U.S. voters will pick their next president on November 5. The choice between current Vice President Kamala Harris, the Democratic candidate, and former President Donald Trump of the Republican Party will reverberate around the world, as the two present stark differences in their domestic and foreign policy outlooks.
Governments in the Asia-Pacific are watching closely – and every country has a different stake in the election.
In collaboration with Kieskompas, the Dutch Election Compass research institute, and the University of Pennsylvania, The Diplomat hosted a pre-election tool to see which candidate best matches the personal preferences of readers from around the globe. Among the readers from Asia who participated in the quiz, their expressed preferences were 37 percent matched with Trump, vs. 60 percent matching with Harris; those from Oceania who took the quiz were 35 percent matched with Trump and 63 percent with Harris.
We also asked quiz takers if they thought their own governments had a preference. A slight plurality of users from Asia (41 percent) said they thought their government would prefer Harris, but almost as many (37 percent) said their government likely had no preference. Just 15 percent predicted their government would prefer Trump. Here there was a major break between the continents: a full 77 percent of quiz-takers from Europe thought their government would prefer a Harris presidency.
Asian governments may be paying close attention, but that doesn’t mean there is a clear favorite. Below, The Diplomat’s authors examine a selection of 13 regional countries to tease out what their government’s preferences might be. In other words, if the Asia-Pacific could vote, whom would it choose: Harris or Trump?
Australia
Bangladesh
China
India
Indonesia
Japan
Kazakhstan
Pakistan
The Philippines
South Korea
Taiwan
Uzbekistan
Vietnam
Australia
by Grant Wyeth
Until the past decade, it has been largely irrelevant to Australia who the president of the United States was. There may have been some policies from different candidates that were preferable in Canberra, but on the broader level of trust and general like-mindedness, Australia was comfortable with either a Democrat or a Republican occupying the White House.
This has changed in dramatic fashion. Although the Australian government knows to hold its tongue on the domestic politics of other states, the private consternation about a return of Trump to the presidency is an open secret.
Australia has taken a massive bet on the future stability and capabilities of the U.S. with the AUKUS agreement. AUKUS relies on not just a willingness of Washington to share technology with Australia, but on a shared worldview and steady commitment to prior agreements. Trump’s worldview and his whims may not guarantee the success of the project. Its failure would not only be a massive embarrassment for Canberra, it would leave it back at square one for replacing its aging submarine fleet, leaving the country with a huge capability deficit.
More broadly, Trump’s worldview has the potential to destabilize the Indo-Pacific in ways Australia would find threatening. His fondness for dictators, suspicion of allies, and lack of understanding of the role the U.S. plays in global stability (however imperfect), presents an enormous opportunity for revisionist actors to alter conditions in the region. Trump’s hostility toward democracy, the rule of law, and constitutionalism also send strong global signals that these institutions are able to be subverted and degraded.
Were Harris to win the election, Australia would be highly relieved. Harris is someone who Australia can easily work with. She will honor U.S. commitments to allies and institutions. She is someone who will surround herself with serious people, and expect quality information to make decisions with. She represents the stability that Australia requires from its primary security partner and third largest trading partner (with Trump’s proposed tariffs also being of great concern to Australian exporters).
Australia fears both the chaos Trump will create if he wins, and the chaos he will create if he loses. The latter, however, will hopefully only be temporary.
Bangladesh
Bangladesh’s relationship with the Biden administration grew increasingly strained in the final years of Sheikh Hasina’s rule. The Biden White House was closely monitoring human rights in Bangladesh and put pressure on the Hasina government by imposing sanctions on the Rapid Action Battalion in 2021 over allegations of human rights abuses. Many in Bangladesh also believe that the U.S. quietly supported the anti-Hasina protests leading to her ouster. Russia had warned Hasina last year in December about external interference, hinting at possible U.S. involvement in the country’s political upheaval.
Bangladesh is now ruled by an interim administration, led by Muhammad Yunus, which has pledged democratic reforms. At the 2024 United Nations General Assembly, U.S. President Joe Biden embraced Yunus, highlighting the restoration of Bangladesh-U.S. relations that were derailed during the Hasina years, and signaling Washington’s backing of Yunus’ democratic transition efforts. Harris, as Biden’s vice president and the Democratic Party’s nominee, is expected to continue Biden’s focus on human rights and democracy.
