Following Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s return from a trip to the South Pacific, China conducted what appeared to be its most extensive military exercises around Taiwan in decades. These marked the third round of extensive drills targeting Taiwan this year, though the exercises have yet to be officially announced by China.
Such drills are intended to intimidate Taiwan while providing the opportunity to rehearse joint operations of the kind that would be conducted in a full-scale blockade or invasion. But they are also intended as a demonstration to the United States of China’s capability and resolve, particularly ahead of a hawkish Trump administration taking office in January – as has been suggested by Taiwanese officials.
In response to a question from an AFP journalist about the current drills, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning stated that “the Taiwan question is the number one red line which cannot be crossed in China-U.S. relations.”
This comes amid political dramas on both sides of the Pacific that heighten the risk of miscalculation amid China-U.S. tensions. While Beijing makes no secret of its desire for “reunification,” and the United States officially opposes any change to the status quo while ensuring preparedness for a potential conflict, all-out war is in neither countries’ interests (and certainly not in Taiwan’s). This, though, does not mean that miscalculation on either side could not escalate into a deadly conflict.
PLA Purges
The drama on the Chinese side is the ongoing anti-corruption drive in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In late November Admiral Miao Hua, a member of the Central Military Commission and one of the most senior figures in the PLA, was suspended for “serious violation of discipline.” This was the latest in an ongoing purge of China’s military, which has included senior figures in the PLA Rocket Force, responsible for China’s nuclear and conventional missile capability, and two defense ministers.
Top leader Xi Jinping has made clear that the PLA must be capable of prevailing in a regional conflict, and that to do so, it must adhere to Communist Party control and standards. The suspension of Miao, the director of Political Work at the CMC and thus responsible for senior appointments and ideological conformity, demonstrates the seriousness with which Xi takes this goal, but also the extent of issues within the PLA.
The picture this presents is one of a PLA that might be increasingly well-equipped, but which is suffering in the short- to medium-term from endemic instability in its high-level command structure. That could seriously undermine its operational effectiveness and contribute to international perceptions that China is not ready to fight a war over Taiwan.
Trump’s Administration-in-Waiting
Meanwhile, across the Pacific, a new U.S. administration stands in waiting. President-elect Donald Trump is known for his tough line on China, and has been lining up hawkish picks for his cabinet. Prospective Secretary of State Marco Rubio, National Security Adviser Michael Waltz, and Ambassador to China David Perdue stand out for their confrontational stances toward Beijing and support for Taiwan.
Trump himself, however, is less clear on Taiwan. He has called for Taiwan to up its spending on defense, in line with his broader desire to see U.S. allies pay their own way. Key Trump supporter Elon Musk has extensive business interests in China, which may influence Trump’s policies. But perhaps most significantly, Trump has campaigned on a position against U.S. intervention abroad.
So, when it comes to the flashpoint of Taiwan, on the Chinese side the ambition to be able to take on the United States and win combines with an unstable command structure, at least in the short term. On the U.S. side, a government-in-waiting packed with China hawks keen to arm and defend Taiwan is headed by a president-elect with an aversion to foreign intervention and instinct for making deals instead. Both situations present contradictions, but the real risk lies in the challenge each presents to accurate perception of motive and resolve should a crisis arise.
What Is at Stake
For both Beijing and Washington, as well as Taipei, the stakes of a conflict over Taiwan would be extremely high.
Beijing fears any Taiwanese move toward formal independence. Its 2005 Anti-Secession Law provides an indication of China’s threshold for using force against Taiwan, including that “possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted.” This would likely include the deployment of U.S. troops to Taiwan.
China’s broader strategic orientation in the East China Sea is not just informed by Taiwan, but also by perception of a general security threat from the United States. Perceived U.S. efforts to contain China’s ambitions and even undermine the Chinese Communist Party regime have long loomed large in Beijing’s thinking. Indeed, China’s program of military modernization since the 1990s, following its observation of U.S. superiority in the Gulf War, has been focused on gaining advantage over the United States in the East and South China Seas.
For the U.S., the implications of “losing” Taiwan likewise go beyond the question of Taiwan’s de facto independence. Failure to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack would immediately undermine the United States’ reliability as a defense partner, dealing a serious blow to its credibility as a major player in the Western Pacific. Losing a conflict would do likewise, along with the massive damage it could inflict on the United States’ long-term ability to project military power in the absence of major revitalization of its defense industrial base. Moreover, as maintaining technological supremacy over China has become a U.S. priority, Taiwan’s status as the world’s most important source of high-end semiconductors makes it crucial to U.S. supply chains.
Taken together, this means that any actual conflict, even if it started over the specific issue of preserving Taiwan’s status quo, would have major implications for the regional and global balance of power between China and the United States – but so also would backing down and allowing the other side to achieve its strategic goals. Given the stakes, a conflict would carry huge risks of escalation. With both sides aware of the increasing parity between their capabilities, and ongoing ambiguity as to which side would prevail in a conflict, this means that entering a war would be a huge risk – one that neither side is likely to take if it can be avoided.
The Risk of Miscalculation
But the risk arises from one side taking action that the other misreads, concluding for example that a red line has been crossed. While isolated accidents and miscalculations are often managed successfully without escalating into all-out war, actual red lines are concealed from adversaries. A series of miscalculations that combine unknown redlines with inaccurate assessments of motive and capability could lead to catastrophe, especially if the United States and China misread one another’s broader geopolitical strategies.
The current contradictions on both sides exacerbate this, if not understood accurately and managed carefully.
Regardless of the PLA scandal, Beijing will continue to pursue a coercive strategy toward Taiwan. The current military maneuvers in response to Lai Ching-te’s trip are some of the most extensive yet seen. Indeed, Beijing may be keen to demonstrate its capabilities and resolve more visibly to compensate for the PLA’s command structure disruption.
U.S. policymakers should be wary of assuming that this disruption would necessarily lead to reduced resolve when it comes to Beijing’s red lines on Taiwan, or that it would reduce the PLA’s operational effectiveness in the event of conflict. While the latter is a possibility, the PLA would remain materially a peer of the United States in the East China Sea, making any conflict a serious challenge.
The risk of underestimating China’s resolve is that a hawkish U.S. administration could feel emboldened to increase support for Taiwan to a degree that China deems too escalatory, and thus feels compelled to respond to with a demonstration of PLA capability. This in turn would require a response if U.S. deterrence is to remain credible; each step raises the stakes both of backing down and of potential miscalculation.
From the Chinese side, a key risk stems from misjudging Trump’s resolve to follow through on deterrence. Beijing may perceive his lack of appetite for foreign wars as indicating that the United States would not support Taiwan in the event of Chinese action. China may be either emboldened to seize an opportunity to attack or, more likely, to increase the extent, intensity, and frequency of coercive measures such as military drills against Taiwan – including by calling Washington’s bluff in response to any increased material support.
This could put the U.S. in an extremely difficult position, because the more routine and extensive China’s actions, the more escalatory a meaningful U.S. response would need to be. It would also make it harder to determine when Chinese action is likely to pass a point beyond which deterrence will be ineffective.
On an issue of fundamentally clashing interests such as Taiwan, communication between both sides will never be straightforward. For China, the status quo is inherently undesirable, but for the U.S., maintaining it as far as possible is likely the best strategy for holding off any Chinese action. To do so effectively, the Trump administration will need to make clear a willingness to follow through on deterrence, and balance this with a realistic assessment of Beijing’s resolve and the risks of miscalculation on both sides.