It’s time for Brussels to rethink its policy of “critical engagement” with North Korea. Presented as less coercive compared to the U.S. approach, the EU emphasizes the importance of keeping limited humanitarian aid flowing to the country and promoting dialogue. Recent signals, such as moves by EU member states to reopen embassies in Pyongyang, are positive.
However, by aligning with Washington’s pressure approach through isolation tactics, EU policy often amounts to a softer echo of U.S. priorities – valuing sanctions over substantive engagement. This strategy has not only failed to deliver “unilateral denuclearization,” but also has the potential to further damage the non-proliferation security order they intend to protect.
Given North Korea’s designation of its neighbor in the South as a “hostile state,” its dismantling of the symbolic elements of inter-Korean relations, its deepening alliance with Russia – including the dispatch of troops to help its war effort in Ukraine – and a Trump administration returning to power, it becomes imperative to question this approach. Why does the EU continue to adhere to a softer iteration of the same failing policy, and what can be done about it?
Lessons From the Past
The reelection of Donald Trump as the next U.S. president has reignited debates about foreign policy priorities and the potential for renewed dialogue with North Korea. While not without valid criticism, Trump’s approach during his first term represented an unconventional attempt to break with previous U.S. administrations by pursuing high-level talks with North Korea.
However, the core issue remains for Washington: It continues to view North Korea through an antagonistic lens, as a “rogue regime” that can never be trusted. This preconceived idea has resulted in the fixation of pursuing an unrealistic goal of unilateral denuclearization, hindering engagement across successive Republican and Democratic administrations in all areas: diplomacy (no official representation through establishment of embassies), economy (U.N. Security Council sanctions remain uncompromising), and security (no formal peace treaty to end the Korean War or movement toward arms control negotiations).
It remains unclear whether North Korea will feature as a priority for the second Trump administration. Beyond a clear preference for “America First” type policies, there are other pressing issues in the Middle East, with China, and in Ukraine that could overshadow any renewed focus.
For that reason, any engagement with North Korea under a second Trump administration would require careful consideration. Trump’s preference for a “maximum pressure”’ approach, as seen in the lead-up to his 2018-19 summitry with Kim Jong Un, could also escalate tensions before any negotiations take place. While it’s conceivable that Trump might attempt to use his stated goal of quickly ending the war in Ukraine to influence North Korea – potentially pushing for a withdrawal of its troops from Russia – it is unclear what remaining leverage the United States holds to achieve that objective. Current U.S. President Joe Biden’s recent reliance on China to pressure Pyongyang, as shown in his meeting with Xi Jinping, highlights the limitations of the U.S. policy vis-à-vis North Korea.
Adding to this, Kim Jong Un left the 2018-19 summits disappointed, gaining neither significant economic concessions, such as sanctions relief, nor security guarantees, including a peace treaty or recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status. In contrast, Kim seems to be getting trade-offs from its current alliance with Russia – technological and economic cooperation, along with a Russian veto of the extension of the U.N. Panel of Experts mandate, thereby ending the monitoring of sanctions on North Korea.
It takes two to tango, and Pyongyang has historically dictated the timing of possible negotiations, aligning them with its own strategic interests. Without addressing unmet demands, any future re-engagement risks becoming another fleeting diplomatic spectacle rather than yielding substantive progress.
Washington and Brussels need to realize that an all-or-nothing approach has repeatedly stalled negotiations. More importantly, Pyongyang’s closer ties to Russia also reflect the international community’s failure to engage North Korea, as the insistence on denuclearization as a prerequisite has alienated Pyongyang and pushed it further into Moscow’s orbit.
While commonly accepted among academic circles, policymakers in Washington, Brussels and Seoul still have not come to terms with the reality that North Korea will not unilaterally give up its nuclear program. North Korea sees its nuclear arsenal as a “treasured sword” – a tool of deterrence, and a symbol of its independence and prestige, serving simultaneous domestic and external functions. Sanctions have not compelled North Korea to abandon its nuclear arsenal. Instead, they have often bolstered domestic support for Kim’s regime by reinforcing its narrative of external hostility. Moreover, these measures have severely hindered humanitarian efforts inside North Korea, exacerbating the suffering of its population.
Until this reality is acknowledged and alternative approaches are considered – such as phased arms control coupled with conditional sanctions relief – policy efforts risk perpetuating the same failures.
