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Busan Was a Major Political Win on Plastic Pollution, Even If Not a Procedural One 

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Busan Was a Major Political Win on Plastic Pollution, Even If Not a Procedural One 

The political dynamics, narratives, and numbers are conditioned in favor of a strong agreement now.

Busan Was a Major Political Win on Plastic Pollution, Even If Not a Procedural One 
Credit: Depositphotos

As the winds settle from the bipolar storm that took over Busan in late November for the fifth scheduled round of negotiations for an international agreement on plastic pollution, the message to the world is clear – in the battle between protecting the planet or ensuring profitability of a few, the majority is finally ready to stand up for the former. This welcome change means respite for activists who have been fighting for environmental justice in the face of the worsening plastic pollution crisis for decades. 

An ambitious two-and-a-half-year timeline was set at the United Nations Environmental Assembly (UNEA 5.2) in March 2022 to develop an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution. It was unanimously agreed under the mandate of resolution 5/14 that the world needs global binding targets with clear rules and compliance mechanisms to set us on the course to a plastic pollution-free world.

Tale of a Faulty Process 

The negotiations have been marred by process issues from the start: from logistical issues such as civil society access in negotiating halls, lack of dedicated space for rightsholders to organize, limited seating arrangements, faulty wifi, and missing charging stations to serious concerns regarding lack of transparency, backdoor consultations with handpicked delegates excluding even some country parties from participation, and unambitious statements from the head of the U.N. Environmental Program.

In the months leading up to Busan, INC Chair Ambassador Luis Vayas Valdivieso started his own process with the “chair’s non-paper,” which was developed through a series of online and one in-person meeting with heads of delegations. This was a consequence of the fact that the compilation text resulting from the fourth Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee meeting (INC-4), with more than 70 pages and over 2,500 brackets, was too complicated for further negotiations. Not only was civil society excluded from participating in this process, but the draft of the non-paper was made public just four weeks before INC-5. 

There was palpable anxiety among civil society going into Busan for INC-5. However, the day before the official start, more than 1,500 people, including activists, parents, youth, health practitioners, advocates, scientists, civil society leaders as well as the public marched to raise the pressure on delegates to agree on a strong plastics treaty. The march demonstrated that while our hopes may be low, our spirits remained positive.

Bad-faith Negotiators Concede

From the first plenary itself, the obstructionist tactics of the Like-Minded Group (LMG) composed of petrochemical states, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, China, Russia, Bahrain, and India among others, were visible. They took the floor consecutively to recall the draft rules of procedure, meaning the meeting had to comply with consensus-based decision making. In a display of satire, Saudi Arabia demanded that the treaty “cannot afford to leave anyone behind.” Next, the Arab group (most of whom are part of the LMG) challenged the chair’s non-paper as the basis of negotiations and argued for going back to the compilation text, citing a “lack of consensus” on the former. The non-paper was eventually rescued by the African and Latin American bloc of countries, the European Union, Japan, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), the U.S., and Canada. 

The LMG finally conceded but on the condition that scope, definitions, and principles be opened for discussion as well. This has been an ongoing tactic to challenge the UNEA resolution 5/14, which mandated that the agreement must address the full life cycle of plastics. The proposals on scope from the LMG and their friends attempted to exclude primary plastic polymers and their feedstocks from the treaty itself. 

How Did the Tables Turn?

In the stocktake plenary two days later, tensions over the lack of progress in negotiations became evident. Progressive countries openly expressed their frustrations at the small number of countries blocking productive discussions. Calling a spade a spade, Mauricio Cabrera Leal of Colombia stated that “a number of parties seem to be delaying discussions, and leading us down a path which will not enable us to reach a constructive agreement. This disrupts the rhythm of our process but threatens to also dilute the efforts needed to face up to this crisis. At a minimum, we believe that all participants should work in good faith.” 

