On January 14, two border patrol officers in Narathiwat province, in Thailand’s south, were killed when a homemade bomb detonated on their pickup truck on the way to Tua Ngo Border Patrol Police School where they worked. A day earlier, nine Thai police officers and village defense volunteers were injured when a bomb planted in a parked motorcycle exploded at a police station in Pattani. While the Malay-Muslim population of southern Thailand has become albeit uncomfortably normalized to flareups in violence, the two incidents made national headlines as they occurred just prior to Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s visit to the southern provinces last week.
Sharing her thoughts on social media, Paetongtarn said that she expressed her “deep condolences to the families of the two officers who carried out their duties as the guardians of public peace with the utmost sacrifice for the sake of residents and the country” and urged the government to restore peace in the region.
Her visit last week was given added security precautions, as she toured progress on infrastructure development, met with religious leaders, and interacted with students and parents at Princess of Naradhiwas University, where a student debt restructuring event was being held. Some of the initiatives showcased during Paetongtarn’s first visit to the Deep South are of critical importance, particularly the need for critical infrastructure, which will facilitate commerce and tourism to the region. The debt restructuring fair was also illustrative of a larger economic problem that affects all of Thailand, namely its stratospheric levels of household debt.
But what comes next is the hardest part, as the Pheu Thai-led coalition government has not only sent mixed signals about its strategy for bringing peace to the Deep South; its optics have also been terrible. A case in point was former Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin’s ambitious plan to construct a “land bridge” connecting the Indian and Pacific oceans, a massive project that stood to endanger livelihoods in the south and cause major economic disruption and displacement in the process.
Paetongtarn is continuing down the same path. In October, the statute of limitations for civil action against those involved in the 2004 Tak Bai massacre was set to expire and a last-ditch lawsuit was filed in hopes of bringing long-awaited justice to the victims and their families. Many of the defendants named in the lawsuit failed to show up to court, rendering the lawsuit useless. Two of those who escaped, Gen. Pisal Wattanawongkiri and Police Gen. Wongkot Maneerin were long-time associates of Paetongtarn’s father, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Thaksin’s own role in the Tak Bai massacre, his securitization of the southern region, and his dubious mismanagement of critical institutions in the South are major contributors to the present-day conditions.
Now Thaksin is back from self-exile abroad and has assumed a position as de facto leader of Pheu Thai, as evidenced by his deep involvement in governmental affairs and increasing public profile. Worse, Thaksin was given a new role as advisor to Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in its role as ASEAN chair for 2025, and although “informal,” the extent of his influence and network could be a deterrent to peace in the southern provinces. While his appointment as advisor might boost Malaysia’s regional profile, as some commentators have suggested, it isn’t likely to have an impact on the southern conflict, even though Malaysia has often been seen as a credible mediator in the peace process. While Anwar may value Thaksin’s counsel in cross-border conflict issues, Thaksin’s own “informal” meetings with rebel groups have raised eyebrows.
The optics of Thaksin’s enhanced profile were made worse when he met with the Malaysian Prime Minister on a yacht near Koh Lipe with disgraced former Agriculture Minister and drug dealer Thamanat Prompow. The optics here are particularly bad, as it was another convicted official, former Thaksin lawyer Pichit Chuenban, whose appointment as the Prime Minister’s Office Minister cost Srettha his premiership via the Constitutional Court.
To build upon a relatively benign but important first visit, Paetongtarn must learn to move away from her father, something she appears unwilling to do. Since assuming power, Pheu Thai has focused on building its “soft power” status, signaling in both Srettha’s and her premiership that the way forward is through tourism and related infrastructure. But initial talks, posing for photographs and introductory meetings must be followed up with concrete action.
There are plenty of opportunities. Whereas her predecessor was unwilling to acknowledge the role of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), the notorious internal security organization that bears much of the responsibility for a heavy-handed approach to violence in the South, Paetongtarn can take the first step in moving toward a desecuritized policy that complements the government’s tourism-oriented efforts. Moving the Deep South forward also means addressing the wrongs of the past, something that previous governments have been reluctant to do. Her own apology for Tak Bai was too little, too late.
Further engagement with civil society organizations in the South, some of whose leaders have been targets of military intimidation for revealing documented cases or torture, require more than a photo opportunity; they require the prime minister’s full attention. Understanding the scope and scale of the damage caused by the unwillingness of previous governments and disparate insurgent groups to come to the negotiating table will likely come with a realization that damage to the Malay-Muslim population and its relations with Bangkok cannot be easily resolved.
This means that to move forward with peace in the South, Paetongtarn must make time to look back at the past. To heal fractured relationships, she must have the courage to jettison the baggage that has contributed to immeasurable grief, loss, and grievances – including Thaksin himself.