In two “regrettable incidents” this summer, several U.S. and Japanese nationals fell victim to frenzied stabbing attacks in China, resulting in one Chinese woman being killed while saving a school bus full of Japanese children from the assailant. While some in the country pushed for her to be posthumously granted the title of “model hero,” others resented her for being a “traitor” who “foiled revenge on the Japanese.”
These violent outbursts of xenophobia and the conflicted public reception have raised concerns about China’s rampant nationalism.
As the government scrambles to curtail online extremism, media-fueled nationalist fervor continues to permeate Chinese social life. From proclaiming Chinese cultural superiority by dismissing Western history as fake, to blatantly promoting xenophobia and antisemitism, nationalist zeal is not only captivating but profitable in the age of social media.
China hopes to leverage “homebrew” nationalism as an ideological defense to ensure its political security in an era largely defined by great power competition and weakening state power. However, this defense mechanism might be employed at the expense of China’s ability to project soft power. For example, overheated nationalism among average citizens and public officials alike is backfiring on China’s public opinion warfare and threatening its “Three Warfares” strategy.
Public opinion warfare, or today’s influence operations, is one of the three pillars of China’s “Three Warfares,” which appeared 20 years ago in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s doctrine of political work. The other two pillars are legal warfare, which seeks legal high ground for China’s interests by exploiting international legal systems, and psychological warfare, which aims to degrade adversaries’ decision-making ability and will to fight.
Some analysts consider the “Three Warfares” to be a unique approach to hybrid warfare that fits into Sun Tzu’s philosophy of “subduing without fighting.” Others regard it as the means of carrying out a much broader form of political warfare and essentially a whole-of-government effort to generate and extend political power. Public opinion warfare plays a weight-bearing role that generates legitimacy for future actions by building international public support and promoting execution of the other two pillars by exploiting mass media channels.
The second biggest economy in the world has invested a fortune in influence operations to shape its national image and sway international public opinion in its favor. Yet grassroots Chinese nationalists are diminishing the return on Beijing’s investment in public opinion warfare. Nationalistic sentiment has driven more Chinese citizens to make arbitrary interpretations of what’s good for China, often to the detriment of official government policy.
Chinese leaders couldn’t have been pleased to see the two xenophobic attacks all over the news shortly after reassuring foreign corporate leaders of a friendly domestic environment conducive to business and promoting mutually beneficial transnational cultural exchange. Actions overseas such as threatening Chinese dissidents, vandalizing cultural and religious sites, and harassing artists during public performances have likely hindered China’s attempt to narrow the “U.S.-China image gap” and “win the world’s love.”
Making matters worse for China, Chinese dissidents have been collecting, translating, and sharing these incidents on social media, circumventing the language barrier and the Great Firewall. China’s nationalists all but guarantee there will be no shortage of supply of such content moving forward.
China’s standing and legitimacy in relevant global affairs are also falling victim to the stunts of “wolf warrior” diplomats and domestic officials pandering to nationalist sentiments. Chinese ambassadors might not recognize the damage done to China’s image and legitimacy when they (for example) intimidate a local journalist on social media for investigating Belt and Road Initiative projects in Nepal or promote “mass re-education” of the Taiwanese on French national television. Mocking India’s COVID-19 death tolls and attacking Filipinos with racist slurs only further degrade China’s geopolitical standing. Parallel to the “Three Warfares,” legitimacy is regarded by some military professionals in the U.S. as China’s critical “center of gravity” in a global competition between the two countries.
From a policy perspective, there is currently a lack of systematic analyses of the impact nationalism may be having on China’s ability to project soft power or how much it may be inhibiting China’s deployment of “Three Warfares” in the context of great power competition. Random xenophobic violence against foreigners comes with geopolitical consequences beyond the risk that it could grow ultranationalism and promote further political violence. Without a thorough understanding, it could be difficult for China to pivot from the 20th century’s experience of ideological mobilization and factor this new side effect into the operational design of “Three Warfares.”
When the work of one propaganda agency undercuts that of another, it could be just as difficult for the “Three Warfares” to succeed as a whole-of-government effort as it is for the U.S. to counter it.