Embarking on a new era of trilateral partnership, the leaders of Japan, South Korea, and the United States held their first-ever stand-alone trilateral summit at Camp David in August 2023. Substantial progress is evident across multiple areas as we reach the first anniversary of the Camp David summit. To continue this new era of trilateral security cooperation, trilateral efforts and framework should be extended to creating an alternative to the Panel of Experts (POE) of the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee, which was killed in March by Russia’s veto on a resolution renewing the POE’s mandate.
Notable achievements of trilateral security cooperation include the establishment of a permanent secretariat to facilitate ongoing consultations and the signing of the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework (TSCF) during a historic defense ministerial meeting in Japan in July. This framework institutionalizes security cooperation through policy consultations, information sharing, and joint exercises.
The successful launch of the multi-domain “Freedom Edge” military exercise, the first to synchronize air, maritime, underwater, and cyber operations, symbolizes the deepening Japan-South Korea relationship. Furthermore, the activation of real-time information sharing on North Korea’s missile launches not only underscores the growing trilateral security cooperation, but also increases in strategic value and timeliness in response to the increasing military ties between Pyongyang and Moscow.
The trilateral security cooperation is not without challenges, however. As the U.S. presidential election looms, with possibility of Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the past year’s work based on the Camp David Spirit may have to again weather Trump’s transactional approach to alliances.
Trilateral resilience may also be troubled should South Korea and Japan relations turn sour again. Japan’s recent bid to list the Sado Island Gold Mines on UNESCO’s World Heritage list, for instance, is again fueling controversy. While Seoul’s consent to this long-pursued bid signaled a timely step forward for reconciliation as South Korea and Japan look to the 60th anniversary of normalized diplomatic relations next year, the South Korean government risks domestic backlash.
To sustain and uphold the Camp David Spirit, it is crucial to explore new initiatives that leverage beyond the foreseeable challenges and continue to develop the unique strengths of this trilateral relationship. One such initiative could involve developing an alternative to the POE.
The POE was the foundation of implementing U.N. Security Council sanctions imposed on North Korea. It published an annual report that revealed wide-ranging sanctions violations and evasion activities by North Korea and third-party facilitators.
Although China has implicitly expressed opposition to creating an alternative, and other countries may align with this stance, there are reasons for the trilateral partnership to remain resolute and act swiftly in finding the best path forward to ensure the continued monitoring of North Korea’s illicit activities.
First, Pyongyang is expected to intensify its illicit transactions with Russia, Iran, and other conflict-prone nations. While North Korea’s proliferation activities are not new, they have been emboldened by Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine. With just over a year remaining until the 9th Party Congress, likely scheduled for early 2026, North Korea will require substantial foreign resources and technology to expedite its five-year economic and defense development plan before the end of next year. Months of POE vacancy may have already allowed numerous sanctions evasion efforts by North Korea and its international partners to go unchecked.
Second, being directly threatened by North Korean nuclear weapons, Japan, South Korea, and the United States have a vested interest in stopping Pyongyang’s illicit transactions. Moreover, as the three major countries that have imposed unilateral sanctions on North Korea in tandem with U.N. sanctions, they have the expertise, networks, and geographical proximity to monitor and investigate North Korea’s compliance with sanctions. Not only their governmental organizations, but also non-governmental and non-profit institutions are capable of and willing to monitor North Korea’s activities.
Third, exploring an alternative to the POE aligns perfectly with the Camp David Spirit, as expressed in the joint statement of the three countries. In the statement, they reaffirmed their commitment to “the complete denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in accordance with relevant UNSC resolutions and urge the DPRK to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.” While key accomplishments should be evident on multiple fronts, prioritizing North Korea remains crucial for the trilateral security cooperation. This focus is essential if the trilateral relationship is to garner strong support from the South Korean public, which still holds divergent views about its future relationship with Japan.
Last but not least, should U.S. leadership falter on the value of trilateral cooperation in the future, it will be crucial for South Korea and Japan to have readied an alternative platform to stop North Korea’s evasion of sanctions as the prolonged vacancy of the POE weakens the role of the international community.
Establishing an alternative mechanism to ensure timely, accurate, and unbiased reporting to the international community is a challenging and complex endeavor. The following recommendations can help achieve this critical objective.
First, while it is essential for Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. to promptly initiate this process, their vision for the alternative mechanism should strive to be more multilateral, neutral, and objective. Although the revival of the U.N. Panel of Experts is not currently feasible due to opposition from China and Russia, efforts should not be hindered by these countries. Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington should start as a small but authoritative group, with their permanent secretariat – already agreed to be established – serving as the focal point. Over time, however, they should work to expand the initiative to include more like-minded countries and non-governmental organizations.
Second, South Korean, American, and Japanese experts must work with impartiality. A significant weakness of the POE was that it allowed Russian and Chinese experts to veto the publication of individual investigations, removing or undermining assessments and analyses that Beijing and Moscow found unfavorable. The first step for these three countries is acknowledging and addressing their own loopholes. A U.K.-based Conflict Armament Research (CAR) analysis early this year found that 90 percent of the electronic components recovered from the debris of North Korean missiles used by Russia originated from 26 companies in eight countries, with the United States accounting for 75.5 percent and Japan for 3.1 percent. Addressing such issues is crucial for the credibility of the alternative mechanism.
Third, Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. can enhance the alternative monitoring mechanism by aligning it with their existing unilateral sanctions and cooperative efforts, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). While each country has imposed its own sanctions on North Korean entities and individuals, inconsistencies exist across their respective lists despite the coordination that sometimes occurs between these countries. The trilateral mechanism can offer an opportunity to cross-check and harmonize these sanctions lists, making them more comprehensive. Also, by directly integrating their investigations into PSI efforts, the three countries can mutually benefit by enhancing both monitoring and efforts to stop the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction.
Lastly, to ensure the mechanism’s credibility and success, South Korea and Japan must remain steadfast in their commitment to non-proliferation. The heated debates in Seoul about acquiring nuclear weapons are understandable, if not rational, given North Korea’s ongoing nuclear development despite decades of international efforts to reverse it. However, self-nuclear arming is not a wise option if Seoul wishes to retain the moral authority to criticize and investigate North Korea’s proliferation efforts alongside its allies and other international partners. In other words, Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. should use the development of this trilateral mechanism as an opportunity to reaffirm their commitment to non-proliferation and to strengthen their collaboration within this framework.
As they celebrate the first anniversary of their enhanced cooperation, Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington should take decisive steps to make this partnership more sustainable. Establishing an alternative to the POE could be a way forward. It will not only provide a necessary and vigilant oversight of the immediate global security concerns posed by North Korea but also reinforce the joint commitments made at Camp David, ensuring a continued focus on denuclearization and non-proliferation.