India’s Act East policy is one of the most consistent policy efforts that New Delhi has pursued since the end of the Cold War. First dubbed the “Look East Policy,” it was initially centered on ASEAN and economic engagement with the Southeast Asian region. Today, it has grown to encompass new areas of strategic engagement with several other countries, including Japan and South Korea as well as key partners including the United States and Australia. Over the years, India’s Act East policy, as the effort has been known since 2014, has sought to improve on strategic areas of cooperation including defense, which has been a nascent growing area of convergence given the increasing belligerence and competition between major regional actors.
While policy plans may signal a renewed interest and display capability and aspirations, execution largely depends on the political and regional stability of partners, especially neighboring countries.
Today, India’s eastern neighborhood faces twin challenges that have emerged as a result of instability in Myanmar, which has been in the midst of a civil war since 2021, and more recently Bangladesh, where Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was ousted by a mass movement against her government. This dynamic also impacts and exacerbates issues in India’s Northeast region, which are multilayered and complex involving ethnic conflicts, separatism, and externally fueled insurgencies.
As a result, India’s Act East policy needs a fresh policy rethink. Analyzing the current state of vulnerabilities could be the first step in identifying areas of possible vulnerability and change.
Two major infrastructure projects that were touted as flagship connectivity projects between India and Myanmar have faced uncertainty as opposition forces dealt blows to Myanmar’s army. For instance, the Kaladan Muti-modal Transit Transport Project has faced a slew of issues owing to defeats by the Myanmar military. In January to February 2024, the Arakan Army took control of Paletwa town, a key command headquarters in Chin state bordering India. The headquarters was also a logistics base for all military outposts on the borders with India and Bangladesh. More importantly, Paletwa was the major link in an inland river port and road network connecting Sittwe on the Arakan coast to Zorinpui in Mizoram. Due to the precarious security situation in and around Sittwe, in April India withdrew its consulate in the city, shifting personnel to Yangon instead.
A slew of other cross-border initiatives, such as the integrated border check post at Moreh-Tamu to facilitate cross border trade, have been shut down due to conflict in Manipur. The border crossing was also a key point of the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway. The humanitarian cost of the project is further accentuated by the negative impact on cross-border movement and trade among people on both sides. The Indian government decided to shut down the Free Movement Regime (FMR) allowing for the movement of people, often sharing ethnic ties, in the border regions.
The recent turn of events in Bangladesh has further increased the challenge for improving India’s policy toward its Northeast region – a key part of India’s Act East Policy. Amid India’s growing relations with Hasina’s ruling Awami League government from 2009-2024, a slew of connectivity projects were initiated, and old disputes set to rest. After Hasina was driven from office, Bangladesh’s turn toward an uncertain future may spell trouble for India.
A sharp anti-India turn would lead to growing competition from other players in Bangladesh’s lucrative textile industry. Moreover, strategic infrastructure projects such as the train services connecting India and Bangladesh, including freight, have been suspended, resulting in a complete stoppage of movement of people and goods between the two countries.
On the humanitarian side, there is an impending crisis on India’s borders. Individuals fleeing violence in their home countries have increased tensions in sensitive bordering states in India’s Northeast such as Mizoram. Some of these refugees may seek asylum under the new citizenship laws, which can grant asylum for people fleeing religious persecution in Bangladesh. The crisis on the horizon continues to cast a shadow on stability in India’s diverse Northeast, which has already seen protests over citizenship granted under the new laws.
India’s connectivity projects in Bangladesh have a key strategic value. The strategic vulnerability for India in the Northeast is offset by connectivity via Bangladesh. A vital connection at a regional level possesses an even greater challenge at the geopolitical level with competition between India and China. Hasina’s government had mostly favored India but also kept its doors open to China, balancing its neighborhood options. An interim government that gives more power to opposition parties closer to Pakistan and China might pose a major risk for India’s national security concerns vis-a-vis Bangladesh.
