Since the October 7th massacre in southern Israel and the outbreak of the war in Gaza, China’s leadership has conveyed outright support in word and deed for the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance.” The display of strategic vulnerability by Iran and its proxies since mid-August appears to have prompted Beijing to pause and reassess. Upon return from the National Day holiday in early October, China’s official messaging on Iran noticeably shifted. This adjustment has been further underscored by commentary from Chinese policy advisers specializing in the Middle East.
As events on the ground led to a review of its Middle East policies, China is refraining from outright public support of Iran and the Axis of Resistance it leads, at least for the time being. This is borne out by the striking difference between China’s response to Iran’s missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attack on Israel in mid-April and its reaction to the latest ballistic missile attack on Israel by Iran on October 1. Similarly, the Chinese response to Israel’s retaliatory strike on Iran on October 28 reflected this revised approach. While the Foreign Ministry refrained from condemning Israel per se for its most recent attack, one of China’s most respected Middle East policy advisers all but justified it in an op-ed published in the China Daily.
A Tale of Two Telephone Calls
The day after the first Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel, on April 15, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi held a phone call with his then-Iranian counterpart, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, and showcased China’s steadfast support to Iran. The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s official readout quoted Wang as all but endorsing Iran’s barrage of drones and missiles on Israel:
China has noted that Iran stated that the actions taken by Iran were limited and that it was exercising its right to self-defense … China appreciates Iran’s emphasis on not targeting regional countries and neighboring countries, and reaffirming its continued pursuit of a policy of good-neighborliness and friendship. China believes that Iran can handle the situation well and avoid further destabilization while safeguarding Iran’s sovereignty and dignity.
Less than six months later, Beijing changed its stance. In the midst of the Chinese national holiday, on October 2, in response to Iran’s mass missile attack on Israel, the Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson in response simply stated that “China is deeply concerned about the turbulence in the Middle East.”
Following mounting international reports regarding potential Israeli retaliatory operations against Iran, on October 9, the Chinese ministry’s spokesperson reiterated the “deep concerns” over the instability in the Middle East and the need to prevent escalation. At the daily briefing, a reporter’s pointed question, which included extreme scenarios of Israeli attacks on Iran’s strategic sites and anticipated harsh criticism of Israel, resulted only in a measured expression of concern. The spokesperson merely called on all parties to “manage the current situation in a calm, rational and responsible manner from the perspective of preserving regional peace and stability.” This response amounts to China diplomatically distancing itself from Iran.
Five days later, on October 14, Wang called up his new Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi. This time around, the official Chinese readout of the call conspicuously avoided any possible hint or suggestion that China approves of Iran’s missile attacks. While the readout commended Tehran’s diplomatic outreach to Arab countries, it implied subtle criticism noting that China “opposed taking adventurous military actions and called on all parties to do more to maintain regional peace and stability.” Beijing’s readout even seemed to present Iran as apologetic, stating that the Iranian minister promised to strengthen communication and coordination with China to “cool down” the regional situation. Rather than demonstrating close China-Iran relations, the call reinforced Beijing’s new “even-handed” approach toward Iran.
China’s Tempered Stance Toward Israel
The distancing of Iran was reinforced by the parallel toning down of Chinese animosity toward Israel, which had become rife since the October 7 massacre. The linkage between the diplomatic distancing of Iran and toning down criticism toward Israel was demonstrated on the day China’s foreign minister spoke with his Iranian counterpart – a conversation that came after a call between Wang and Israel’s foreign minister, Israel Katz.
The most striking example of this rhetorical adjustment is the formal statement by Lin Jian, the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson, following Israel’s retaliatory strike on Iran on October 26. In the daily briefing of October 28, Lin sidestepped a leading question asked by a reporter from Russia’s TASS that anticipated condemning Israel. The reporter alleged the Israeli attack led to “exacerbating the escalation of the conflict and endangering civilians.” Instead, Lin noted that China “opposes infringing upon the sovereignty and security of other countries and opposes resorting to the use of force,” and called on “all parties concerned’ to “avoid further raising the overall security risks.” Despite official condemnations of Israel from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the spokesperson refrained from even the slightest condemnation.
The Chinese envoy to the United Nations, however, was critical of Israel even though he refrained from specifically and straightforwardly expressing condemnation. Rather, he stated that “China condemns acts that violate Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity…” Despite his harsh criticism of Israel during the U.N. Security Council hearing convened on October 28, his careful wording spoke volumes.
Chinese Policy Advisers Rethink Iran
This shift in China’s official public messaging regarding Iran aligns with public commentary by Chinese policy advisers specializing in the Middle East. Professor Liu Zhongmin, head of the well-respected Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University, asserted that “the Axis of Resistance led by Iran has suffered significant losses and even a complete failure. The export of the revolution by Iran and ideological diplomacy has reached an unsustainable dead end.” In a subsequent piece, Liu argued that Iran and its proxies have harmed the Palestinian cause.
Similarly, a researcher from the think tank affiliated with China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the China Institute of International Studies, commented on Iran’s nuclear policy. Responding to a statement from an Iranian lawmaker that Iran is considering withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Li Zixin warned that such a move would constitute crossing a red line that goes against Iran’s own interests.
Notably, any change in China’s public stance on Iran is likely to be limited, at least in the near term. This is not the first time that China has distanced itself from Iran, as it repeatedly sided with the UAE over a bilateral border dispute. Furthermore, a recent study by a Chinese policy adviser contended that the Chinese-Iranian bilateral relationship is held back by “little political mutual trust” and that Beijing is less keen on deepening the relationship than Tehran. Notwithstanding, China has other strategic considerations involving Iran, particularly in Afghanistan, a neighbor of both countries and where Iran holds influence, and in the broader context of China’s partnership with Russia, to which Iran contributes militarily.
Is China Recalibrating Its Middle East Ambitions?
The current dynamics – marked by Iranian setbacks and strategic vulnerability – have challenged China’s Middle East strategy since October 7. Beijing’s steadfast support to Tehran was based on the assessment that Iran and its proxies could advance China’s interests and influence in the region by thwarting the Saudi-Israeli normalization. Furthermore, Chinese policy advisers were confident that Beijing was on the way to assuming a key role in “Middle East Security Governance,” as extensively outlined in a paper published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Following Beijing’s role in the 2023 Saudi-Iran agreement, Chinese leaders and diplomats considered the Middle East as a key arena for validating one of their key initiatives – the Global Security Initiative (GSI).
Understanding it cannot rely on Iran to advance its strategic interests in the Middle East has had a broader impact on China’s approach to the Middle East, even beyond adjusting its rhetoric on Israel. Considering recent Chinese expert commentary that noted the limits on China’s influence in the Middle East, this experience may have somewhat curbed Beijing’s strategic ambitions in the region, including applying the GSI in the Middle East. Thus, Beijing’s shifting position toward Tehran and its Axis of Resistance might well evolve into a strategic turning point in China’s Middle East policy.