The rise of minilaterals – smaller, issue-specific coalitions that aim for pragmatic problem-solving – has been a defining characteristic of international politics in a multipolar 21st century. Arguably, minilaterals have risen in response to the growing inability of multilateral institutions to address complex governance issues, especially at regional levels.
While the rise of minilaterals has spurred extensive research on their functional benefits and theoretical design, an underexplored role of minilaterals is their capacity to act as norm entrepreneurs in international politics. By shaping normative frameworks and exporting them to global platforms, minilaterals are effectively redefining the mechanisms of influence in global governance.
Trendsetting FOIP the Quad Way
As minilaterals often focus on ad hoc problem-solving, they can establish and disseminate normative frameworks that influence global governance. The Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), comprising the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, exemplifies this role most successfully. It remains the first, and most prominent, minilateral to have achieved international fame. Initially dismissed as a transient alignment, the Quad evolved into a cohesive platform of “like-minded” democracies following its revival in 2017, and began advocating for a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” or FOIP, deriving from Japan’s diplomatic concept. In 2021, the Quad underscored the same on paper in “The Spirit of the Quad,” the grouping’s first joint statement. This commitment has remained consistent, being enshrined in the Wilmington Declaration of 2024 most recently.
The “free and open Indo-Pacific” directive underscores principles like freedom of navigation, adherence to international law, and regional inclusivity. While these norms are not novel in global diplomacy, their repeated articulation and operationalization in the Indo-Pacific context have been distinctly championed by the Quad. Today, the term Indo-Pacific is hardly, if ever, not prefaced with the terms “free” and “open” both in diplo-speak and discourse. Such trendsetting is one of the Quad’s most successful public opinion dissemination campaigns, creating communication narratives reflected in policy and politics. The grouping’s efforts have influenced regional discourse, with FOIP now embedded in the strategic lexicons of European Union and even Southeast Asia where the Quad’s “ASEAN Centrality” commitments continue attempts to build trust with ASEAN partners.
Importantly, the Quad’s push of the FOIP narrative has even made the norm a centerpiece of China’s counter-narratives on the Indo-Pacific, though Beijing continues to refer to the region as the Asia-Pacific. By way of delegitimizing the concept and calling it a propagator of Cold-war era “bloc politics,” China’s Foreign Ministry has found itself increasingly encumbered by the “free and open Indo-Pacific” narrative, so much so that it claims that the FOIP aims to reframe China’s intentions (for instance, Beijing argues that terms like “freedom of navigation” are selectively applied to counter its maritime claims in the South China Sea).
Effectively, in the past five years, the Quad’s emphasis on a “free and open Indo-Pacific” has repeatedly shaped regional discourse on not just the envisioned Indo-Pacific architecture, but also tangible maritime security policies. The Malabar exercise comprising the Quad countries reinforces their focus on interoperability, transparency, and adherence to international maritime law, serving as visible demonstrations of the Quad’s normative commitments to FOIP. Similarly, naval exercise La Pérouse, which the Quad countries conduct with France, promotes maritime cooperation toward a free and open Indo-Pacific. The United States links its CARAT (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training) bilateral exercises with ASEAN countries to its FOIP strategy, while exercises like JIMEX (Japan-India Maritime Exercise) reinforce commitment to building a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Importantly, deriving from minilateral norm building momentum, these exercises serve as models for maritime initiatives beyond the Quad. For example, ASEAN’s Code of Conduct in the South China Sea negotiations have been influenced by the operational standards and cooperative frameworks established through Quad exercises such as adherence to UNCLOS as the legal framework for resolving disputes. Increasingly emphasizing the importance of joint patrols, information-sharing mechanisms, and MDA capacities as well as academic referencing by ASEAN think-tanks of operational principles and frameworks that overlap with those advocated by the Quad are other avenues of influence. Quad-led initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) have also indirectly supported existing regional discourse in ASEAN by advocating for setting stronger benchmarks for transparency and data sharing. Such moves suggest a normative overlap, even if the expansion does not directly acknowledge Quad influence.