Many in Bangladesh retroactively view Trump’s presidency as a period of economic pragmatism in the bilateral relationship. During his tenure, there was a stronger emphasis on trade and economic partnerships, with less criticism of Bangladesh’s internal politics.
For a country whose economy heavily relies on the ready-made garment industry – a sector employing over 4 million people and accounting for a significant portion of trade with the U.S. – economic stability is crucial. The Trump administration’s more transactional approach to foreign policy, prioritizing economic growth over governance concerns, allowed Bangladesh to navigate global markets with fewer complications.
However, a second Trump presidency could encourage a weakened Awami League to lobby its way back into political relevance. The party, which still wields strong influence and has deep connections, money, and might, could find a friendlier environment in Washington under Trump.
Bangladesh’s regional positioning adds another layer to its preferences in the U.S. election. Under Hasina, Bangladesh deepened economic ties with China, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). A Democratic president’s tougher stance on China could complicate Dhaka’s balancing act between its key partners. In contrast, Trump’s silence on China’s activities in Bangladesh could allow Dhaka more flexibility in its foreign relations.
Although the interim government has not indicated a preference between the U.S. presidential candidates, it is clear that a Trump presidency may allow more breathing room economically and be less critical of governance. But with Yunus at the helm and Washington’s current focus on supporting democratic transitions, there is equally strong a case for Bangladesh to lean toward a Democrat presidency.
China
For China, the choice between Harris and Trump is a bedeviled one. As numerous commentators have pointed out, many of the policies that Beijing sees as “containment” began under Trump and expanded under Biden: tariffs on Chinese imports, export controls on semiconductors, the resurrection of the Quad. The biggest difference is in tactics.
The Biden administration has put more emphasis on convincing allies to jointly pursue its China policy goals. Trump, meanwhile, often alienated these same allies, aggressively pressing NATO members as well as Japan and South Korea to pay more for U.S. military support. Trump also targeted not only China but also U.S. partners with tariffs.
It’s also worth nothing that many of the Trump administration’s hawkish China policies were argued for and supported by other figures in the Trump administration, like Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Deputy National Security Adviser Matt Pottinger. It’s unclear if any of these officials would return. Trump’s own views on China (as on many subjects) are contradictory, veering from admiration for President Xi Jinping to lambasting China for “malfeasance.”
With Harris, there’s reasonable confidence that she will continue the Biden administration’s policies. From China’s perspective, we might call Trump the “high risk, high reward” scenario.
The risks for China are obvious: He has threatened to slap astronomical tariffs on imports from China (and elsewhere) and seems dangerously cavalier about the prospect of nuclear war. The potential downside, then, is worse than under a Harris administration.
Yet the potential upside for China is also higher under Trump. He could shred U.S. relationships with allies and partners, which are crucial to an effective global response to China’s rise. And Trump is unlikely to pay much attention to fostering goodwill in the Global South, given his dismissal of African nations as “shithole countries.” That could cement Beijing’s sway in the developing world, while also forcing U.S. partners in Europe and Asia to drop their harder line on China as Washington itself attacks their interests.
Finally, while Trump has pledged more tariffs, meaning an intensified trade war is likely, he also has a tendency to try to cut deals to “solve” issues once and for all. Witness the ill-fated “Phase One” China-U.S. trade deal, for instance.
So for China, the choice boils down to an uncomfortable status quo – “the devil you know,” so to speak – or a wild card that could potentially improve Beijing’s position in the China-U.S. competition but also could tank both countries’ economies. The real question, then, is whether Chinese leaders are risk-takers, willing to gamble on an unpredictable Trump administration.
Given China’s own domestic difficulties, stability is the preferred path, even if a Harris administration is no friend of Beijing’s.
India
Indians are watching the U.S. presidential elections with more interest than in the past as the Democrat nominee, Harris, is partially of Indian origin. While ordinary Indians would like to see a person with Indian roots make it to the most powerful post in the world, few expect Harris’ origin to determine her policies or benefit India.
