiences and foreign investors. These investors stand to benefit from streamlined bureaucratic procedures and investment incentives, such as preferential tax rates. At home, Vietnamese social media users have blacked out their profile photos in a show of mourning for the party head, recalling his years-long efforts to eliminate graft and remove discredited officials. The anti-graft purge now appears to be irreversible, with those who choose to distance themselves from Trong’s legacy possibly facing criticisms of betraying the party’s ideals.
During Trong’s long tenure, the CPV’s stewardship of the Vietnamese economy has been sound. Since 2011, Vietnam has risen to be one of the fastest-growing economies in Asia, making its prestige widely recognized on the international stage. Also, the country’s economy has been growing steadily thanks to a spike in domestic demand and robust export-oriented manufacturing. An increase of 6.93 percent is expected in the second quarter gross domestic product compared to a year earlier, up from 5.87 percent in the first quarter.
At the same time, Trong’s anti-graft investigations have alarmed party officials, who are astute enough to understand that the authorities have closely monitored their actions. As a result, they may perform more responsibly and prudently and exhibit morality and professionalism at work. But the allure of power can lead anyone astray, particularly in situations when the costs of graft are comparatively modest and the rewards strikingly huge.
Trong’s unflinching confidence in the CPV’s supremacy and his anti-corruption campaigns will stand as the centerpieces of his domestic legacy. He was well-known for his hardline and intolerant stance towards political decay and activities that could threaten the party’s survival. In his 2023 book titled “Resolutely, persistently fighting corruption and negative phenomena to contribute to building more transparent and stronger Party and State,” he demonstrated his commitment to continue the corruption fighting by acting “even more resolutely and drastically in the time ahead.”
In short, Trong was driven by an iron will to “make the Party great.” And he communicated this aspiration by making every effort to shore up the CPV’s standing and credibility while striving to purify the party through anti-graft purges. But his passing leaves unresolved the puzzle of how the party can remain resilient while effectively navigating the coming internal turmoil. Is there a competent and fervently devoted Marxist-Leninist ideologue who can continue Trong’s purifying drive? Will his successor(s) be equally committed to furthering his vigorous anti-corruption campaign? Or will the corruption-hunting just be a means of outmaneuvering political rivals? As Vietnam enters a new political era, these questions are unlikely to go away.
The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official stance of his affiliated institutions.