Reversing the trend that India and China ties have witnessed in the last half-decade, the coming year is unusually optimistic. For the first time in recent history, bilateral hostilities have taken a backseat, even if straightforward cooperation and trust are still missing. Nonetheless, despite the upward outlook, China’s uneven trajectory with India during the Xi Jinping era continues to warrant a cautious reading of current events. Add to the mix a resurgent Donald Trump, and the China-India thaw looks even more capricious.
Around mid-December, India and China concluded the 23rd meeting of Special Representatives for the China-India Boundary Question in Beijing. The representatives – China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi and India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval – primarily embraced the need to advance “effective border management” for maintaining “peace and tranquility on the border.” Despite the phrasing, China watchers know that the latter remains a clichéd phrase used regularly in such briefings. Yet, the expansion of bilateral relations was tied to the success of future meetings between the representatives, which the latest talks highlighted.
A couple of months earlier in October, the two sides had also reached a landmark disengagement pact on patrolling border areas in Depsang and Demchok along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) – the de facto border, which itself is contested.
At the outset, such a dual promise seems in tune with the flurry of national and international headlines marking the start of a new chapter for India and China in resolving their disputes. However, on closer examination, the bonhomie seems burdened by multiple factors, most notably their leadership.
The timing of these “positive” developments is also especially remarkable: amid the flourishing India-U.S. engagements and the imminent return of Donald Trump as the U.S. president. Trump has already indicated a rough trajectory ahead with Beijing, with China hawks as his national security picks. Even vis-à-vis India, Trump’s unpredictability will usher in challenges, New Delhi’s immediate uncomplicated positive reaction to the Trump victory notwithstanding. How the China-India-U.S. triangularity plays out in the coming months and years would be one of the more compelling narratives to watch out for in the regional and global landscape.
Against this scenario, what are the expectations for the year 2025? How far will the thaw sustain China-India ties in 2025 and beyond? Can the incoming Trump administration muddy the waters of the apparent China-India budding warmth in ties? Or will it be business as usual? Where does the Global South feature in this unending saga of India-China rivalry?
The Thaw to Nowhere? China-India Ties Are Leadership Centric
Undoubtedly, the China-India reality is still embedded in mutual distrust. For example, not only has there been an absence of joint statements but there also are discrepancies in the latest December statements of the two sides. The Indian side stuck to a non-descript version that basically does not go beyond the October disengagement agreement, with vague pointers (“positive direction”) on improving cross-border cooperation (albeit on minor issues ranging from trade to the religious Mount Kailash-Mansarovar Lake pilgrimage, which goes through contested Tibet).
In contrast, the Chinese side provided a larger political perspective by referring to the meeting’s conclusions as a “six-point consensus” while reaffirming a mutually acceptable “package settlement” to the boundary question as per a 2005 bilateral agreement. India, however, effectively denied the details in the Chinese readout by only referring to the 2005 pact in terms of exploring a “settlement framework” in the future, and that too only in a press conference – the official meeting statement from India does not mention anything geopolitically or linguistically as concrete as adherence to any pact or consensus at all.
More importantly, it is evident that the China-India ties are broadly over-dependent on top leadership. That the two current leaders are strongmen, with personality-driven government policies and approaches, is a clear giveaway. Not only bilateral contact at the the top level but their “personalistic” political will matters. For example, the momentum for the recent thaw ultimately picked up the pace after the meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Russia in late October.
At the same time, the October bilateral meeting produced no special pact, consensus, or concrete achievement, besides the already undertaken disengagements at specific points. That this was Modi and Xi’s first bilateral meeting in five years – and the “informal summit” in 2019, too, was regarded as lacking in substance – adds to the takeaway that the present dialing down of tensions is precisely that and nothing more.
It should, however, lead to better trade and economic contact in select areas that are not susceptible to security concerns. China became India’s top trading partner in the period 2023-2024, with bilateral trade reaching $118.4 billion. Notably, India may also loosen up its stringent curbs on Chinese investments. Already, there have been reports about India looking to give a go-ahead to Chinese investment proposals in the electronics manufacturing sector.
Yet, even if China-India relations seem to have temporarily improved, a trust deficit will continue to exist. Whatever the latest narrative may be, it is important to remember that the boundary tensions are not completely resolved – the details are also rather sketchy on what withdrawing troops entails. Nonetheless, it is true that official military and diplomatic channels have improved communication, which is a major achievement in itself.
