2024 ended with the bilateral relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan plummeting to a new low after each carried out attacks on the other. While Islamabad nurtures a feeling of being betrayed by its former ally, for the Taliban, it is a question of maintaining old ties with terror groups and moving past Islamabad’s hospitality. In 2025, these divergent policies will widen the rift between the two, with the Taliban seeking new allies in a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape and shifting alliances.
On December 24, the Pakistan Air Force carried out strikes on the hideouts and facilities of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) terror group in Paktika province of Afghanistan bordering Pakistan. The attack, the Pakistan military privately claimed, killed some TTP cadres and leaders. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif followed up by accusing the Taliban of crossing the “red line” by continuing to shelter the TTP. The air raids curiously came just hours after Pakistan’s special representative for Afghanistan, Mohammad Sadi, met interim Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Kabul.
Islamabad’s narrative of air raids successfully targeting the TTP, however, was contested by the Afghan Taliban, who claimed that the strikes killed 46 civilians, mostly women and children, many of whom were refugees who had returned from Pakistan. The Taliban spokesperson vowed retaliation against the “cowardly act.”
The language used by both sides to describe one another betrayed the sense of camaraderie they shared before August 2021. Friendship has been replaced by enmity in quick time. It’s a classic case of strategic blowback for Islamabad.
On December 28, the Taliban Defense Ministry claimed that its forces targeted “multiple points” in Pakistan, without providing either the location, nature, or results of those measures. While there has been no official reaction from Pakistan, unidentified sources have told media that one Pakistani paramilitary personnel was killed and seven others were injured in the cross-border exchange of heavy weaponry fire between the two countries.
The December 24 strike isn’t the first of its nature by Pakistan, but certainly is a rarity reserved as a reaction to extreme situations and used sparingly with the hope of eliciting positive responses from the Taliban. On March 18, 2024, multiple strikes were carried out in Khost and Paktika provinces, in response to the killing of seven Pakistani security force personnel. A TTP suicide bomber had rammed his explosive-laden truck into a military post in northwest Pakistan. On that occasion too, the Afghan Taliban spokesperson said that the strikes killed civilians instead of militants – five women and three children.
More than 900 Pakistani civilians and security forces were killed in terror attacks in 2024. The TTP accounted for a bulk of these fatalities. Prior to the December 24 air raid, the TTP carried out an attack on a security post, killing 16 security forces. The “red line” referred to by Sharif also includes Chinese nationals and interests coming under repeated attacks by the TTP. Enormous pressure mounted by Beijing on Islamabad to protect its nationals may have hastened the latter’s military move over diplomacy.
In response to the repeated pleas by Islamabad, the Taliban reportedly have moved some TTP cadres and leaders to central Afghanistan. But this has not impacted the 6,000-cadre-strong TTP’s capacity, which in the first week of January 2025 announced a new armed campaign against business entities run by the Pakistan military. Similar to states announcing sanctions against specific agencies and individuals of rogue countries, the TTP named commercial entities having links with the military and asked civilians working for them to leave.
Islamabad in general and Pakistan military in particular have sufficient reasons to be frustrated by the half-baked policies of the Afghan Taliban and the TTP’s ability to escalate the fight. For the Taliban, on the other hand, a strong arm tactic is not an option, for it can potentially push the TTP toward rival groups like the Islamic State’s Khorasan branch.
While a reconciliation between the two estranged partners – the Taliban and Islamabad – seems impossible, the rift has opened up opportunities for New Delhi to step in. On January 7, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson criticized the Pakistani air strike on Afghanistan and the loss of civilian lives. A day after, on January 8, India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met Muttaqi, the Taliban foreign minister, in Dubai for detailed discussions on bilateral relations. Following the meeting, the Taliban Foreign Ministry termed New Delhi a “significant regional partner.”
India, still reluctant to accord official recognition to the Islamic Emirate, is no longer shy about deepening its engagement with Kabul. Hollowing out Islamabad appears to be part of its recalculated calibrations.
As they saying goes, there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies, only permanent interests in international relations. However, the swiftness with which the game of seeking new alliances is being played in Kabul could certainly have implications for regional security and stability.