On November 26, a six-member Chinese delegation headed by Yue Xiaoyong, the country’s special representative for Afghanistan affairs, travelled to Kandahar, where the Taliban’s reclusive head Hibatullah Akhundzada lives. One of the items on the agenda was to discuss Pakistan’s concerns regarding the Taliban sheltering the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Afghanistan.
The Taliban chief, however, refused to pander to Chinese demands and made himself unavailable. Instead, meetings were held with the governor of Kandahar, Mawlawi Shirin, and Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid. Islamabad’s attempt to put pressure on the Taliban via the Chinese was unsuccessful. The Chinese, meanwhile, have been left to introspect about the gap between the leverage they think they have over the Taliban and the leverage they actually have.
A week earlier, on November 18, Yue was in Islamabad, holding discussions with Pakistani Foreign Secretary Amna Baloch and other officials. During the meeting, Pakistan shared fresh evidence of the TTP’s use of Afghan territory for cross-border attacks. Pakistani officials reportedly told the Chinese envoy that it was time to take a collective stance against the Afghan Taliban to persuade them to meet the promises they made to the international community. Islamabad has tried to project the TTP as a common enemy and is trying to convince Beijing to act in the face of the Afghan Taliban’s dismissals of Pakistan’s repeated pleas.
According to a July 2024 report from the U.N. Security Council committee that monitors activities of the Islamic State, al-Qaida, and other associated groups worldwide, the TTP has an estimated strength of between 6,000 and 6,500 fighters, accompanied by approximately 14,000 family members in Afghanistan. The committee also noted that between January and June 2024, the TTP carried out 600 attacks within Pakistan, including suicide missions, curated by al-Qaida in Afghanistan’s Kunar province. Attacks have surged in subsequent months in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces, some of which have targeted Chinese nationals. The TTP, Islamabad believes, is collaborating with the Baloch insurgents as well to carry out specific attacks on China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects and Chinese nationals.
On October 6, two Chinese nationals were killed in an explosion near the Jinnah International Airport in Karachi. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), whose upgraded tactics have assumed increased lethality, possibly due to its ties with the TTP, claimed responsibility.
Beijing seems to have been convinced of the need to act on its ally’s behalf and to protect CPEC and its citizens. Notwithstanding Hibatullah Akhundzada’s refusal to grant the Chinese delegation an audience, Beijing is trying to turn up the heat on the Taliban on the TTP issue. Before the Kandahar visit, Yue met the Taliban’s defense and interior ministers in Kabul. During the meeting with acting Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoob, the Chinese side discussed a Kandahar visit to meet the Taliban chief. Yaqoob reportedly arranged the trip.
However, it is unlikely that the Taliban will yield to any pressure to sever ties with the TTP. They haven’t in the past, as they strongly adhere to the Pashtunwali code of providing protection to guests. Yet, they also steadfastly refuse to acknowledge that the TTP cadres have been provided sanctuary in Afghanistan. Their prescription for solving the problem is to play the role of mediator in bringing about negotiations between the Pakistan government and the TTP, a solution that isn’t acceptable to Islamabad.
The Taliban don’t take kindly to Pakistan’s attempts to make common cause with China on the issue either. In May 2024, in response to Islamabad’s accusation that TTP militants in Afghanistan were responsible for the deaths of Chinese workers in Pakistan in a terror attack two months earlier, the Taliban accused Pakistan of sowing discord between Kabul and Beijing.
Beijing’s outreach and influence in Kabul indeed has its limits. The Taliban have entertained the Chinese demands to rein in the activities of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) group. Acting against the TTP is likely to be viewed by the Taliban as too big an ask, given Kabul’s strained relations with Islamabad. Further, as more countries queue up to engage the Taliban, Beijing’s leverage with the Islamic Emirate, understandably significant in the post-August 2021 period, may undergo a transformation.
Experts predict that the Taliban’s non-cooperation could eventually lead to a triangular – Pakistan, Iran, and China – counterterrorism effort in Balochistan against the BLA and other groups. Iran is keen on a cross-border operation to get rid of the Sunni Baloch separatist group Jaish al-Adl (JA) from its Sistan-Baluchistan province. The JA has ties with the BLA. The outcome of such regional alignment notwithstanding, the TTP continuing to find sanctuary in Afghanistan and its increasing lethality could continue to harm Pakistani and Chinese interests.
From a larger perspective, however, the issue isn’t much about the Chinese failure or Pakistan’s predicament. It is about their limited influence, the Taliban’s selective attitude toward terrorism, and its use as a state policy to extract leverage from a neighboring country. The Taliban’s nurturing of the TTP as a strategic asset will have greater ramifications as the tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan escalate and other groups associated with the Taliban begin to follow a similar path.