Dual Ploys of “America First” vs. National Security
In recent years, China has been a major factor of convergence for India and the United States. India-U.S. ties have played a vital role in advancing not only a sturdier bilateral framework but also boosting the emergence of security architecture in the region via minilaterals like the Quad and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). The Quad, which was notably revived under Trump’s first term, has gone from strength to strength, while IPEF’s new supply chain agreement has the potential to revitalize the Indo-Pacific stakeholders’ solidarity against countering China’s dominance and its strides in technology.
Yet it is only the former that looks set to remain in prominence. There are fears that the IPEF will lose its newfound relevance amid the rise of Trump-led transactional politics.
In the areas of trade, Trump’s “America First” stance will impact all emerging economies, including India. India and the United States will assume protectionist stands and their differences will continue to hamper all-round strategic growth. Looking back at Trump’s first term, this was an area of concern between India and the U.S.: Trump had at the time criticized India’s tariffs system (harshly calling it the “king” of tariffs) and the India-U.S. trade deal had also fallen through. Not much has changed on that point.
However, the push on bilateral defense ties between India and the United States will be accelerated, and India would be looking to benefit from greater technological and defense cooperation that has already been jump-started. For example, the initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) looks to facilitate joint production of jet engines, among other important projects).
The political brass in India have been upbeat about Trump’s return. They are anticipating a Modi-Trump leadership bonhomie; a chance to secure India’s regional and border security aims against China; and a re-routing of differences relating to democracy and minority rights – concerns that had begun to dominate during Biden’s later days in office, with U.S. experts calling the India-U.S. ties “fundamentally fragile.”
Expectations for the Year 2025
Ultimately, there are complex equations among China, India, and the United States, especially bilaterally, that will shape the friendship and rivalry between them. In particular, it stands to reason that the India-U.S. ties under a bullish Trump will have implications for China, as for some years Washington has certainly played its support for India as a vital counter to hamper China’s regional designs and goals. This aspect is bound to grow, with enhanced defense and technological cooperation continuing in line with the outgoing administration of U.S. President Joe Biden.
However, the aforementioned trade issues between India and the United States might bring India and China closer. Against such a background, India and China must remain wary to not let hostilities govern overall economic prospects. They will likely reconfigure their mutual approach keeping U.S. protectionist trends into account.
Notwithstanding such issues, the emerging security landscape defined by the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy will be strengthened, which means the Quad grouping comprising close partners Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. will get top billing. This also implies that China’s distaste for the Quad as a U.S. tool to spread NATO-like expansionism in Asia-Pacific – never mind Trump’s own dissatisfaction over NATO – will translate into a continuing distrust of India, which has wholeheartedly embraced the Quad.
On the other hand, the state of China-U.S. ties will either propel or slow down India’s march to regional prominence, both economically and diplomatically. Thus far, there are no indications that the China-U.S. trade rivalry will in any shape or form decelerate. Hence, it would be safe to assume that India’s fortunes as a bridge between the West and the Indo-Pacific will continue to gain traction.
India’s attempts at building a bigger role for itself in the China-dominated non-Western forums of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS will also help – the latter’s expansion has in particular allowed India to highlight its multipolar vision, as well as its strategic autonomy goals. India hopes that its involvement with both the West and China-led forums will help in its outreach to the Global South. The South is averse to such binary divisions as ideologies, which are amplifying challenges like food security and climate change for the already economically distressed developing and poor countries. India as a bridge or a voice that speaks their concerns is a huge draw.
This is not to discount that China also has a large and expanding presence in the Global South (be it Southeast Asia, Central Asia, West Asia, or South America), largely courtesy of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)-linked financial and infrastructure initiatives. The Global South is already a battleground, and both India and China will be looking to boost their strengths. Beyond the race for Global South, the BRICS Plus engagement will also help facilitate for India and China alternative avenues to counter Trump’s “America First.” But for such an ambitious aim to fructify, a China-India bonhomie is crucial, which is a tall order.
Whether an emphatic India means that China will instigate more tense escalations, like the 2020 Galwan skirmish or even the 2022 Tawang clash, along the Himalayan border to dampen India’s growth enthusiasm remains to be seen. Yet one thing seems clear: the potential for a destabilizing China-India military stand-off so soon seems unlikely, with the caveat that the Modi-Xi dynamics, or rather lack thereof, continue to favor the existing status quo.