Disagreements on polymer production controls, eliminating hazardous chemicals, and financial mechanisms persisted. However, this plenary cracked open the divide in the room. On one side was a progressive majority of states including Panama, Ghana and much of the Africa Group, Fiji along with the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS), New Zealand, Australia, the European Union, the Philippines, Bangladesh, and many more. And the other bloc, led by Saudi Arabia, Russia, India, and the LMG, shamelessly behaved like spoiled children demanding their way. 

Frustrated with the lack of both consideration in the text and access to talks, the Indigenous Peoples’ Forum rose to their feet with fists in the air, demanding to be heard. Soon a crowd of civil society members gathered around them in solidarity. Finally, the chair caved to civil society pressure but not until Russia, Saudi Arabia, and other like-minded countries were allowed to quibble over when the text was delivered to the legal drafting group. 

Lisa Bellanger, a representative of the Forum, said:

The treaty must actively promote Indigenous People’s contributions, providing a platform for our full and effective participation in decisionmaking and implementation of the treaty as rightsholders, not stakeholders… There is no recognition of the rights of Indigenous Peoples in this document, only references to our knowledge. We call on Member States to fully uphold the rights of Indigenous Peoples. A weak treaty is a failed treaty. 

This riled up the LMG, who were increasingly finding themselves in a corner. The chair then decided to conduct informal negotiations, which meant civil society would no longer be able to be in the negotiating rooms. Civil society was completely locked out of negotiations for over two days. Undefeated, we waited outside the meeting halls in the hopes of talking to friendly delegates and supporting them on technicalities. Meanwhile, an analysis showed that 220 fossil fuel and chemical industry lobbyists attended INC-5.

As groups of countries released Conference Room Papers (CRPs), it became clear that history was on the right course. The African Group of Negotiators (AGN), Group of Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC), Fiji, the Cook Islands, and Micronesia released the Conference Room Paper calling for a new dedicated fund to implement the plastics treaty, with funding provided primarily from developed countries whose corporations have profited most from the plastics crisis. The paper was supported by more than 100 countries as a basis of negotiations on finance provision.

91 countries, including many countries in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, the European Union, the United Kingdom, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Australia, and New Zealand submitted a text proposal on the sustainable production of primary plastic polymers with global targets. The small island developing states (SIDS) made the same submission, which brings the final count for support on production controls to 105. South Korea also supported the instrument to address the full life cycle of plastics but disappointingly did not endorse the CRP on production reduction.

On the last day of INC-5, a press conference saw more than 100 ambitious countries come together as a coalition of the willing declaring, “No treaty is better than a weak one.” The final plenary, later in the evening, seemed to be an extension of the morning’s powerful press conference in which Rwanda’s Juliet Kabera listed the indispensable elements of an effective treaty on behalf of 85 countries, called Stand up for Ambition. Her address received a 2-minute standing ovation from an emotional crowd of civil society observers, shaming even reluctant delegates to applaud. Mexico’s Camila Zepeda was received with thunderous applause as she went on to list the 94 countries that signed a declaration on plastic production and chemicals of concern

Courage, Not Compromise

INC-5 was suspended, not concluded. The chair’s text, which failed to include the majority’s positions (especially on finance) and got weaker during the meeting with controls on chemicals missing, would nevertheless be the official text for negotiations when the session resumes as INC-5.2.  

What is evident is that the chair and the Secretariat failed in their efforts to make Busan a true success. Their process allows for a small minority to overthrow progress. While consensus is the common practice of multilateralism, the option for majority voting ensures countries can arrive at a resolution. Unless the process is fixed, INC-5.2 will also fail. 

The political dynamics, narratives, and numbers are conditioned in favor of a strong agreement now. However, we must not let this momentum drop. INC-5.2 must not be delayed too long, which is what the LMG wants, since it gives them time to rally. The next few months are crucial for the ambitious countries to stay committed in their political leadership and strategize together for a strong treaty. This coalition of the willing must come prepared with their text proposal and be unwilling to compromise. The need for courage has never been more dire: the planet and its people cannot afford another impasse. 

As Panama’s Juan Carlos Monterrey Gomez said, “When we reconvene, the stakes will be higher. This is not a drill, this is a fight for survival. We did not accept a weak treaty here, and we never will.”

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