The recently concluded Lok Sabha election results heralded the return of coalition politics in India as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) lost its single-party majority in the Parliament. The BJP falling short of its expected results meant that for the first time in his political career, Narendra Modi was at the mercy of allies to remain in office as prime minister. These developments triggered widespread speculations about the future course of Indian politics.
As the government completes the first 100 days in office on September 17, it is an opportune moment to read the political tea leaves. There are five broad takeaways for observers of Indian politics.
First, the BJP has looked to project an image of strength even as voices of discord are registering themselves. The continuation of key ministers was meant to signal that a BJP-led government would provide broad policy continuity, despite losing its single-party majority. The top leadership’s behavior would give one the impression that the BJP has decided to dismiss the electoral setback. Addressing a crowd in Chandigarh, Home Minister Amit Shah boldly proclaimed that Modi will return as prime minister in 2029.
While critics might label this hubris, for the BJP, displaying any sign of weakness goes against the strongman image it has assiduously cultivated for Modi. However, while Modi remains the top politician, the impregnable halo around him has vanished. The backlash by upper-middle-class sections against the Union Budget reveals that he now enjoys less blind devotion even among his most fervent support base. Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) chief Mohan Bhagwat too launched a thinly veiled criticism of the prime minister for his statements during the election campaign. Therefore, while Modi will continue to exhibit bravado, his performance and conduct will be under increased scrutiny.
Second, the government has proven tactically adept at keeping alliance partners in good humor and has reached an amicable modus vivendi. There was concern about how Modi, with his penchant for centralization of power, would manage the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA). In contrast to the previous two terms, where it frequently steamrolled through legislation despite opposition from its allies, the government is now willing to eat humble pie when confronted with displeasure in its own camp.
The government, for instance, revoked the advertisement for lateral entry appointments, withdrew the second draft of the Broadcast Bill, referred the contentious Waqf Board Bill to a Joint Parliamentary Committee for review, and restored the indexation benefit on long-term capital gains. The alliance partners have hitherto not raised objections to the style of governance.
Both critical NDA allies – the Telugu Desam Party from Andhra Pradesh and the Janata Dal (United) from Bihar – are primarily interested in securing economic benefits for their states. The finance minister announced spending of 600 billion rupees on infrastructure projects in the Union Budget for Bihar; meanwhile, Andhra Pradesh received 150 billion rupees in financial aid through multilateral agencies. Modi will approve these indulgences as the cost to be paid to run a coalition government. The BJP can breathe easy as the allies are unlikely to bring down the government out of any ideological differences.
While the alliance looks fairly stable, the one possible bone of contention is the issue of caste. As the demand for a caste census grows, NDA allies like the JD(U) and the Lok Janshakti Party have indicated their willingness to join the chorus. These parties cannot afford to ignore the demand of backward castes whose support is critical for them in Bihar, which is scheduled to conduct elections next year. The pressure to agree to a caste census from its allies, besides the opposition, may threaten the NDA’s longevity.
Third, the opposition is emboldened after surviving an existential election. Nowhere was this on display more than in the Parliament. Having lost its single-party majority, the government cannot pass bills in the Parliament without debate and discussion, creating greater space for the opposition parties to make their voices count. The Congress party, led by Rahul Gandhi, the leader of the opposition, has emphasized social justice issues inside and outside the Parliament.
The demand for a national caste census is the top weapon in its armory for blunting the BJP’s attempt to consolidate the Hindu vote bank. The mobilization of backward castes behind a caste census gives the Congress an imprimatur of mass politics, a phenomenon that has been alien to the party in recent decades. Other key issues on its radar include the legal demand for a Minimum Support Price for farmers and pressuring the government for its perceived close association with India’s top business houses.
The Modi government’s inability to bring a structural transformation of the Indian economy and create adequate formal jobs has rendered it vulnerable to political attack. At a time of growing inequality, the opposition has decided that issues of redistribution and representation have an electoral cache. The challenge for the opposition is to display a better economic model in the states where it’s in power to convince citizens that it is a viable alternative.
Fourth, caste politics is again emerging as the strongest antidote to Hindutva. The cry for a caste census and greater distribution of government largesse along caste lines helps the opposition create a demographic coalition that undercuts the RSS’ and BJP’s work of socially engineering a unified political bloc of Hindus.
Will the BJP concede to a caste census? For the party, there are no easy options. Accepting the demand for a caste census will be an ideological defeat for the party that has been working to create a monolithic Hindu identity. On the other hand, rejecting the demand would further weaken the party’s credentials among the backward castes, who recently shifted their allegiance to the opposition in important states like Uttar Pradesh.
Hindutva has achieved many of its decade-long objectives, like building a Ram Temple at the site of a razed mosque in Ayodhya, and is now ironically a victim of its own success. While evidence suggests that the BJP will keep the communal pot boiling over issues like “love jihad,” conversion, and cow slaughter, they don’t yet have the mass galvanizing effect of the Ayodhya movement. The BJP will look for a fresh rallying cause to unify Hindus and reap electoral dividends.
Meanwhile, the opposition will work to stitch together the caste arithmetic of the underprivileged. As the contestation around identity politics looks set to sharpen, Hindutva versus caste politics will be the deepest ideological divide in Indian politics.
Fifth, while the election result has opened up space to arrest India’s descent into unchecked executive power, it has not led to an automatic reversal. Constitutional scholars like to believe that institutions keep power in check; however, it is the configuration of power that determines the behavior of institutions. A more competitive political arena has allowed independent institutions with greater room to assert themselves. The weakening of the executive power incentivizes institutions to hedge their political bets.
The Supreme Court for instance has granted bail to the opposition leader Arvind Kejriwal, which bucks the trend of the judiciary largely toeing the executive line in important cases. A sterner test for the judiciary would be whether it can stand up for constitutional values when it falls foul of the core ideological projects of the government.
Moreover, a large section of Indian media, especially TV, continues to remain uncritical cheerleaders of the ruling dispensation. It would be naive to expect a radical change in their behavior. Elites who have supported the regime hitherto out of ideological convictions are unlikely to jettison their support instantly. It is therefore premature to believe that India’s liberal democracy will be out of the woods anytime soon.
Elections in India are breathless and more political action is expected in the coming months. The BJP will look to bounce back in the upcoming state elections in Jammu and Kashmir, Haryana, and Maharashtra to drive home the message that its setback in the national election was a mere aberration. However, if the opposition emerges victorious, especially in the critical state of Maharashtra, it will bolster the impression that the BJP’s political capital is on the slide.
The challenge for the BJP may also come from civil society and social groups. While India may enjoy a reasonably healthy rate of growth, its uneven distribution will create pockets of resentment against the BJP-led government. Unemployed youth and farmers are itching for social confrontation and if economic disenchantment continues to brew, they will not be shy to take to the streets.
While the BJP will remain the dominant force in Indian politics, the opposition will act as an amalgamation of pressure groups that prevent the BJP from riding roughshod over India’s electoral landscape. After a decade of a singular booming note reverberating across much of the country, Indian politics will now sound like an orchestra of disparate tunes.