Normative Diplomacy in Action
Minilaterals also succeed – and lead – as norm entrepreneurs by leveraging their small, selective membership. Unlike multilateral organizations, which are constrained by consensus-building among diverse actors, minilaterals enjoy agility and coherence in norm-setting. The Quad’s consensus-driven yet flexible approach allows it to articulate norms that resonate with its members’ shared values while addressing specific regional challenges.
For instance, initiatives like the Quad’s Vaccine Partnership, which promotes equitable vaccine distribution, reflect a normative commitment to public health as a global public good, extending the coalition’s normative influence beyond security. Importantly, beyond regional momentum, minilaterals such as Quad have also encouraged replication (such as China’s “Himalayan Quad” or the new Middle East Quad) in other parts of the world. The “free and open” concept has itself not remained limited to Indo-Pacific, but seen reproduction in calls for a “Free North” in the Arctic, which is “akin” to commitments expected and ideas encouraged for the Indo-Pacific.
The process of norm entrepreneurship by minilaterals is often iterative. Norms initially conceived within these small coalitions are disseminated through joint statements, capacity-building initiatives, and partnerships with regional actors. Over time, they can influence broader international frameworks. Even as FOIP has thrived on collective action by the Quad countries, it has also found its way into bilateral engagements between the four countries – and their partners beyond the quadrilateral.
Similarly, concepts of balance of power and rules-based order, which are cornerstones to a free and open Indo-Pacific, have gained increased traction by connection to the Quad. The Quad’s maritime security initiatives, emphasizing rule-based order and transparency, have informed discussions within ASEAN and the European Union, creating a normative bridge between regional and global governance.
ASEAN has gradually integrated concepts aligned with the Quad’s emphasis on a rule-based maritime order, particularly through the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). Released in 2019, the AOIP explicitly emphasizes freedom of navigation, adherence to international law, and cooperation in maritime security – principles central to the Quad’s FOIP vision. While ASEAN maintains its emphasis on inclusivity and avoids direct alignment with Quad frameworks, the shared language of “freedom of navigation” and “respect for international law” reflects normative convergence. This suggests that ASEAN’s public discourse has been shaped, at least partially, by the Quad’s advocacy for these norms.
Similarly, the EU’s long-awaited Indo-Pacific Strategy has derived from the existing ambitions of the “free and open Indo-Pacific” construct, focusing on aspects like “rules-based international order” and “open and fair environment for trade.”
Beyond the Quad: The Broader Role of Minilateral Norm Builders
While the Quad exemplifies how selective issue-based partnerships can shape global governance, it is just one of many minilaterals driving normative change. Trilateral groupings/minilaterals like the AUKUS similarly serve as platforms for crafting and disseminating norms, with the infamous branding of AUKUS as a “security pact” making the terminology widely known – and replicated, as seen with coverage of the signing of the Japan-U.K. Reciprocal Access Agreement.
The Quad’s efforts also illustrate the potential of minilaterals to fill gaps in global governance. In areas where multilateral institutions remain paralyzed – whether due to great-power rivalry or structural inertia – minilaterals can act as incubators for innovative solutions. The Quad’s engagement in emerging technologies, cybersecurity, and supply chain resilience reflects its ability to address critical governance deficits while fostering normative frameworks that could shape future multilateral agendas. As the global order becomes increasingly fragmented, minilaterals like the Quad hold immense potential to act as laboratories of norm entrepreneurship. Their ability to foster cooperation among “like-minded states,” articulate norms tailored to regional realities, and project these standards onto global platforms positions them as vital actors in a multipolar world.
However, to maximize their normative influence, minilaterals must navigate the delicate balance between exclusivity and inclusivity, ensuring their frameworks resonate with broader international audiences. The Quad is currently in its trust-building era as a young minilateral, and should seriously look at calls for a rotational-membership driven Quad “Plus” in this regard. Linking minilaterals like the Quad to existing multilateral institutions like the United Nations will also advocate stronger growth of their roles and narratives, giving global reach.
Nonetheless, Quad advocacy for a free and open Indo-Pacific has set a precedent for how minilaterals can shape global governance. This shows that by bridging the divide between regional and global norms, minilaterals have the capacity not only to solve immediate problems but also to shape the rules and principles that underpin the international order. The question now is not whether minilaterals can act as norm entrepreneurs, but whether they can do so in a manner that fosters a truly inclusive and resilient global system.