Relations between India and Bangladesh, which have been on a downturn since the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government on August 5, seem to be caught now in a downward spiral. The impact is evident not just in increasingly accusatory official statements, but also in unrest that is impacting the lives and livelihoods of ordinary people.
The latest incident to strain relations came early this week, when a mob of Hindu activists forced their way into the premises of Bangladesh’s Assistant High Commission in Agartala in northeast India, and vandalized it.
Bangladesh’s response was swift. Anti-India protests broke out. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs not only said it “deeply resents the violent demonstration and attack” on its mission at Agartala, but also it castigated India. “Accounts received conclusively attest that the protesters were allowed to aggress into the premises,” the MFA statement said, stressing that the attack was carried out in a “pre-planned manner.” India responded by describing the incident at Agartala as “deeply regrettable.” It has stepped up security for all Bangladeshi diplomatic missions in India.
However, the spat is showing no signs of abating.
Bangladesh’s interim government summoned the Indian high commissioner in Dhaka. In India, politicians of India’s ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party have threatened to impose an “indefinite export embargo,”
“If the attacks on Hindus and their religious establishments do not stop by next week, we will impose a five-day trade embargo,” the BJP’s Suvendu Adhikari, leader of the opposition in the West Bengal assembly, said. “After the beginning of next year, we will stop trade for an indefinite period. We will see how the people there live without our potatoes and onions,” he warned.
Amid soaring anger over alleged harassment of Hindus in Bangladesh, truckers and traders have halted business with Bangladesh and Indian hospitals are turning away patients from across the border. Amid border sealing rumors, panic-stricken Bangladeshis in India are rushing home.
The spat comes at a volatile time in Bangladesh-India relations.
Days before the incident at Agartala, India and Bangladesh were locked in a war of words following the arrest of Bangladeshi Hindu monk Chinmoy Krishna Das in Chittagong on charges of sedition for allegedly disrespecting the Bangladeshi national flag. His arrest set off clashes and tensions in Bangladesh, and protests in several Indian cities by activists from Hindu organizations and the BJP.
Following his arrest, India’s Ministry of External Affairs called on Bangladesh’s interim government “to take all steps for the protection of minorities.” “We are concerned at the surge of extremist rhetoric, increasing incidents of violence and provocation [in Bangladesh],” MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said at a news conference.
Bangladesh hit back immediately. Accusing India of “double standards,” Asif Nazrul, legal adviser to the interim government, pointed out that despite “numerous atrocities against the minority Muslim community” in India, its government showed little “remorse over the incidents.” However, it was showing “unwarranted concerns over Bangladesh’s situation.”
In the chaotic months after Hasina’s overthrow in August, many of her supporters, including religious minorities, came under attack from mobs. The interim government has repeatedly said that it is providing security to minorities.
Bangladesh-India relations were particularly warm when Hasina’s Awami League was in power in Bangladesh. Hasina was perceived as a “trusted friend and ally” of India, especially since she was seen to be “sensitive to India’s security concerns.”
However, with her exit from power, Delhi-Dhaka ties have come under strain.
As far as Bangladesh is concerned, Hasina’s “continued presence in India is the main irritant in bilateral relations,” a Dhaka University professor told The Diplomat. Although the Muhammad Yunus-led interim government has called for her extradition to face trial in Bangladesh for alleged war crimes, India has not heeded the request.
For India, the resurgence of Islamist forces in post-Hasina Bangladesh is an important concern.
“While the politics of Islamism has always been a part of Bangladesh’s political journey, the Jamaat-e-Islami [JI] appears to be more dominant now. In terms of political discourse, Islamism appears to be dominant in defining post-Hasina politics,” Smruti S. Pattanaik, a research fellow at the New Delhi-based Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, who was in Bangladesh recently, told The Diplomat.
The JI, which is Bangladesh’s largest Islamist party, collaborated with Pakistan during the 1971 liberation war and is perceived in New Delhi to be pro-Pakistan.
