The defense news agency Breaking Defense published an analysis on November 22 provocatively titled, “After watching Ukraine, Central Asian nations’ turning away’ from Russia for arms: US officials.” The article quotes an unnamed U.S. State Department official, who explains that “Washington has seen a ‘very high level’ of interest in American-made defense products, platforms, and services” from the Central Asian nations.
Earlier this month, Donald Lu, assistant secretary at the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, said during a panel at the Center for New American Security that as Central Asian governments turn away from Russia for military technology, “they’re not just looking at China, they’re looking at Iran, they’re looking at Europe, they’re looking at the United States.”
The unnamed State Department official cited in the Breaking Defense piece noted potential barriers, like U.S. reluctance to sell high-tech defense equipment to governments with well-known close relations with Moscow and Beijing.
“The Central Asians, though, are again very interested in our particular products; it’s really just a matter of making a good match,” the official said.
The more limited defense budgets of the Central Asian states is another challenge. Thus, instead of selling high-tech equipment like F-35 fighter jets, the U.S. official has seen “very precise requests,” the article explains, like “the sort of smaller capabilities that tend to fill niches they have.”
Breaking Defense lists examples like uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), radars, small arms, and ammunition as potential systems and equipment Central Asian militaries desire. There is also interest, a second unnamed State official interviewed by Breaking Defense explained, for boutique equipment used by U.S. special operations forces.
Arms sales to Central Asian militaries are an obscure topic. As Breaking Defense explains, U.S. military sales to the region nations are limited, and information is scarce. In 2020, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced the approval of a potential sale of three King Air B300ER Scorpion Aircraft with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) mission systems to Kazakhstan, with a price tag of $128.1 million. In 2022, Uzbekistan reportedly acquired Puma 3 AE uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) from U.S. manufacturer AeroVironment.
There are several factors determining whether the U.S. can become a supplier to Central Asian militaries. Due to space considerations, we will focus on Kazakhstan as more information is available.
Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has stressed the importance of acquiring new technology for the armed forces. At a May 5, 2023 conference about the development of the armed forces, the president highlighted the necessity of “increasing the share of high-precision weapons, drones, robotic systems, the fleet of military transport aviation and combat vehicles for higher mobility.”
The first issue to consider is budgets. According to Kazakhstani media, the defense budget in 2023 totaled $2.5 billion (1.2 trillion Kazakh tenge), signifying an 11.6 percent increase compared to 2022. However, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) notes that the country’s defense budget in 2023 was only 0.5 percent of GDP. SIPRI does not have information on Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan’s historical competitor for regional leadership. However, media reports say that Kyrgyzstan allocated 1.5 percent of its GDP to defense last year — though SIPRI puts the amount at 3.6 percent. (The 2021-2022 border clashes are a likely factor that explains why Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are investing proportionally more on defense than Astana, whose GDP is much larger).
In other words, U.S. companies cannot expect the same profit compared to European or Asian customers. Sales will also require concessions or offsets to justify purchasing the more advanced and expensive U.S. technology.
A second issue is the domestic defense industry. Kazakhstan has more robust defense industries than its fellow Central Asian countries. While Astana wants to procure equipment from abroad, it also wants to manufacture domestically. For example, Kazakhstan Paramount Engineering (KPE) is a joint venture between South Africa’s Paramount Engineering and Kazakhstan’s Kazpetromash. The companies manufacture the 4×4 Arlan armored personnel carrier (APC). In early 2022, KPE announced the delivery of a new batch of Arlan for the Kazakhstani military. The two companies have also developed the 6×6 Barys infantry fighting vehicle (IFV).
At Serbia’s Belgrade Partner 2023 defense expo, Taharqa Technologies, a Kazakhstani start-up, showcased the prototype of its NMD multirotor drone. “In regards to the NMD system, the requirement from the Kazakh Ministry of Defense was a weapon that can target enemy infantry with high-explosive fragmentation warheads,” and according to Taharqa Technologies, the NMD “can penetrate armor up to 10 mm,” explained a Defense News article.
In other words, Kazakhstan may not solely want to buy technology, but also obtain the know-how to manufacture some systems domestically.
Third, there is the question of the diversification of suppliers as extra-regional governments and defense companies see the gap in Central Asia and want to supply their systems and platforms. South Africa has been mentioned as an example, but there are others. Kazakhstan Engineering signed a memorandum of understanding with Turkiye’s Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) in mid-May 2023 to produce TAI’s Anka UAV in the Central Asian nation. Turkish companies are also reportedly interested in modernizing the Kazakhstani navy’s fleet.
Moreover, China is an obvious potential supplier, and according to SIPRI, Kazakhstan has procured Wing Loong-1 UAVs and Blue Arrow-1 anti-tank missiles. Again, the issue of budgets, equipment costs, and convenience are at play. Neighboring Uzbekistan has also acquired Turkish and Chinese drones, demonstrating a similar willingness to diversify suppliers.
With that said, Astana has turned to the West for some systems, as the country acquired A400M transport aircraft from Airbus and L-39 jet trainers from Czech airframer Aero Vodochody.
Finally, there is the issue of Russia. It is debatable how Moscow would react to Astana–a fellow member of the Eurasian Economic Union, Collective Security Treaty Organization, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization — if the Kazakhstani Ministry of Defense were to acquire U.S. military technology. At the very least, bilateral relations could temporarily sour, and trade or commercial repercussions could occur. Upsetting an already complex regional status quo may not be worth the trouble for a fleet of UAVs.
One additional variable is Ukraine. The Kazakhstani military continues to utilize military equipment that is overwhelmingly Soviet or Russian. However, the Russian defense industry is heavily focused on producing hardware for the front lines in Ukraine and the Black Sea. Astana has not disclosed if the war has affected the transfer of military hardware with Moscow. Given the volume of Soviet/Russian military technology utilized by the Kazakhstani armed forces, the situation could become dire if the Kazakhstani defense industrial sector cannot keep these weapons and platforms operational. The future of the war and Russia’s defense industry will influence whether users of Russian/Soviet military technology in Central Asia and beyond look elsewhere for new equipment.
As a final point, there is the eternal question of who Washington should sell equipment to. Kazakhstan strives to show the U.S. that it is a reliable partner, but Astana has work to do on good governance and government transparency, as demonstrated by the popular discontent against authorities that provoked the Bloody January of 2022 and its aftermath. Meanwhile, authoritarian Turkmenistan, with its atrocious record on human rights and democracy, is one potential client Washington and U.S. defense companies may strive to stay away from.
Breaking Defense’s article does an excellent job of throwing light on arms sales in the Central Asian defense market. There is certainly room for the U.S. to become a supplier of some equipment, as regional militaries want to modernize their inventory and even expand the size of their armed forces (for example, Astana is creating a military reserve service). However, there are several variables that suggest U.S. defense industries will not become significant actors in the region anytime soon.
For more information, the Oxus Society is publishing a comprehensive analysis of the Central Asian armed forces. The Tajikistan chapter was published in October (the author of this commentary is contributing to the project).