Doubling Down on the Call for Strategic Autonomy
As the EU looks to address security challenges in an increasingly unstable global order, it must shed the outdated mindset of U.S. primacy in international affairs. The United States under a Trump administration will face significant constraints, including domestic polarization and competing global priorities, which limit its capacity to lead on every front. For Europe, this presents an opportunity: to think independently and consolidate its security role in Asia. The prospect of being left behind by the U.S. has led to a growing consensus around the need to push for more defense investment. This is a welcomed development, but a clearer strategy needs to emerge that goes beyond hard power measures and makes use of the EU’s recognized role as a normative and economic power that prioritizes non-coercive means of dealing with international security issues through diplomacy and engagement.
This means not only challenging rigid stances on unilateral denuclearization but also embracing the option of arms control dialogue, targeted sanctions relief, renewed humanitarian initiatives. EU-North Korea political dialogue – the most recent instance being parliamentary diplomacy in 2018 – has proven valuable in acquiring North Korean perspectives on several domestic and international issues. It also serves to signal Pyongyang that a diplomatic backdoor remains open to them, should they decide to reach for it.
Given North Korea’s well-known maneuvering of its allies and adversaries, concessions may incentivize Pyongyang to reconsider its involvement in Ukraine. Despite Poland’s steadfast military and humanitarian support for Ukraine and the fact that the two nations back opposing sides in the conflict, North Korea has permitted Polish diplomats to return to Pyongyang.
For all its twists and turns, North Korea has maintained official diplomatic relations with the EU since 2001 – an advantage that, regrettably, Europe has failed to fully take advantage of over time. Unlike the hostile tone defining North Korea-U.S. relations, EU-North Korea ties have been less confrontational. North Korean state media often portrays its relations with European countries in a generally positive light, despite periodic criticism, particularly concerning human rights and Europe’s alignment with U.S. policies. Should Brussels pursue a more autonomous approach, North Korea might view this as an opportunity to engage on terms distinct from Washington’s lead.
Regarding the Korean Peninsula, the EU and its member states have disproportionately focused on the “critical” dimension of its “critical engagement” policy. This shift did not happen in isolation but stemmed from a tendency to defer security matters on the Korean Peninsula to U.S. leadership and avoid conflict with the EU’s most important transatlantic partner over an issue often perceived as peripheral to European interests.
However, the scenario has changed. Strategic autonomy is not only a goal but a necessity. Kim Jong Un’s risky decision to put boots on European ground has explicitly linked the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific into a single theater – it has also become a “proxy war” for both Koreas that could spiral out of control and lead to more insecurity not only in Europe but also in the region.
The EU must reevaluate its approach by considering U.S. policy shortcomings while leveraging potential openings – such as the future Trump administration’s transactional approach – to pursue solutions that stabilize both the Korean Peninsula and Europe’s security environment. This is not to say that the EU should act alone or abandon its alliance with the United States. Instead, by taking the lead in its own foreign and security policy, the EU can address its security concerns while encouraging Washington to reconsider its hardline strategies. This is relevant under a Trump administration, which may be more receptive to policy adjustments.
The EU could also explore using its relationship with China to address the growing ties between North Korea and Russia, since Beijing does not seem entirely on board with this alignment. On the sidelines of the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Lima, Xi Jinping emphasized China’s intolerance for “conflict and chaos” on the Korean Peninsula, saying “China will not sit idly by when its strategic security and core interests are under threat.”
Europe should not simply follow U.S. policy out of alliance loyalty. Instead, the EU can use its partnership with the United States to jointly reassess and readjust policies toward North Korea, ultimately embracing arms control as a feasible path forward. Trump’s remark in 2019 that he was “not disturbed” by North Korea’s testing of “some small weapons” reflects his broader view that North Korea’s missile tests were part of normal state behavior and an established element of North Korea’s security strategy. A proactive, independent EU stance could not only secure European interests but also foster a constructive realignment in transatlantic strategies on North Korea.
While certain risks – such as South Korea developing nuclear weapons and signaling permissiveness to countries like Iran – remain, the circumstances on the Korean Peninsula no longer support a policy based on CVID, or complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization. This approach undermines diplomacy by clinging to the unrealistic premise that North Korea – a de facto nuclear state – will unilaterally denuclearize. It could even trigger the outcome most want to prevent: South Korea deciding to go nuclear anyway.
It could be argued that efforts for arms control on the Korean Peninsula may already come too late. However, this does not diminish the urgency of seeking a more constructive approach. It’s time to be creative, reject purely militaristic strategies (pursued by the EU and others), and make the best out of the opportunities that may arise during the next Trump administration. Europe cannot afford to passively follow an outdated playbook. By acting decisively, the EU could lead where others have failed – building a path toward gradual progress while reinforcing its own role as a global security actor.