As for the Indian government, when asked about India’s preference in the upcoming U.S. presidential election at an event in New Delhi on August 13, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar said, “We have every confidence that we will be able to work with the president of the United States, whoever he or she will be.”
Indeed, the Narendra Modi government should be able to work with whoever occupies the White House next. Despite the deep political polarization in the United States, there is a strong bipartisan consensus on the importance of building strong relations with India. As a result, the India-U.S. relationship has deepened over the past two decades under successive U.S. governments, both Democrat and Republican.
This bipartisan consensus has grown largely because of the importance that the U.S. accords India in its efforts to contain a rising China. Consequently, the Indian establishment is confident that whether Harris or the Republican candidate, Trump, becomes the next U.S. president, India’s relations with Washington will not suffer disruption.
However, there are reasons why the Modi government is likely to prefer one over the other.
Both Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Trump are social conservatives, who are comfortable dealing with “strong,” or rather autocratic, leaders. They worked together when Trump was previously president and gel well. Trump remains effusive in his praise of Modi.
However, as president, Trump froze H1B visas, which hit India’s IT industry particularly hard. He also terminated India’s preferential access to U.S. markets over its high tariffs on American products. He has promised to impose reciprocal taxes on India if reelected. He is also expected to reimpose the freeze on H1B visas, which Biden lifted. A Trump presidency could therefore spell bad news for India in the fields of trade, technology, and immigration.
Harris is likely to broadly continue Biden’s foreign policy to India. She will therefore continue building resilient supply chains, and deepening trade and advanced technology cooperation with India.
Harris is also likely to continue Biden’s opposition to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Modi had ruffled feathers in the Biden administration over his proximity to Putin on the Ukraine crisis, and differences on this issue are likely to be a “complicating factor” in the bilateral relationship in a Harris presidency.
However, the Indian establishment sees Harris’ progressive-liberal views and her willingness to air these views as the most problematic for bilateral relations. She is expected to be less accommodating than Biden in her approach to the Modi government’s domestic policies and actions, especially toward religious minorities and democratic rights. The Modi government is known to be extremely prickly in response to criticism of its policies, especially to censure from the West. This makes a Harris presidency a less welcome partner of the Modi government than Trump in the White House.
Indonesia
Indonesia, a country of over 270 million, is one of the world’s foremost emerging economies and is projected to rank in the top five by the middle of the century. With that in mind, Indonesia’s relationship with the United States is one to watch, particularly in light of the upcoming U.S. election.
As Americans go to the polls, Indonesia itself is in a state of flux, witnessing a change of administration with the departure of former President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and the advent of President Prabowo Subianto, who was sworn in on October 20.
Prabowo has mostly enjoyed a conducive relationship with the United States in recent years, although he was banned from entering the country in 1998, following allegations of gross human rights violations including the abductions of student activists during the reign of former president Suharto, when he served in the Indonesian military.
Prabowo has always denied any allegations of war crimes and human rights abuses, and the U.S. travel ban was lifted in 2020 when he was appointed minister of defense by Jokowi. His new role necessitated a thawing of relations with the United States, which is likely to continue following the U.S. election.
Prabowo traveled to the United States in 2023 and signed defense agreements that included joint military exercises and enhanced maritime security. The Indonesian government and the U.S. aircraft maker Boeing also agreed on a sale of some 24 F-15EX fighter jets to be sent to Jakarta following the visit.
In June 2024, Prabowo again met with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and the pair discussed a possible lasting ceasefire in Gaza, including the potential for Indonesia to assist other countries looking to mediate between Israel and Palestine.
As the largest Muslim nation in the world, Indonesia has long supported the Palestinian cause, and in recent years has looked to foster a role mediating in other international disputes, including the Russia-Ukraine war, with Jokowi traveling to the two countries during his presidency with a view to brokering a peace deal.
That said, while Indonesia continues to be involved in developments on the world stage, the new Indonesian administration likely does not have strong views on whether Harris or Trump should win the U.S. election. This is largely due to Indonesia’s “bebas-aktif” or “independent and active” position on foreign affairs.
