On October 6, Kazakhstan will hold a referendum on the construction of a nuclear power plant, an initiative the government of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev is strongly in favor of despite Kazakhstan’s deep nuclear scars.
From 1949 to 1989, the Soviet Union conducted some 456 nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk Test Site in Kazakhstan’s northeastern Abai Region.
Amid an extensive address delivered on September 2 opening the new parliament session, Tokayev announced the referendum date, and the next day the necessary presidential decree was issued. In his speech, Tokayev said, “Given the growing global energy deficit, we are in dire need of reliable and environmentally friendly energy sources.”
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), as of 2021, 48.8 percent of Kazakhstan’s total energy supply (TES) is provided by coal, followed by oil at 24.9 percent and natural gas as 24.7 percent. Hydropower accounts for only 1.2 percent and just 0.4 percent comes from other renewables like solar and wind.
As per the IEA, “TES includes all the energy produced in or imported to a country, minus that which is exported or stored… Some of these energy sources are used directly while most are transformed into fuels or electricity for final consumption.”
In Kazakhstan, for example, coal-fired power plants provide most electricity.
In his speech, Tokayev stated that “in my opinion, it is necessary to pay the closest attention to the development of nuclear energy” as nuclear power is “capable of largely satisfying the rapidly growing needs of our economy.”
Debate over the construction of nuclear power plants is as old as Kazakhstan. One hurdle for other states in contemplating nuclear power plant construction is not an issue for the country: uranium supply. Kazakhstan is believed to possess 12 percent of global uranium reserves and as of 2022, produced 43 percent of the world’s uranium.
The Kazakh president stressed that the possibility of a referendum has “been on the public agenda for a year.” He said that the upcoming referendum was a clear manifestation of his “listening state” concept.
Tokayev has long been in favor of nuclear power plant construction, but for a time appeared mindful of the controversial nature of such a project in Kazakhstan.
In June 2019, three months after ascending to the presidency following Nursultan Nazarbayev’s resignation and a day after being elected in a snap election on June 9, Tokayev said, “The construction of a nuclear power plant is not planned yet. If necessary, we will definitely discuss this issue with the people. If necessary, we will hold a referendum.”
By May 2021, Tokayev commented that “phobias” regarding the dangers of nuclear power were “inappropriate.” Speaking via video at the Eastern Economic Forum, Tokayev reiterated his belief that “the time has come to consider this issue in detail, since Kazakhstan needs a nuclear power plant.” He seemed at the time to be moving away from a referendum, but the January 2022 Qandy Qantar events were a shocking reminder of the power of the public. Talk of a referendum began to emerge in earnest last year.
The question – “Do you agree with the construction of a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan?” – will be put to voters on October 6.
Chairwoman of Kazakhstan’s Central Commission on Referendums (ORK) Sabila Mustafina said that 15.5 billion tenge (more than $32 million) is being requested to fund the referendum, in which more than 12 million Kazakh citizens will be eligible to vote.
Given Kazakhstan’s constrained political environment, the ultimate vote may not adequately reflect the complexity of public opinion on the issue. Referendums in Kazakhstan don’t fail: Constitutional referendums in 1995 and 2022 passed easily, and a 1995 referendum on extending Nazarbayev’s first post-independence term passed with 96 percent in favor.
As has happened before various referendums and elections, activists in opposition to the proposals have found themselves under pressure.
Last month, Meiirkhan Abdimanapov, an anti-nuclear activist, was detained in Almaty. He had boarded a bus to Astana, where he planned to participate in public debates about the nuclear power plant, when police forcibly removed him. He was reportedly held for more than 9 hours and charged under Article 488 (a violation of the law on peaceful assemblies) for participation in protests of the arrest of journalist Duman Mukhammedkarim last year. Abdimanapov was fined 129,000 tenge.
According to RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service, activists said that a public discussion of the nuclear power plant proposal in Almaty earlier in August resembled “propaganda… not a discussion.”
In January 2024, three Oyan, Kazakhstan (“Wake up, Kazakhstan”) activists were arrested in Almaty for an “illegal” picket near the Independence Monument on Republic Square.
Beyond the political question of the will of the people regarding nuclear power, even if the referendum passes the way forward is not necessarily easy. Moscow stands as the most likely partner for nuclear power plant construction in Kazakhstan. Russia is partnering with neighboring Uzbekistan on the construction of small nuclear power plants, and Kyrgyz officials have floated similar ideas.
Finally, nuclear power plants make people nervous for good reason. Accidents like the 2011 Fukushima disaster in Japan and the epitome of all nuclear diasters, the 1996 Chernobyl disaster, highlight the difficulties of nuclear risk management.
As Nazira Kozhanova wrote for The Diplomat in 2021, “Additional key problems that make ensuring the safety of nuclear energy difficult in Kazakhstan are accountability and transparency, problems that are quite common in Kazakhstan.”
Kozhanova went on to note that “problems with both the legislation and the practice of environmental affairs in Kazakhstan may impede the implementation of an accountability system for any future nuclear power plant. The systematic repression of civil society impedes the meaningful participation of citizens, and the participation that is still possible is curtailed by legal restrictions. Much of this is not taken into consideration by Tokayev’s ‘listening state.’”
As is often the case, the simple referendum question belies the myriad issues at play under the surface.