The case for U.S. nuclear superiority made by several high-profile nuclear policy experts in the United States has tacitly increased tensions between Washington and Beijing. Any decision to pursue the recommendations outlined in the U.S. Strategic Posture Review to respond to China’s alleged efforts to achieve nuclear parity with the United States will only create a more uncertain and dangerous international threat environment. Hence, it has never been more crucial to understand China’s approach to deterrence, in order to bring a much-needed sense of perspective to Sino-American nuclear dynamics. More importantly, cultivating a sense of understanding is critical to attaining and maintaining peace.
This article seeks to contextualize China’s nuclear journey, and to serve as a reminder to policymakers and the general public alike that while China’s nuclear journey has been far from straightforward, China’s nuclear intentions have historically been to prevent and not to provoke nuclear conflict.
China has been a nuclear power since 1964. Up until the 1990s, China only had roughly 20 strategic nuclear capable delivery systems. Its approach to deterrence in that period, according to Nicola Leveringhaus, was not strategic, but rather can be understood by analyzing technological constraints, domestic politics, and its leadership decision-making considerations on nuclear and national security issues.
During the Cold War, China’s main strategic threats were posed by the USSR and the United States. Then, nuclear weapons served as a deterrent against any acts of aggression by the superpowers. In the 21st century, China has undertaken massive nuclear modernization and expansion. Today, China’s nuclear forces are numbered at roughly 440 warheads, and according to Pentagon estimates will number 1,500 warheads by 2035.
With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR, and the emergence of regional nuclear powers such as India and Pakistan as well as a continued U.S. threat perception, China’s nuclear deterrent is positioned to prevent acts of aggression regionally and against the United States. Indeed, according to Caitlin Talmadge and Joshua Rovner, “The specific nature of China’s improvements do seem oriented toward bolstering the country’s assured retaliation posture in response to growing threats from ever more capable U.S. counterforce and missile defense systems.”
Yet, throughout China’s nuclear history, it has consistently adopted a deterrence by punishment posture, and has stressed the importance of maintaining an effective second-strike retaliatory capability.
A deterrence by punishment posture enables China to threaten nuclear retaliation against a nuclear strike on its vital interest, and a secure second-strike capability refers to China’s ability to absorb a nuclear strike and to retaliate with a nuclear response. Both require highly survivable nuclear capabilities, and a resilient national security infrastructure, which China appears to have continually pursued.
Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, China has invested heavily in developing a triad of land, air and sea-based nuclear capabilities. While the proliferation of nuclear silos from which to launch its DF-5 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) constitutes the largest land-based nuclear build-up in China’s history, they bolster China’s strategic deterrence capability by signaling to the United States that it is investing in long-range delivery systems that can reach targets in the continental United States.
Nevertheless, as Vipin Narang observed, “The types of capabilities that China developed are consistent with a retaliatory posture aimed at deterring nuclear coercion and nuclear use.” China has also always adhered to a “no first use” (NFU) doctrine regarding its nuclear forces, precluding it from adopting an asymmetric escalation posture. That it is entirely reliant on its own strategic nuclear capabilities for deterrence also precludes it from adopting a catalytic posture, as it does not need to, nor can it rely on, a nuclear patron to intervene in crises on its behalf.
As Brandon Babin stated, “China has defined its active defense national military strategy as ‘striking only after the enemy has struck.’” Nevertheless, recent Chinese efforts to develop more nuclear options, such as theater nuclear weapons and longer-range ballistic missiles, indicate that China is potentially reviewing its deterrence posture.
Current estimates of their nuclear forces suggest that China appears to adopt a posture that includes countervalue targets, holding at risk their adversaries’ densely populated centers. The size of China’s nuclear forces logically orients it toward adopting countervalue targeting, as a counterforce posture would require a nuclear force size capable of successfully hitting an adversary’s nuclear forces.
A damage limitation approach, therefore, would simply not be feasible with their force size. As it stands, counterforce would prove ineffective for China if ever it is engaged in a nuclear conflagration with the United States. Again, Narang here is salient: “Chinese posture features…strong centralized controls, survivability through dispersed and concealed stewardship procedures and numerical ambiguity, and punitive retaliatory strikes against key countervalue targets.”
Adopting countervalue targeting enables China to effectively deter adversaries without requiring it to possess robust nuclear forces with sophisticated delivery systems. Changes in force size, however, will surely increase China’s nuclear options and will afford China with a breadth of maneuverability previously unattainable.
China’s targets also align with its deterrence by punishment posture. Its primary targets, as illustrated by its DF-1 to D-5 ICBMs, are strategic in character. These targets illustrate that China’s approach is also shaped by the fact that since the end of the Cold War, it does not face any direct existential security threats on its borders. Recent skirmishes with India have not escalated to levels of war-fighting sufficient to warrant genuine concern and are unlikely to result in the kind of direct military engagement seen in the 1969 conflict with the Soviet Union.
There is precedent – however obscure – for China to trade blows with a nuclear power: The Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969 are the only time in history that a nuclear China clashed militarily with another nuclear power. However, given that the likelihood for a recurrence of such clashes remains low, never mind the likelihood of regional nuclear escalation involving China, policymakers in the United States should not seek to pursue superiority simply to fuel a sense of insecurity in China.
Having said that, China’s main strategic concern revolves around Taiwan, and its nuclear deterrence strategy is ultimately oriented toward preventing what it refers to as a “high-intensity war” with the United States. How the next president of the United States will affect China’s calculus remains to be seen, but recent reports regarding China’s decision not to pursue arms control talks with the United States surely do not bode well for Sino-American cooperation on nuclear matters.
Whether a President Trump or a President Harris can lead to a course reversal for the better remains to be seen. Nevertheless, China’s approach to nuclear deterrence looks likely to continue to be informed by its efforts to protect its vital interests and to deter conflict with the United States, through threatening a retaliatory nuclear strike and by preserving assured second-strike capabilities.
While concerns mount over the prospect of a future nuclear conflict between the United States and China, a concerted U.S. pursuit of nuclear superiority will do little to decrease tensions with China and preserve the peace, however fragile it may currently appear to be.