A key Myanmar resistance group says that it has captured an important military headquarters in northern Shan State, in what would be the greatest defeat that the military junta has suffered since the coup of February 2021.
In a Chinese-language statement posted to its social media accounts on Saturday, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) said that it had “fully captured” the headquarters of the Northeast Regional Command in Lashio, and that “the operation to eliminate the remaining enemies achieved a comprehensive victory.”
The MNDAA also released trophy photos of its soldiers standing outside the headquarters’ gilded signboard and videos of its troops raising their red flag inside the seized base. The announcement came a week after the MNDAA prematurely announced the fall of the Northeast Regional Command, while its troops were still on the outskirts of the city.
Since then, fighting has raged in and around Lashio, the largest city in northern Shan State, which sits on a crucial artery of trade with China, as the MNDAA and its allies have forced their way into the center of the city and tightened the noose around the Myanmar military personnel remaining there. While the military State Administration Council (SAC) denied the fall of the Northeast Regional Command last week, a military source told the AFP news agency on Saturday that “soldiers who have been resisting for weeks inside the northeastern command started retreating this morning.”
Videos have been posted on social media purporting to show hundreds of junta personnel surrendering to the MNDAA in Lashio. A junta spokesperson has also reportedly confirmed that three senior commanders from the Northeast Regional Command have been detained by MNDAA.
The MNDAA began its attack on Lashio on July 3, as part of the second phase of Operation 1027, which saw the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which also includes the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Arakan Army, resume its offensive against junta positions across northern Shan State and parts of Mandalay Region.
During its first phase from October to January, the surprise offensive, named after the date of its commencement, saw the groups capture large swathes of territory in northern Shan State, including numerous towns and several important border crossings with China. The most significant of these was the MNDAA’s reconquest of the ethnic Chinese-dominated Kokang region, from which the military had expelled it in 2009.
Still, the situation remains fluid and it is hard to know how much resistance remains in Lashio itself, but it is clear that it is only a matter of time before the remaining personnel and their families are forced to resign.
The loss of the Northeast Regional Command, one of the Myanmar army’s 14 regional command centers, is perhaps the most significant achievement of the anti-junta resistance in the three-and-a-half years since the military takeover. It is the first time in the history of the Myanmar armed forces that it has lost a regional military command, and marks a humiliating defeat for junta chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing.
The implications are hard to predict with certainty, but are likely far-reaching. The junta’s losses over the past few weeks “effectively render all of Northern Shan State under the occupation of the anti-SAC resistance,” David Scott Mathieson wrote for Asia Sentinel on August 1. They will likely lead to cascading regime losses further south in Shan State and into the northeastern part of Mandalay Region, where the TNLA has also made considerable gains since launching phase II of Operation 1027 in late June. Indeed, the TNLA’s seizure of a number of key towns along the highway between Mandalay and Lashio has prevented the SAC from being able to resupply its besieged Lashio garrison.
The Irrawaddy reported that clashes were continuing in northern Shan State on Friday as the TNLA and allied People’s Defense Forces “attacked the headquarters of the junta’s Light Infantry battalions 501 and 502 outside Kyaukme town.”
The collapse of the junta’s position in northern Shan State will sooner or later bring the former British hill station of Pyin U Lwin, the location of the Myanmar military’s Defense Forces Academy, and even Mandalay, Myanmar’s second-largest city, into play. Coupled with resistance gains in Kachin State, Rakhine State, and Sagaing Region, the full collapse of the junta, at least in upper Myanmar, is now something that seems conceivable in the short- to medium-term.
There is a lot of water still to flow under the bridge, of course. As I noted last week, one of the most intriguing questions is how the various resistance groups will manage to administer Lashio. The city is both larger (170,000 population) than any they currently control, and one of the first that lies outside the territories historically governed or claimed by the MNDAA and its allies.
In addition to the challenges of basic administration (water, electricity, schools, health services, etc.), there is the question of if and how the various resistance groups involved in Operation 1027 will share the load. Rule by the MNDAA, an ethnically Chinese group, could be a potential source of tension with the city’s ethnic Shan and Bamar populations, and Mathieson reported that pro-SAC Telegram channels have been pumping out “sinophobic rhetoric” in a bid to play on common anti-Chinese prejudices.
This raises the question of whether the National Unity Government, the titular head of the nationwide resistance to military rule, and the local People’s Defense Forces, will be allowed some role in the administration of Lashio. Adding an extra layer of complexity, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), Myanmar’s most powerful armed group, also entered Lashio on July 29, supposedly in a peacekeeping capacity, in order to safeguard its own liaison office and economic interests in the city.
Victories inevitably bring challenges, and the successes of the second phase of Operation 1027 presents a stiff test of the unity and coordination between the various resistance groups in Shan State. If successful, it could create a model for how the resistance forces will govern any other major urban centers that may fall under their control in the months to come.
Then there is the question of how China, which brokered a ceasefire that paused Operation 1027 from January until June and was reportedly opposed to the resumption of the offensive, will react to the recent developments. In a paper published on August 1, Jason Tower of the United States Institute for Peace argued that the current situation is “likely to prove most beneficial to the UWSA,” which he said would “continue to expand its territorial control and authoritarian influence at a very low price while the military seems headed for collapse.”
Given the close and longstanding links between Beijing and the Chinese-speaking UWSA and MNDAA, the expanding influence of these groups in northern Shan State will likely also lead to an expansion south of Chinese influence. This is another factor that could be decisive for the course of the current conflict, and what kind of Myanmar might emerge if, or when, the military junta collapses definitively.