The larger geopolitical picture points to a major disadvantage for India in its eastern neighborhood. Growing contentions with China over India’s boundary in Tibet further add stress to the already unsettled and destabilizing region. Domestically, the issues in Nagaland and Manipur continue to spillover from domestic political considerations and identity-based issues onto foreign policy.
Rethinking India’s Act East Policy
In analyzing the realignment of India’s foreign policy, there needs to be a rethink in three key areas. First, there is a serious need to rethink the orthodox way of dealing with political constituents in both Bangladesh and Myanmar. Second, India’s foreign policy must factor in a humanitarian approach and the third need is to bring in the larger changing geopolitical calculation into the matrix.
First, the Myanmar army’s loss of territory to the different fighting factions in the country’s borderlands has been beyond expectation. In Myanmar, India’s traditional policy of support to the military was seen as a quid pro quo for increased security against separatist groups in Nagaland and even more so a geopolitical counterweight in dealing with China’s growing footprint along the Arakan coast. With the systematic collapse of the military’s control and the war moving closer to the Burmese heartland, India may need to consider whether to support local power centers in order to ensure more stable borders. While Naypyidaw wants unconditional support, India’s projects may not be successful or even feasible in a post-conflict state if a new chord is not struck with different groups, albeit indirectly at this moment.
Bangladesh presents an equally major, if not greater, challenge. Bangladesh’s new foreign policy adviser has been quoted as saying that while relations with India were important, they may not be the “role model” of diplomacy, as India wants it to be portrayed. India should reassess its strategy of engaging with Bangladesh. India needs to cultivate ties in the country, and should do so in whatever form possible. Going forward New Delhi may need to read the tea leaves in assessing the emerging power center and moving to develop relationships as needed.
Second, the humanitarian aspect of policy engagement will pay rich dividends in the future among the exiled and the diaspora if dealt with strategically. For instance, India continues to play a role in supporting refugees from Myanmar despite being a non-signatory to the international refugee convention or its additional protocol. While this policy has led to arbitrary handling of those fleeing conflict, it has also led to an overreliance on the judiciary in terms of deciding refugee policy directions.
The security-oriented approach in play at present could be broadened to include a more nuanced policy that may benefit India in the future. The strategic accommodation of refugees and facilitating temporary assistance would help cement a positive image of India among those fleeing conflict. Such a policy, however, continues to be mired in domestic political contention and cross border ethnic considerations. The influx of refugees from Bangladesh is much more complex and continues to arouse suspicions due to illegal cross-border economic migration and the larger facilitation of refugees from other regions including Myanmar. The sentiment toward migrants from Bangladesh in particular remains contentious in India’s domestic political scene, especially in the Northeast.
Finally, any inability on India’s part to reset ties to match current events plays to the geopolitical advantage of major powers such as China and neighbors such as Pakistan that have continued to remain antagonistic to India’s growth. China has continued to engage with various ethnic groups and even brokered peace deals in its bordering regions in Myanmar to maintain safety and security of its economic assets. A rethink of India’s policy approach will be crucial for safeguarding its interests geopolitically.
Likewise, dealing tactfully with the turn of events in Bangladesh in the long term would ensure that the countries such as Pakistan do not meddle or use Bangladesh to foment trouble in India. A regional multilateral approach could also be considered as it may have the ability to solve multiple issues such as humanitarian, security, as well as political concerns in a single forum.
The security of India’s eastern borders continues to hinge on a combination of intrinsically linked internal and external factors. India’s Act East Policy, which has seen much progress since its initiation in 2014, now stands at a major turning point. As countries in India’s eastern neighborhood see tumultuous political change, the gains that India makes in distant shores of the Pacific and the southern Indian Ocean may be roadblocked by the lack of policy innovation in addressing challenges closer home. Developments in India’s neighbors to the east remain critically important for the security and stability of the country and its foreign policy interests abroad.