Indonesia was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1960s, against the backdrop of the Cold War, and has endeavored to stay neutral on wider foreign policy, refusing to align itself with any major power bloc.
In this context, the new administration will likely continue this position with the new U.S. president, with a focus on working with the United States on wider issues of trade, military sales and training, and other strategic partnerships.
Japan
Japanese government officials avoid commenting on the U.S. presidential election because they respect the United States’ domestic politics and don’t want to be seen as meddling in it. But in their heart of hearts they would most likely prefer a Harris administration to a second Trump administration.
The biggest reason is that Harris will basically take over the Biden administration’s foreign, security, and economic policies. The bilateral relationship between Japan and the United States is now extremely smooth sailing, and the Japanese government would prefer to maintain the status quo under a Harris administration.
As stated in the April 2024 Japan-U.S. Joint Leaders’ Statement, the alliance “reached unprecedented heights” under Biden and former Prime Minister Kishida Fumio.
With strategic competition with a rising China in mind, the Biden administration has been working hard to strengthen not only individual cooperation with its allies but also ties among allies themselves. With the United States and Japan at the core, it has enhanced cooperation with Australia, the Philippines, and South Korea, as well as the Quad, a four-nation cooperation framework with Australia and India.
On the other hand, Trump’s foreign and security policies often get discussed as isolationist for his skepticism of allies, or as realist for his singular focus on national self-interest. Trump also has a strong mercantilist streak, with a preference for cold cost-cutting and an obsession with trade deficits.
“Trump’s notion is that U.S. security interests are divisible from that of other states and regions, meaning the U.S. peace and prosperity can exist separately from the rest of the world,” Mori Satoru, a professor at Keio University, pointed out at Foreign Press Center Japan on October 11.
Japan is surrounded by three nuclear-armed nations: China, North Korea, and Russia. As a worst-case scenario, it must prepare for simultaneous emergencies on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. In such an increasingly dire security environment, Tokyo needs Washington as a reliable and stable ally.
But many in Tokyo believe Trump’s basic notion is that if you want to get more protection from the United States, you must pay us or buy more from us.
Tokyo still remembers news reports in 2019 that the Trump administration requested about a five-fold increase in the cost of stationing U.S. troops in Japan, which Tokyo flatly rejected. The Japanese government may be afraid of this sort of a one-sided and unreasonable request by a second Trump administration.
But there are still some optimistic views that even if Trump wins, new Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru will be able to build a good relationship with him.
“Ishiba and Trump use the same [mental] operating system. I think they are surprisingly on the same wavelength because they think alike,” Sato Masaru, an ex-chief intelligence analyst at the Foreign Ministry of Japan said in a speech in Tokyo on October 2.
Could an Ishiba-Trump era be the same as the golden days of Abe-Trump?
Kazakhstan
The beating heart of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has long been the rather clunky term “multi-vector.” This perspective – in which all relations are balanced on the fulcrum in Astana – arguably would influence Kazakhstan’s opinion on the U.S. election, if Astana were to have one. Regardless of who occupies the White House, U.S. policy with regard to Central Asia writ large, and Kazakhstan, in particular, is unlikely to change markedly.
The present U.S. strategy on Central Asia, for 2019-2025, was released in February 2020 under the Trump administration and broadly welcomed in the region as it sought to bolster trade relations with a strong emphasis on the region’s independence. But it was Biden who convened the first meeting of the C5+1 at the presidential level on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in 2023 – a remarkable meeting given the steady drum-beat of democracy promotion from the White House under Biden and the arguably undemocratic nature of the region’s regimes, including Kazakhstan’s.
Where changes are possible with the inauguration of a new U.S. president are on the margins and in regard to tone and perception.
And here Kazakhstan’s political elites may, indeed, have a preference. No matter how many failed business ventures can be attributed to Trump, he is still widely viewed as a “successful businessman” and that carries a certain cachet that Harris – unknown in Central Asia, decidedly not a involved in business, and a woman to boot – cannot match.
