To Lam, Vietnam’s state president and the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has just concluded a state visit to China, his first foreign trip since succeeding the late General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong earlier this month. China welcomed Lam with a 21-gun salute, the highest level for a head of state, after Foreign Minister Wang Yi personally greeted him at the Beijing Capital International Airport. It is worth noting that Wang did not greet other leaders such as Russian President Vladimir Putin when he visited China earlier this year, a signal of the high importance that Vietnam occupies in Chinese foreign policy.
In his meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, the two leaders witnessed the signing of 14 cooperation documents on political exchanges, trade, healthcare, banking, and infrastructure. China affirmed that it supports Vietnam’s socialist regime as well as the promotion of a form of socialism suited to Vietnam’s conditions, and that Vietnam is a priority in China’s neighborhood diplomacy policy. In return, Vietnam affirmed its “four no’s” defense policy and the important role of the Vietnam-China comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership in Vietnam’s socio-economic development.
What stood out from Lam’s visit was not just the Vietnam-China bilateral agreements. On his way to Beijing, Lam stopped in Guangzhou, a city that played a pivotal role in the history of the CPV. President Ho Chi Minh trained Vietnam’s first generations of communist cadres in the city. Lam visited the site of the headquarters of the Vietnam Revolutionary Youth League, the precursor to the CPV, and the grave of independence fighter Pham Hong Thai at the Huang Hua Gang Martyrs’ Cemetery. Lam thanked both the Chinese and Guangzhou provincial governments for their efforts to preserve Vietnam’s revolutionary history and the symbols of Vietnam-China revolutionary and traditional friendship.
In Beijing, Lam visited the Memorial House of Chairman Mao Zedong and paid tribute to the late Chinese leader. The Vietnamese President emphasized the comradeship between Mao and Ho, and expressed appreciation for China’s precious support for Vietnam during its wars of independence and unification. This is a major point to note given Vietnam’s official narrative of self-reliance, which has tended to downplay China’s contributions to its war efforts. Lam’s visits to historical sites commemorating Vietnam-China comradeship add further historical significance to the “community of common destiny” that Vietnam joined last year. Lam’s message is clear: he wants to preserve and cultivate what his predecessors contributed to Vietnam-China relations.
This demonstration of bilateral trust between China and Vietnam also exposes the relative political weakness of Vietnam’s relationship with the United States, even though both nations are comprehensive strategic partners of Hanoi. The essence of Vietnam’s “bamboo diplomacy” is to preserve communist rule, and the country’s engagement with the major powers, especially China and the United States, reflects this conscious effort. However, what Vietnam hopes to get from either country is different.
With respect to the United States, the best Vietnam can hope for is a negative assurance that the United States will not overthrow the communist regime via closer cooperation. Vietnam’s search for such a negative assurance can be seen via its emphasis on mutual respect for different political systems in all of its major joint statements with U.S. leaders. However, Vietnam’s skepticism of U.S. intentions still runs deep due to the U.S. support for many anti-communist organizations on its soil despite Washington’s recent professions of respect for Vietnam’s political system. The recent U.S. decision not to lift Vietnam’s Non-Market Economy status has only confirmed Hanoi’s skepticism.
In contrast, Vietnam-China statements do not mention the respect for each other’s political systems simply because there is no need for one. Instead, Vietnam looks for a positive assurance from China, that China and Vietnam can learn from one another’s experience in governing a communist party-state and cooperate in maintaining political stability in the face of domestic and foreign threats. In the joint statement, Hanoi and Beijing pledged to cooperate on preventing a “color revolution” and to “jointly protect political security and regime security.” The two countries’ armed forces also committed to “stand side by side” in the cause of building socialism. They both condemned any attempts to politicize human rights issues and to use those issues to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, an implicit reference to the United States.
Contrary to some suggestions that political cooperation between China and Vietnam mostly benefits Vietnam, China has much to gain from a politically stable Vietnam as well due to the two nations’ shared land border. It is worth noting that China assisted Vietnam in its wars against France and the United States for that exact reason, because China could not be safe when Vietnam was under attack. Even leaving aside its general aversion to regime change, China is more resistant to advocating for political change in Vietnam compared to the United States due to the different risks that this might pose. The United States will not have to bear the consequences of a politically unstable Vietnam because of its geographic detachment. The same is not true of China. The two countries’ determination to preserve a peaceful land border is clear in their statement, which states that both Hanoi and Beijing will work to strengthen cooperation in the border area and celebrate the 25th anniversary of the 1999 Vietnam-China Land Border Treaty.
Close Vietnam-China political cooperation does not suggest that Vietnam needs China’s support to survive as a communist country, but learning from the Chinese experience definitely helps Vietnam navigate the uncertainty of economic reforms and international integration. It is not a coincidence that during Lam’s visit, Vietnam and China agreed to expand cooperation between the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics and the Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party. When visiting the Central Party School, Lam personally remarked that Vietnam could learn from how China trained its Party cadres.
China’s decision to give To Lam the highest honor welcoming ceremony early in his tenure is an affirmation that China respects the authority of, and the orderly power transition within, the CPV. China also holds the top position in the number of foreign direct investments in Vietnam in the first seven months of 2024, while Vietnam remains China’s top trading partner in ASEAN. The trading volume is slated to increase in light of Lam and Xi’s pledge to simplify customs paperwork and enhance connectivity.
The differences in the level of Vietnam’s political cooperation with the United States and China will keep China at the top of Vietnam’s policies towards the major powers. Geographic proximity not only means that China can potentially exert massive coercive pressure on Vietnam, but also that China desires a politically stable Vietnam. The U.S. geographical detachment from Vietnam means that it cannot credibly help Vietnam when Vietnam needs, and it does not have to directly bear the costs of regime change in Vietnam.
The United States can increase its level of political trust with Vietnam by moving from negative to positive assurance, that it not only pledges to not overthrow the CPV but also cooperates more with it to maintain the CPV’s domestic authority. Until the United States can overcome its two weaknesses in its relations with Vietnam, the China factor will still serve as the principal point of departure for Vietnam’s foreign policy.