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Will Central Asia Speak Up? A Look at the Upcoming UNGA Session

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Will Central Asia Speak Up? A Look at the Upcoming UNGA Session

Central Asian nations are forming closer alliances with each other in light of the Russo-Ukrainian War, and these efforts are reflected in their recent UNGA speeches.

Will Central Asia Speak Up? A Look at the Upcoming UNGA Session

Dennis Francis (at podium and on screens), President of the seventy-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, addresses the opening of seventy-eighth session of the General Assembly Debate in 2023.

Credit: UN Photo/Cia Pak

On September 24, the high-level General Debate of the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly will be opened by former Prime Minister of Cameroon Philémon Yang. This is the third UNGA session since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. 

The annual UNGA General Debate holds particular importance for minor power states, such as those in Central Asia, as it is one of the few times that their positions are clearly heard among the booming echo of more powerful states. Moreover, the UNGA sessions are widely covered in the popular press, thus providing smaller states with a platform to speak not only to other heads of state and government officials but also to their support groups back home.

The theme for this year’s General Debate aims to address the ongoing war in Ukraine, shining a light on the continued importance of “acting together for the advancement of peace.” In recent years, the Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – have been gradually distancing themselves from Russia and have shown themselves open to deepening ties with other competing powers, such as the United States and China more overtly than before.

Last year, for instance, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan were accused of helping Russia evade sanctions imposed by the West. Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the president of Kazakhstan, arguably the most influential Central Asian country, denied these allegations, and stricter customs controls were enforced thereafter. Kyrgyzstan, however, was not as diligent at improving its trade practices (or, rather, at covering its tracks), for which five of its companies had to pay by facing sanctions from the United States. 

More recently, Kazakhstan moved even further away from Russia – and closer to the West – when it accepted serves from the United States’ Dell Technologies Inc., to further strengthen the Central Asian nation’s customs controls against “parallel imports” to Russia. 

Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, recently expressed his concerns regarding the involvement of “extra-regional actors” in the Central Asian states. He put special emphasis on Kazakhstan, whom he called Russia’s “ally” and with whom Russia “maintained warm and allied relations.” Russian President Vladimir Putin sent out a similar message to the world in November 2023, claiming that Kazakhstan and Russia “are not just allies,” but are rather “the closest allies.” This is also corroborated by the fact that Putin has regularly visited Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan, since the start of Ukrainian conflict. 

Apart from individually backing away from Russia, the Central Asian nations are also paving the road for more Russia-free regional cooperation. 

Uzbekistan is positioned very fortuitously for this task, having closer contacts with and proximity to all Central Asian nations and further distance from Russia. 

So, it comes as no surprise that Uzbekistan has been at the center of efforts to bring together the nations of the region – and initially suggested the now annual Consultative Meetings of the Heads of State of Central Asia back in 2017.

The start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, however, turned the tide, with Kazakhstan taking up the role of the main instigator of closer regional relations under the pressure (or protection) of the West. 

Just last month, Tokayev sent a clear message with his “Renaissance of Central Asia,” article, in which he called for more direct defense cooperation efforts from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and, to some degree, Turkmenistan, in anticipation of the 6th Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, which was held in Astana. 

Earlier this month, on September 8, the opening ceremony for the fifth World Nomad Games took place in Astana. The traditional sporting event brought together over 2,500 athletes. First Deputy Prime Minister of Kazakhstan Roman Sklyar gave a welcoming speech, in which he highlighted “the unity and harmony of [Central Asian] countries that have been steadfast friends, good neighbors and share common spiritual values.” 

It seems that on all fronts Central Asian nations want to show the world that they are a closely-knit region that is built on a wide range of shared values and culture – and that they are leaving Russia behind in search of better partners.

And China is listening. 

Last year, Chinese President Xi Jinping shared that Beijing is willing to support Central Asian nations through these difficult times and create more opportunities and projects for cooperation. Earlier this year, Xi visited Kazakhstan and met with the leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member states. During that meeting, more than two dozen strategic documents were approved. Many Russian partners in the energy and trade sectors, to name a few, were replaced by Chinese counterparts. 

China has been making inroads in Central Asia’s lucrative energy market for some time, and this trend only accelerated after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. For instance, much to Russia’s dismay, Turkmenistan recently dethroned Russia as the biggest liquefied natural gas exporter to China and is further deepening its ties with China.

The crippling sanctions on Russia, which have hurt its energy sector and political influence, have encouraged China to be more assertive in the Central Asian political landscape. Indeed, China is proving itself to be a viable alternative to Russia as a regional power in the whole Central Asian region. As such, slowly but surely, the orbit of influence is shifting from the north to the east of the region.

Seeing the unstable and vulnerable position that Central Asian states occupy between the West and Russia, the international community is eager to see the stance that these states will proffer in their UNGA speeches next week. 

Historically, Central Asian nations have not been ones to pick sides (or, rather, to declare their choices) in their speeches when it comes to Russian-led conflicts. 

After the outbreak of the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, for instance, Kazakhstan’s then-Foreign Affairs Minister Marat Tazhin was careful with the invocation of the concept of sovereignty in Kazakhstan’s UNGA speech, never mentioning Russia or Georgia directly. The same was done by Uzbekistan. This is similar to the speech patterns of Central Asian leaders in the aftermath of the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.

In 2021, in the midst of the accumulation of military equipment by Russia near Ukrainian borders, Central Asian states again delivered UNGA speeches in New York. Yet, their focus was not on Ukraine or the concepts of sovereignty and territorial integrity, but rather topics like Afghanistan, environmental issues, and the consequences of COVID-19. 

Tokayev’s speech that year captured Kazakhstan’s multi-vector approach best when he said, “We enjoy good relations with all [emphasis added] our immediate neighbors, the Western countries, the EU, Asian and Middle Eastern states.” 

In 2022, this proclivity to not choose sides and ignore the Russo-Ukrainian War largely continued among the Central Asian states. 

Last year’s UNGA Session, however, became a turning point as Central Asia’s leaders finally spoke up. Of course, some spoke more directly than others. 

Tajikistan made no effort to mention the Russo-Ukrainian War at all.

Uzbekistan contented itself with general phrases like “a huge increase in tension,” “deviation from international law,” and “global crisis of confidence.”

Turkmenistan was a bit more direct, with President Serdar Berdimuhamedov mentioning “the principle of the integrity of security” and talking at length about the repercussions of not solving global security issues.

Kyrgyzstan was a lot more overt. President Sadyr Japarov said:

Today the world is at a turning point. We are all witnessing and seeing with our own eyes the negative changes in the world order, increasing geostrategic competition between major powers and their blocs. 

Geopolitical tensions are leading to the fact that the world is moving towards fragmentation into regional and subregional financial and economic blocs and systems. 

It is also obvious that the governments of various countries will be compelled (or forced) to make their economic, technological and geopolitical choices.

Such a direct response to and mention of the ongoing conflict may have come as a result of pressure and punishment from the West just a month prior to the session.

Kazakhstan stood out the most, mentioning Ukraine directly and campaigning for the amplification of middle powers’ voices within the Security Council.

Tokayev said:

The resolution of political issues by force in fact results only in deadlock. Dialogue is the only way to create a conducive environment that enables agreement on new principles and norms… 

In this regard, Kazakhstan commends all the efforts and plans proposed by different states and groups of countries in support of a political settlement of the Ukrainian crisis.

Kazakhstan along with some of the other Central Asian nations are step-by-step distancing themselves from Russia, shifting the center of influence toward the West and toward the region of Central Asia itself. When the next General Debate opens on September 24, we’ll get another glimpse at this evolution.