While it was put on a tight leash during Hasina’s rule — several JI leaders were convicted, even executed for war crimes, and the party was banned and hundreds of its members jailed — there is a visible assertion and consolidation of the JI and other Islamists in post-Hasina Bangladesh. Within days of taking charge, Yunus lifted the ban on the JI.
Such steps have provided a “boost to Islamists,” a former MEA official told The Diplomat. Its experience in Bangladesh has made India wary of the rise of Islamists, he said, pointing to the significant weakening of India’s security interests when Islamists were operating freely in Bangladesh.
In the 2001-2006 period, for example, when a Bangladesh Nationalist Party-led coalition that included the JI was in power, Islamist activity witnessed an upsurge. Religious radicalism surged, extremist groups proliferated, and Bangladesh witnessed hundreds of terrorist bombings. Bangladeshi and Pakistani intelligence agencies were said to be collaborating on anti-India activities.
Anti-India insurgent groups operated freely in Bangladesh in this period, Pattanaik said, recalling the landing of ten truck-loads of weapons and ammunition meant for the United Liberation Front of Asom, a banned Indian secessionist organization, at Chittagong. “These are facts that remain deeply etched in India’s memories” of Bangladesh when Islamists had a free run in that country, she said.
In post-Hasina Bangladesh, Islamists have stepped up their anti-India propaganda. They were “behind the propaganda that India caused the floods that hit Bangladesh soon after Hasina’s ouster,” Pattanaik said.
While India’s “unwavering support” for Hasina’s autocratic rule is mainly responsible for the widespread anti-India feeling in Bangladesh today, stoking of such sentiment by the Islamists has undoubtedly fueled the fire.
India, the Awami League, and Hindus have become synonymous in the narrative in Bangladesh today, Pattanaik said.
In highlighting the plight of Hindus in Bangladesh, India’s BJP government is, no doubt, motivated by domestic compulsions to pander to its Hindu support base. Bangladeshis say that a disinformation campaign has resulted in exaggerated reporting by the Indian media on the issues faced by religious minorities.
Yet, Indian analysts are warning of the implications of the rise of Islamist and anti-India politics in Bangladesh for India’s security interests. Violence and instability in its neighborhood are concerning for India as it has cross-border implications. “Instability in Bangladesh could spill over into India through the porous borders,” Pattanaik said.
India is also apprehensive that an Islamist ecosystem in Bangladesh could pave the way for a rise in Pakistan’s influence in Dhaka. Such apprehensions would have been affirmed by the recent docking of a Pakistani cargo ship at Chittagong port, the first in over 50 years. It is expected to pave the way for greater maritime contact and trade between the two countries. Will security cooperation follow? The possibility cannot be ruled out.
Worryingly for India, Bangladeshi Islamists seem to have a good relationship with China. On the day of Das’ arrest, even as Chittagong’s streets were roiled with protests, Chinese Ambassador Yao Wen hosted a reception for leaders of Islamist parties, including the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Hefazat-e-Islam Bangladesh at the Chinese Embassy in Dhaka. Delhi, whose contacts with non-Awami League parties is minimal, would have noted the engagement with concern.
The fraying of Bangladesh-India relations is not just about ties between two governments. Indians and Bangladeshis share religious, cultural, and economic ties as well as familial relations. In the wake of strained relations, cross-border travel has dipped. According to reports, the number of flights and passengers traveling between Kolkata and Dhaka halved between July and November. Truckers have scaled down operations, resulting in shortages of food and other essentials. There is uncertainty about doing business with the other side.
“Bangladeshi importers aren’t sure whether distributors would receive goods. There’s uncertainty about what an exporter can do if a letter of credit is dishonored,” an Indian poultry feed exporter told The Telegraph. “No one is ready to trust anyone.”
The growing suspicion of the other is worrying, especially since fake news and inflammatory rhetoric are rising. In a region that is familiar with communal tensions and violence, the situation could quickly spiral out of control.