Recently, China conducted a series of large-scale military activities near Taiwan and in the Western Pacific, drawing significant attention from regional and international actors. According to Reuters, China deployed 90 naval vessels (a number unprecedented in recent history) and set up seven “temporary reserved areas” of airspace to the east of its eastern Fujian and Zhejiang provinces, targeting the entire First Island Chain.
Furthermore, a large number of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft repeatedly entered Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). Data from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) indicates that the PLA deployed over 130 sorties of military aircraft and dozens of naval vessels from December 9 to 11. These actions reflect Beijing’s strategic calculations and its policy direction under both domestic and international pressure.
The scope of these military activities extends beyond the Taiwan Strait to include waters near Japan and the Philippines, as well as areas outside the First Island Chain. Particularly, the PLA’s naval deployments east of Taiwan formed a distinctive “dual wall” formation, indicating an intention to demonstrate anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities.
Taiwan’s MND assessed that the military actions aimed not only at rehearsing a comprehensive blockade of Taiwan but also at extending the PLA’s operational reach, with a broader objective of “internalizing” the Taiwan Strait. This aligns with the PLA’s operational principle of “training where battles are fought.”
Analyzing the Objectives of the PLA Maneuvers
It is difficult to determine if these military operations were primarily directed at responding to Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s visits to Taiwan’s allies in the South Pacific, including his transit through Hawai‘i and Guam. Unlike previous exercises, the December 9-11 activities were not assigned a specific exercise name.
On December 13, China’s Ministry of National Defense provided commentary on the large-scale military activities for the first time, with its spokesperson stating, “The PLA will decide whether and when to conduct military exercises in accordance with our needs and the situation on the ground.” He also emphasized that the PLA will not hesitate or soften its stance on “fighting ‘Taiwan independence’ and promoting national reunification.” This statement reflects a broader policy declaration and strategic deterrence, conveying Beijing’s firm position on Taiwan and its flexible approach to future actions.
From a strategic perspective, several aspects warrant consideration. First, these military operations primarily aim to demonstrate the PLA’s freedom of movement within the First Island Chain and its surrounding areas, consolidating China’s strategic position in the Western Pacific. Second, by asserting control over the First and Second Island Chains, Beijing seeks to enhance its A2/AD capabilities to counter the U.S. military presence in the region. This is especially relevant as U.S.-led joint operations in the Indo-Pacific strengthen, posing a perceived challenge to China’s security. Although U.S. officials noted that the scale of PLA activities during December 9-11 aligned with previous exercises, the strategic intentions underlying these actions merit close attention.
Domestically, this large-scale deployment reflects internal pressures faced by China’s leadership. On the eve of Army Day (August 1), Xi emphasized the need to strengthen national border, maritime, and air defenses, calling for “modern border and coastal defenses to safeguard China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights.” The recent military activities can be interpreted as an exercise reinforcing these priorities, aligning with Xi’s commitment at the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee to “strengthen traditional combat forces.”
Additionally, these activities send a message to U.S. President-elect Donald Trump. Hawkish voices in China argue that the PLA’s military buildup is intended to counteract U.S. actions that threaten Beijing’s stance on Taiwan – a core issue in China-U.S. competition. Scholars in the PRC generally hold a pessimistic outlook on China-U.S. relations and military developments under Trump’s second term, predicting an intensification of his administration’s hardline policies.
The PLA’s operations, conducted shortly after Lai’s overseas visits and approximately 40 days before Trump’s inauguration, appear to signal that the Taiwan issue remains a red line. This suggests that Taiwan’s presidential visit may have been only one of several factors influencing the timing and scope of Beijing’s military activities.
Although China continues to employ military force as a primary tool for deterring Taiwan – particularly since August 2022, when targeted military exercises were conducted to exert strategic coercion – this recent series of military activities differs significantly from previous operations. Notably, this time there has been no explicit or severe criticism of “Taiwan’s leadership” from China’s official channels or state-owned media. From the perspective of China’s concept of strategic deterrence, there was no clear attempt to actively convey a direct deterrence signal to Taiwan.
Nevertheless, the PLA’s extensive military activities, conducted under adverse maritime conditions in December – when sea conditions are notably more challenging compared to other seasons – reveal its efforts to develop and strengthen all-weather joint operational capabilities within the First and Second Island Chains. This development signals a growing operational readiness that Taiwan, regional countries, and even the United States must address with caution and vigilance.
Conclusion
By conducting these operations during the U.S. presidential transition, Beijing may be attempting to pressure the incoming administration. However, such actions risk exacerbating China-U.S. tensions and prompting Washington to adopt even tougher policies toward Beijing.
China’s large-scale military maneuvers have not only escalated tensions in the Taiwan Strait but also raised concerns in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. These nations have strengthened monitoring of China’s military activities and called for greater U.S. involvement in regional security affairs.
It is evident that the PLA’s large-scale maneuvers pose significant security threats to Taiwan and other regional actors. While some in Taiwan have criticized the government’s response to these exercises, a cautious and vigilant approach is both necessary and prudent. Taiwan must avoid underestimating Beijing’s military preparations or dismissing them as unrelated to Taiwan’s security.
China’s military actions near its coastal regions appear defensive on the surface but reflect deeper ambitions to alter the regional strategic balance. Although these actions are unlikely to provoke full-scale conflict in the short term, their long-term implications for Taiwan and regional security cannot be ignored. Taiwan must adopt a calm and pragmatic stance, strengthening its defense capabilities and deepening international cooperation to ensure resilience in an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment.