One of the Trump administration’s first foreign policy acts, less than a day after the inauguration, was convening the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (FMM) on January 21. The FMM involved wide-ranging discussions addressing different dimensions of the Indo-Pacific, culminating with a consensus on the salience of “thinking bigger,” and a concise joint statement. The joint statement, relatively shorter than each of its precedents, entailed changes on at least three counts.
Shifting Rhetoric
First, a noteworthy and positive shift was using the phrase “security in all domains.” This change was perhaps long overdue, since the Quad’s agenda is not confined to traditional security issues but spans various nontraditional security areas including health security, climate change, cybersecurity, and critical and emerging technologies (CET). The shift from previous statements is also crucial from the perspective of developing nations, as their concerns center around climate change, health, and interest in leveraging digital public infrastructure and AI systems.
Second, the statement excludes any reference to the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), let alone “unwavering support” for “ASEAN centrality,” or ASEAN-led regional architecture, which was a regular feature of previous joint statements. The change was particularly striking given that ASEAN was also a point of discussion during each of the grouping’s senior official consultations during Trump’s first term.
The omission of ASEAN could potentially be a signal of diminished focus on ASEAN in the strategic posture of both the Quad and Washington. This could involve consequences not only for the Quad or the United States’ standing with ASEAN, but also for fostering China’s further regional strategic clout. Up to now, ASEAN’s perceptions of the Quad were improving thanks to perceptions of potential benefits and the Quad’s complementarity to the notion of ASEAN centrality.
Third, there is no explicit reference to traditional support for “freedom of navigation and overflight” or the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Instead, this is implied through the mention of support for “international law… in all domains, including the maritime domain.” Another new addition comes in the form of a commitment that “the rule of law, democratic values, sovereignty, and territorial integrity” are to be not only “upheld” but “defended.” This likely portends a future where the Quad puts more attention toward joint warfighting scenarios, with joint exercises like Malabar involving more high-end combat-oriented drills.
Thinking Ahead
Beyond the joint statement, the primary factors likely to influence and predict the Quad’s trajectory under Trump 2.0 are the views of President Donald Trump and senior White House officials on China, the Quad’s record during Trump’s first term, and China-India ties.
Besides being positive on his personal ties with Xi Jinping, after a recent phone call with his Chinese counterpart Trump suggested his intention to do “everything possible to make the world more peaceful and safe” with Xi. This, however, does not necessarily portend stability for either the world or for China-U.S. ties, given Trump’s known capriciousness. His rhetoric was both bullish and dovish on ties with Beijing and Xi Jinping before beginning his first term as well. Nonetheless, bilateral ties slid downhill soon after Trump assumed power, with his administration’s National Security Strategy in 2017 becoming the first to recognize China as “revisionist” – a threat to American security and prosperity. Notwithstanding two ongoing wars, China is likely to remain the primary strategic rival and a challenge for the United States, which in turn bodes well for the Quad.
Moreover, both newly appointed Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Adviser Michael Waltz are known China hawks and have been critical of the Biden administration for being timid in countering Beijing. Rubio has gone to the extent of positing that China had “lied, cheated, hacked and stolen their way to global superpower status, at our expense.” In tandem with this, Rubio has also expressed support for bolstering the network of partnerships and alliances including the Quad, and cooperation with India within the coalition.
Another factor that portends a promising trajectory for the Quad is its evolution during Trump’s first term, which brought about the group’s revival in 2017. Building on increased bilateral and trilateral diplomatic and security engagement between the members, the Quad witnessed several key developments during Trump 1.0.
Among those was the creation of six working groups. With a broadened agenda, these leader-level working groups involving a range of departments and agencies of member states focus on six verticals i.e., Health Security, Climate, Critical and Emerging Technology (CET), Space, Infrastructure, and Cyber. This approach gained global traction, including from the European Union, with its Indo-Pacific Strategy expressing willingness to work with Quad working groups.
The Quad was upgraded to the ministerial level in 2019, with the first FMM held on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. Thereafter, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic proved to be a turning point for the grouping, with the initiative on COVID vaccines – although it fell short of realizing its objective of supplying 1 billion doses by the end of 2022 – reflecting a new commitment among the members to deliver public goods in the Indo-Pacific.
While the Quad’s four member states have at times experienced discord on issues like China, with the Trump administration explicitly branding the Quad as a form of collective opposition to Beijing, the coalition proved to be a key regional institutional mechanism. The term “Indo-Pacific” gained prominence as the U.S. Department of State released the strategy document “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific” in 2019, which deemed the Quad as a nimble way to coordinate on key issues with like-minded partners.
Unlike during Trump’s first term, however, China-India ties are currently experiencing a thaw. However, even if the rapprochement sustains and disengagement and de-escalation at the border unfolds as planned, the systemic rivalry of not only India and China but also of the United States and China means Delhi’s ties with Beijing are not likely to be free of pinpricks. Since World War II, China, in part, has perceived its ties with India through the prism of India’s ties with the United States, Beijing’s strategic adversary. The thinking in China that the U.S. plans to use India to threaten its interests, and the related fear of an emerging Indo-U.S. alliance, has only been entrenched since the revival of Quad. If India and the United States get closer under Trump 2.0, it’s not unreasonable to think that India’s ties with China, which views the India-U.S. defense partnership as a security challenge, could get muddier. In that scenario, Beijing’s potential border aggression could nudge Delhi into embracing more traditional security cooperation under the Quad, as it did just about four months into the Galwan Valley standoff. After India initially refused Australia’s bid to join the Malabar exercise in 2017, China’s Galwan intrusion prompted Delhi in October 2020 to invite Canberra to take part in the drills, despite Beijing’s strong opposition to any expansion of the joint exercise. Malabar thus incorporated all four members of the Quad for the first time, and has done so ever since. And let us not forget that Delhi’s decision to join the revived Quad came on the heels of the Doklam clash. Consequently, Beijing’s potential security dilemma vis-à-vis India-U.S. ties going forward is likely to boost security cooperation under Quad.
The dynamics of the Quad under Trump’s first term portend a primary focus on reinforcing supply chains, connectivity, and technology collaboration. Thus Delhi should anticipate a potentially reduced emphasis on delivering public goods in the region. While there are no signs of the grouping’s further institutionalization yet, the broadened agenda reflects increased convergence on strategic issues, even as members continue their efforts toward internal coherence. While Trump’s skepticism toward alliances and burden sharing portends the strengthening of the Quad, the coalition’s long-term credence will depend on its ability to streamline its working groups to deliver tangible regional benefits, despite the different modi operandi of bureaucracies of member states.