Since assuming the presidency in 2019, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has made three working visits to the United States – all of them to New York in conjunction with the annual U.N. General Assembly in 2019, 2022, and 2023. If Tokayev has any hope of making an “official” visit to Washington – the kind Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev got to make in 2018, replete with a presidential meeting at the White House – it would most likely happen under Trump. To date, no Central Asian president has been invited to make a state visit to the United States, and no U.S. president has visited Central Asia while in office.
Trump infamously lionizes strongmen and autocrats. He’s called Russian President Vladimir Putin a “genius” and Chinese leader Xi Jinping “brilliant.” He’s unlikely to carry on Biden’s pro-democracy push, whereas Harris’ official platform pledges she would “stand up to dictators.” This tonal difference has had little impact on actual U.S. policy toward Central Asia, but it does influence how those policies are received in Central Asia.
Kazakhstan is far from a top priority in Washington, and that won’t change anytime soon. But the Central Asian region is adjacent to some of the United States’ most critical foreign policy challenges, in the forms of China and Russia. Adjustments in U.S. relations with China and Russia would necessarily alter conditions for Kazakhstan too and, if given a vote, this would likely factor into the choice as well. While there has been continuity in policy with regard to China between Trump and Biden, it is with regard to Russia that a change in president could yield a change in policy that would release some of the pressure Astana has felt given its close relations with Moscow.
Pakistan
by Umair Jamal
With the U.S. election just weeks away, Pakistan’s government is closely monitoring the two presidential candidates, especially Kamala Harris of the Democratic Party. The prospect of her victory holds significant implications for Islamabad, as it could foster a continuation of the current state of relations between Pakistan and the United States.
Under the current U.S. administration led by Biden and Harris, the relationship between Islamabad and Washington has evolved into a relatively stable partnership. Key military stakeholders and government officials in Pakistan are satisfied that the current Democratic Party government in the United States has shown support for the newly elected government in Pakistan. This support seemingly includes a tacit understanding that Washington will refrain from openly criticizing the Pakistani military’s stringent measures against political opposition, notably concerning former Prime Minister Imran Khan and his party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf.
There remains uncertainty about what concessions or assurances Pakistan may have provided to the U.S. to gain the existing support for its current governing setup.
The Biden-Harris administration has allowed space for an atmosphere where both nations seem to be committed to expanding security and financial cooperation. They are aligning efforts to combat terrorism threats within the region, including from groups such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Islamic State Khorasan Province, al-Qaida, and other militant organizations. This collaborative approach marks a significant shift toward a more comfortable state of affairs between Pakistan and the U.S.
Moreover, during the Biden-Harris administration, Pakistan successfully secured Washington’s backing for its recently approved International Monetary Fund deal. Notably, this support came without active pressure from the U.S. regarding Pakistan’s expansion of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor or its ties with Beijing – a sensitive issue for many stakeholders in Washington.
While Pakistan’s relationship with the United States has not undergone a significant transformation under the Biden administration, it also hasn’t deteriorated.
Equally, there are concerns in Islamabad regarding a potential return of Trump to office. The civil-military leadership in Pakistan fears that such an outcome could push bilateral relations back into an era of unpredictability – one marked by a return to the severe cuts to military financial aid and training programs seen during Trump’s previous tenure. The apprehension surrounding Trump’s possible re-election highlights how crucial it is for Pakistani officials to navigate their diplomatic strategy carefully amidst shifting political landscapes in Washington.
Trump’s return to the White House could complicate the already delicate bilateral relationship, necessitating a recalibration of Islamabad’s approach toward Washington. The previous administration under Trump was marked by fluctuating policies and rhetoric that often strained ties, making the prospect of his return concerning for Pakistani officials.
In contrast, Harris’s candidacy is viewed in Pakistan as an opportunity to build on existing frameworks and engagements that have been established in recent years. Her platform promises a more stable diplomatic environment that may prioritize collaboration over confrontation. As Pakistan navigates its foreign policy objectives, Harris’ candidacy seems to align with its interests in maintaining constructive dialogue and cooperation with one of its key allies.
The Philippines
Philippine President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. has not endorsed any candidate in the U.S. presidential election, but it is noteworthy to mention that he developed closer relations with the Biden administration. It may be assumed that his Cabinet is hoping that this working relationship will continue under a Harris presidency.
