Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s visit to New Delhi on January 23-26 — he was the chief guest at India’s 76th Republic Day parade on January 26 — saw the two sides agree to deepen cooperation in maritime and cyber security, defense manufacturing, and supply chain development.
In addition to signing five Memorandums of Understanding that envisage cooperation in maritime safety and security, health, traditional medicine, digital development, and cultural exchange, the two sides “agreed to work together in preventing the spread of online radicalization and strengthening mechanisms to counter extremist ideologies.” At a CEO forum, Prabowo said that his country’s infrastructure sector, including ports, airports, and railways, was open to Indian business.
However, the much-anticipated announcement of a multi-million-dollar deal relating to Indonesia’s purchase of the made-in-India BrahMos supersonic cruise missile did not happen.
In the run-up to Prabowo’s visit, the Indian media was abuzz with reports that the $450 million BrahMos deal was about to be signed. Budgetary constraints in the way of sealing the deal had been removed. Final discussions on the deal would be closed during the Indonesian president’s visit, media reports said.
However, no announcement was made on the BrahMos missile deal during Prabowo’s visit. Indeed, a senior official of India’s Ministry of External Affairs avoided being drawn into the specifics of discussions on the BrahMos missile and spoke instead about the “very wide-ranging discussions on cooperation in the defense area.”
It does seem that there was “no specific progress” to announce regarding the sale of BrahMos missiles to Indonesia.
What did happen during Prabowo’s visit is that he met the CEO of BrahMos in the presence of India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and a high-level delegation led by Indonesian Navy Chief Admiral Muhammad Ali visited the BrahMos facility. According to one report, the talks “did not witness much progress.” In a few weeks, a high-level Indonesian defense delegation will be visiting India to continue discussions on defense cooperation.
According to a source familiar with the BrahMos discussions, “Indonesian wariness of China and financial constraints” underlie their reluctance to commit to purchasing BrahMos missiles. “Financial considerations have been overcome somewhat with India likely to offer them a line of credit for purchase of the missile,” he said, but “the Indonesians want more discussions.” The issue of wariness of China’s reaction is therefore the main remaining hurdle. This will not be easy to remove, the source added.
Little progress seems to have been made on the strategic Sabang port project too, although the feasibility report for joint development of the port was completed in May 2023. This is the case with connectivity initiatives between Indonesia’s Aceh and India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands as well.
The vast Bay of Bengal may separate India and Indonesia, but they are in fact neighbors as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands share a maritime border with Indonesia.
Relations go back at least two millennia, marked by deep cultural exchange and commercial ties. Relations were strong in the early post-independence years as well. Both suffered colonial rule, and their freedom struggles drew support from each other. These experiences shaped their outlook on global issues and contributed to their co-founding and cooperating in the Non-Aligned Movement.
However, they drifted apart in subsequent decades. Indonesia showed little solidarity with India during the 1962 China-India war, and backed Pakistan in the 1965 India-Pakistan war, even providing it with weapons.
The bilateral relationship has improved in recent decades. Economic and defense cooperation has grown.
Importantly, Jakarta’s position on India-Pakistan conflicts is more responsive to Indian sensitivities today than it ever was. For instance, at closed-door meetings of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in recent years, Indonesia has been reluctant to endorse strongly worded statements critical of India’s Kashmir policy. Prabowo’s plans to travel to Pakistan after his recent visit to New Delhi were reportedly called off in the context of India’s sensitivity to being “clubbed with Pakistan.”
However, the full potential of India-Indonesia cooperation is yet to be tapped. Nowhere is that more visible than in trade. While bilateral trade may have grown from $4.3 billion in 2005-06 to $29.40 billion in 2023-24, its size is “paltry,” and way below the goal set in 2019 to achieve a trade target of $50 billion by 2025. Besides, worryingly for India, there is a large and worsening trade deficit in Indonesia’s favor. The two countries have been negotiating a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) since 2011 “but with limited progress.”
Security cooperation has grown too with the number and scope of naval exercises, exchanges, and port visits expanding. The purchase and joint production of military equipment will strengthen the cooperation.
However, “wrinkles in the security relationship in the past should guide India in the future,” a former Indian Defense Ministry official told The Diplomat.
He recalled that India’s overtures to join the Malacca Strait Patrol, a quadrilateral arrangement including Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand for coordinated air and sea patrolling of the strategic waterway, were “strongly rebuffed by Indonesia and Malaysia.”
Although it is not a Malacca Strait littoral, as a “funnel state” — the Andaman and Nicobar Islands lie near its mouth — India’s participation in the Patrol would have strengthened the strait’s security system. But India should have been more “mindful of Indonesian sensitivities,” he said.
As a big power, Indonesia — like India — is uneasy with the entry of extra-regional powers into its neighborhood and is understandably wary of India’s growing extra-regional ambitions. According to the Defense Ministry official, as cooperation deepens, the Malacca Strait Patrol experience should guide India in dealing with the Indonesians. More sensitivity to Jakarta’s sovereignty concerns could lead to progress on initiatives like the development of Sabang port, he said.
Both India and Indonesia are concerned over a rising China’s increasing muscle-flexing, prompting analysts to argue that the “China factor” provides a strong basis for bilateral security cooperation.
However, Prabowo has committed to upholding Indonesia’s long-standing “free and active” foreign policy. He is unlikely to tilt against China given Indonesia’s strong economic ties with Beijing. Since his election as Indonesia’s president last year, Prabowo has made two visits to China, underscoring the importance he accords to building relations with Beijing. New Delhi could face a “challenge of aligning Indonesia’s stance [on China] with India’s perspectives,” warned Gurjit Singh, a former Indian ambassador to Indonesia in an opinion piece in Indian Express.
Consequently, “India and Indonesia must also identify areas of collaboration beyond the China factor,” he writes.