On August 18, To Lam arrived in China for his first official visit abroad since becoming general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) earlier this month. According to some commentators, the visit signaled a potential pro-China shift within Hanoi. However, one should not read too much into the timing of the visit. Lam had already visited Cambodia and Laos, Vietnam’s traditional partners, after he became president in May, so China was the next logical country to visit. The visit was likely planned months ago, before the death of Lam’s predecessor, Nguyen Phu Trong, who passed away July. The timing, then, is more about diplomatic protocol than any sudden change in Hanoi’s foreign policy orientation.
Next, Lam is expected to visit New York next month, potentially for the upcoming United Nations General Assembly meeting that begins on September 10, or for the U.N.’s Summit of the Future, which kicks off on September 22. Although the future summit is technically part of the General Assembly, it is unlikely that a visiting Vietnamese delegation would want to spend two weeks in New York. Vietnam will want to send representatives to the Summit of the Future since Hanoi launched the ASEAN Future Forum this year, which aligns with the U.N. initiative.
Vietnam may send two delegations: one for the General Assembly, led by Lam, and another for the Summit of the Future, potentially led by Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, who has played an instrumental role in the ASEAN Future Forum. In New York, Lam and accompanying Vietnamese leaders, like Chinh, would likely meet with U.S. officials on the sidelines of these U.N. events. To Lam, then public security minister, was part of Chinh’s delegation to the U.N. General Assembly in September of last year.
This columnist has heard that Vietnam wants to make Lam’s trip an official state visit, which could include a meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden and his team, and potentially Vice-President Kamala Harris, the Democratic Party’s presidential nominee. No official agreement has been reached, though a full-on White House-hosted visit seems unlikely. Biden has maintained a rigorous schedule since announcing he would not seek re-election in November. As a source of mine put it, Biden is “a six-hour-a-day president now,” with limited time for meetings. Although Vietnam is important to America’s Indo-Pacific policy, it’s not significant enough to secure a place in Biden’s increasingly tight schedule, especially with him having less than three months before retirement. It’s possible Biden might travel to New York for a day next month, meaning that Lam may get a few minutes with Biden – or with Harris – on the sidelines of the U.N. meeting.
Hanoi, however, would likely not be too disheartened by such a brief encounter. Any meeting between Lam and Biden or Harris would be largely symbolic – the most crucial of photo opportunities. What they have to discuss could be covered in a minute or an hour; the important thing is that they meet. Vietnam’s “bamboo diplomacy,” which is flexible and non-aligned, relies on maintaining the appearance of neutrality. At the highest levels of diplomacy, this has settled down into a predictable routine: a Vietnamese prime minister or party chief meets with the leader of one power, followed swiftly by a meeting with the leader of another.
Last year, Biden visited Hanoi to upgrade relations to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” A few months later, Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Hanoi for his first visit in six years. In June, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Hanoi, and his hotel room was barely cold before Daniel J. Kritenbrink, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, arrived for talks. Thus, since Lam visited Beijing this month, a visit to the U.S. next month would symbolize Vietnam’s balancing act in action, regardless of how much face time the new party chief gets with Biden or Harris.
On a more practical level, the Biden administration would be wise to ensure some continuity in relations, especially if Harris wins November’s election and becomes the next president. She would likely reshuffle some departments, perhaps including the State Department. A photo-op with Biden might serve to bolster perceptions of neutrality, but the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry will also want to engage with Harris and her team. A meeting between Lam and Harris next month makes strategic sense.
The Vietnamese government was deeply disappointed when the U.S. Commerce Department decided this month not to reclassify Vietnam as a “market economy.” Hanoi could attempt to appeal the decision in a few years, a possibility that might find more traction under a Harris presidency, though it would be far less likely if Donald Trump wins in November. Indeed, Hanoi’s greatest concern is the prospect of Trump’s return to the White House.
Vietnam lobbied hard so then Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc could be one of the first world leaders to congratulate Trump on his victory in 2016. Initially, relations were warm. Phuc visited Washington in May 2017, just four months after Trump took office, and signed numerous deals with American firms, demonstrating Hanoi’s commitment to reducing its trade surplus with the U.S. Trump returned the favor by selecting Hanoi to host his ill-fated summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in 2018. But relations then soured. In 2019, Trump accused Vietnam of being “the worst abuser” of U.S. trade – worse than China – seemingly because he only then realized the extent of Vietnam’s trade surplus with Washington. His trade representative classified Vietnam as a trade manipulator, and potential sanctions were on the cards before Biden won the 2020 presidential elections and his team reversed many of Trump’s policies on Vietnam.
However, Vietnam’s trade surplus with the U.S. is now around $104 billion, double what it was in 2019. This increase probably has not gone unnoticed by Trump’s staff. There’s ample ground for Trump to accuse Vietnam of aiding Beijing in circumventing U.S. tariffs by shipping Chinese goods through Vietnam to the U.S.; analysts have noticed the similarities between increased Vietnamese imports from China and increased Vietnamese exports to the U.S. The penalties that could be imposed on Hanoi for such practices would make the denial of “market economy” status seem minor by comparison.
As Vietnam navigates these complex diplomatic waters, To Lam’s upcoming visit to the U.S., however brief or symbolic, will be a critical step in maintaining Hanoi’s delicate balancing act between major powers.