Consider what Marcos and Biden achieved after the former became president in June 2022: The U.S. now has access to nine military facilities in the Philippines after Marcos granted four new locations under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement; the two governments signed the Bilateral Defense Guidelines in May 2023, which affirmed their security partnership; and they joined Japan in a trilateral summit in April 2024, which led to the unveiling of the Luzon Economic Corridor.
Marcos has repeatedly stated that he shares Biden’s vision for a stable Indo-Pacific region. For his part, Biden reiterated the U.S. government’s “ironclad commitment” to defend the Philippines from external threats. This mutual assurance translated into regular and bigger joint military exercises, the deployment of inter-range missiles by the U.S. in the northern Philippines, and the stronger pressure exerted by U.S. allies in calling out China’s incursions in the maritime territories of the Philippines.
Harris has been an active enabler of closer relations between the two governments, having visited the Philippines twice as vice president and met Marcos on multiple occasions.
Will a Trump presidency lead to the reversal of the security deals initiated and reinvigorated by the Biden administration? Not necessarily, but Trump’s unpredictable policy actions could hold back the Marcos government in implementing these agreements. There might also be a brief period of uncertainty about Trump’s foreign policy direction, which could slightly affect the status of U.S. forces stationed in the Philippines.
The previous Trump administration didn’t weaken the relationship of the two countries even if the Philippine president at that time, Rodrigo Duterte, openly announced that his government would pivot toward China. But the supposedly pro-Beijing stance of Duterte didn’t invalidate the various defense-related pacts of the two countries. Duterte briefly suspended the Visiting Forces Agreement but his term ended with all the major military deals with the U.S. remaining intact. Proof of Duterte’s cordial relationship with Trump was his public endorsement of the latter’s candidacy, although this was announced when Biden was still the Democratic nominee.
Either a Trump or Harris presidency is expected to endorse the security framework rolled out by the Biden administration when it comes to strengthening the Philippines-U.S. security partnership, which is anchored on the principle of maintaining influence across the Indo-Pacific while countering the rise of China and its belligerent actions towards its neighbors in the region.
Between the two candidates, Harris represents continuity, which could be more favorable for the Marcos government whose term will end in 2028. The Dutertes, who are now publicly feuding with the Marcoses and are aiming to reclaim power, have already endorsed Trump.
As for opposition forces in the Philippines, mainstream parties have echoed the government’s narrative about securing U.S. support to reject China’s wholesale claim of ownership over the South China Sea. But nationalist forces that led the successful campaign for the expulsion of U.S. bases in 1991 are wary of the increasing U.S. military presence in the Philippines, and these groups have been asserting that instead of siding with either Harris or Trump, the government should instead pursue an independent foreign policy.
South Korea
by Mitch Shin
In the past, a presidential election in the United States was not a big issue for South Korea. No matter whether Republicans or Democrats won the election, Seoul had no choice but to actively work with the new U.S. governments, as its security has been highly dependent on the U.S. military assets and the U.S. forces stationed on the South’s soil since the end of the 1950-53 Korean War.
Also, as North Korea has consistently developed its nuclear program over the past 20 years, especially during the Kim Jong Un era, every South Korean president vowed to strengthen ties with the U.S. to deal with security threats posed by North Korea.
For Washington, it has also been crucial to maintain strong alliance with South Korea and Japan, its like-minded allies in the East Asia region, to cope with China’s rising leverage not only in the region but also in worldwide. Under both Democratic and Republican presidents, South Korea has been a key partner for the U.S. in achieving its strategic goals in the region.
However, there might be a preference in Seoul at this time.
Since South Korea experienced Trump’s “America First” approach during his first term as president, it would be no surprise if Seoul prefers working with a prospective Harris administration. There is a possibility of Trump making gestures that could weaken the alliance again if he is reelected. In particular, he may attempt to make South Korea pay more in defense sharing costs.
Although South Korea agreed to raise its share of the cost to support the U.S. troops stationed in South Korea by 8.3 percent year-on-year in 2026, Trump signaled that he would order his team to renegotiate this defense cost sharing with South Korea. In his mind, South Korea is a “money machine” and would have paid $10 billion every year if he had been president for the last four years (Seoul currently pays around $1.1 billion per year). Trump also said that he tried to make South Korea pay $2 billion a year after then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in opposed his initial demands for South Korea to pay $5 billion.
Considering current South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s policy on North Korea and his attempts to increase Seoul’s leverage in the international diplomatic stage, he would prefer working with a U.S. counterpart who supports his initiatives. Also, in light of his chemistry with U.S. President Biden, the Yoon administration would not have to conduct a policy review on the United States if Harris wins the election, as her policy on the two Koreas is expected to be similar to the one the Biden administration initiated.
Thus, Seoul would want to work with Harris as a reliable partner who can smoothly work with the Yoon administration.
Taiwan
by Brian Hioe
As with other countries, Taiwan has sought to hedge its bets regardless of either a Trump or Harris victory, to ensure ties with either possible administration. Nevertheless, it is also clear that Taiwan has severe anxieties regarding the possibility of a Trump win.
Trump was originally seen in a positive light in Taiwan, especially as he was willing to take an unprecedented phone call from then-President Tsai Ing-wen after his 2016 victory. In the early years of the Trump administration, with the start of the China-U.S. trade war, Trump was perceived in the mold of traditional Republicans tough on China due to anti-communism.
Yet in the years since, Trump has acquired a reputation for unpredictability in Taiwan. Trump’s comments comparing Taiwan to the size of a pen and China to the size of the Resolute desk used in the Oval Office were widely reported on. Suggestions by Trump that he might trade away Taiwan in order to secure more favorable terms in negotiations with China angered the public.
International reactions notwithstanding, the August 2022 visit to Taiwan by then-U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi did much to improve perceptions of Democrats in Taiwan. Historically, Taiwan has favored Republicans because of the perception that they were tougher on China, while Democrats were viewed as more interested in establishing trade ties with China. This was the case even as support for Taiwan became increasingly bipartisan.
At present, Harris is generally viewed as a safer bet than Trump, simply because Trump is viewed as dangerously unpredictable. This is the case even though relatively little is known about Harris, and even as DPP governments have continued to cultivate ties with former Trump administration officials such as Nikki Haley, John Bolton, Mike Pompeo, and Kelly Craft.
Some voices influential on policy take the view that a second Trump administration would probably continue to take a strong stance on China, pointing to the fact that the first Trump administration did not break from precedent as much as anticipated. Trump also continues to have adherents who continue to perceive him as a consistent critic of China, downplaying times when he has suggested close ties of friendship with Chinese President Xi Jinping. But Harris is probably preferred by default in light of Trump’s unreliability.
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan, like other Central Asian nations, does not feature prominently on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. The region remains relatively stable, with no active wars, escalating conflicts, or crises such as widespread famine or disease that would demand urgent international intervention. Given this relative calm, it’s unlikely that U.S. foreign policy toward Central Asia, including Uzbekistan, will shift dramatically between administrations. So, whether it is the Democratic or Republican government, Uzbekistan leans toward neutrality, preferring to maintain a steady relationship.
But Tashkent might slightly favor a Trump victory for a few reasons. For one, under Trump’s administration, the United States is likely to place less emphasis on furthering the country’s human rights records and democratization process, leaving the internal governance to Tashkent’s own terms and prioritizing direct bilateral relations. In contrast, Harris is expected to continue the Biden administration’s focus on human rights, democracy, and multilateral engagement, likely leading to increased scrutiny of Uzbekistan’s internal affairs.
However, the C5+1 format has gained greater prominence under Biden, and a Harris presidency could bring a more focused approach to regional cooperation and long-term development in Central Asia.
During Trump’s presidency, in 2018, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev made an official visit to Washington, marking the first such trip by an Uzbek leader in 16 years. However, this milestone more reflected Uzbekistan’s attempts to showcase reforms in its internal and external politics following the government change in 2016 rather than a change in Washington’s position toward Uzbekistan. While other Western leaders, like French President Emmanuel Macron (in 2023) and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz (in 2024), have made official visits to Uzbekistan, neither Trump nor Biden (nor any other U.S. sitting president) has ever done so.
Prior to Mirziyoyev’s visit, the White House had welcomed Uzbek President Islam Karimov twice, with his last visit taking place during George W. Bush’s presidency in 2002. At that time, the Bush administration appreciated Karimov’s cooperation in the context of broader U.S. engagement in Central Asia, particularly due to the U.S. military presence at Uzbekistan’s Karshi-Khanabad air base, which was used to support military operations in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2005. The strategic importance of Central Asia for the U.S. has been renewed in light of the Russia-Ukraine war, China’s aggressive economic expansion into the region, as well as the region’s close proximity to Afghanistan and Iran.
Another factor is the region’s relationship with Russia, a key strategic ally for Uzbekistan in both security and economic matters. If Trump were to foster more amicable Russia-U.S. relations directly, there will be less significance attached to Central Asia in U.S. policy, but also less pressure. For Tashkent, it could be a chance to strengthen its position without navigating the strained Russia-U.S. tensions, especially in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war.
In either scenario, the United States’ policy toward Uzbekistan or toward the region will not drastically change and for Tashkent, neutrality remains the best choice.
Vietnam
As in much of the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. presidential election will be watched closely in Vietnam, a nation that has seen considerable forward progress in its relations with the United States over the past four years.
While Vietnam’s diplomatic discretion has prevented the country’s leaders from expressing any views on the U.S. election, it is unlikely that they have much of a preference for either Trump or Harris. The structural factors underpinning the relationship suggest that relations with the U.S. will continue along their current trajectory no matter who wins the White House on November 5.
Relations between Vietnam and the U.S. have improved steadily under both the Trump and Biden administrations. Increasing U.S. tensions with China have highlighted Vietnam’s strategic importance, and increased its prominence in the minds of U.S. policymakers. At the same time, Vietnamese leaders, eager to reduce their nation’s dependence on China, have made decisions to widen and deepen the relationship with Washington, a process that culminated in the establishment of a U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership last year. They have also leapt at the opportunity to attract U.S. and Western businesses that, sensing a shift in the strategic winds, have begun to diversify their manufacturing operations away from China.
There have been points of friction and misalignment under both administrations. Under Trump, the U.S. Treasury Department and U.S. Trade Representative’s office officially labeled Vietnam a currency manipulator, accusing it of improperly intervening in foreign exchange markets to advantage its own exports, and imposed tariffs on a limited number of Vietnamese imports.
Vietnam has also attracted the scrutiny of the Biden administration for acting as a manufacturing for Chinese-made goods hoping to avoid U.S. tariffs. The U.S. Commerce Department this year also refused to recategorize Vietnam as a “market economy,” a decision that was met with disappointment in Hanoi.
The fact that relations have continued to trend upward under two very different presidents suggests that they are premised on structural rather than personal factors. As a result, Vietnamese leaders recognize that relations with the U.S. will remain strong, despite occasional disagreements, whoever occupies the White House.
The one thing to which Vietnam is particularly sensitive is any sudden lurch in U.S. relations with China. The country’s multilateralized and diversified foreign policy is designed in large part to strike a steady balance between China, the United States, and other major powers – and under the past two U.S. administrations it has managed the balancing act with considerable aplomb.
Last year’s diplomatic upgrade with the U.S. was accompanied by considerable efforts to reassure Beijing that the move was not directed at China. It was also carefully nested within a broader deepening of Vietnam’s diplomatic relationships with other important countries, including Australia, Japan, and, most recently, France. A turn toward more intense confrontation or accommodation by a future U.S. administration could complicate Vietnam’s ability to maintain this diplomatic balance.
However, neither Trump nor Harris has done much to suggest that they differ much on how to approach China. Trump’s adversarial, hawkish stance has become the subject of a broad bipartisan consensus, and intensifying strategic competition – even a new “cold war” – seems likely to be a feature of the international system over the long term regardless of who wins the election. Indeed, this is something that Vietnamese strategists and policymakers have already factored into their predictions. From their perspective, the difference between Trump and Harris is therefore likely to be one of degree rather than kind.