While many U.S. subnational actors have reciprocated PRC efforts to reconnect, a growing number of governors and state legislators have been proposing and enacting an unprecedented volume of substantive measures aimed at mitigating risks from PRC behavior, predominantly citing security concerns as justification, to fill a perceived policy vacuum. This analysis series examines these latest efforts by presenting notable trends from three original datasets – 167 China-related excerpts identified in 941 state of the state addresses delivered by U.S. governors from 2005 to 2024, as well as 334 China-related measures introduced in 50 U.S. state legislatures in 2023 and over 270 China-related measures proposed in 43 U.S. state legislatures in 2024, systematically coded across 12 variables (including month introduced; status; sponsor partisanship; originating chamber passage vote partisanship; opposite chamber passage vote partisanship; impactfulness; sentiment; China specificity; primary subject, primary issue area(s), primary topic(s) addressed; and volume per state). The research methodology is available here.
The data, combined with illustrative examples of China-related campaign rhetoric employed by candidates in 13 U.S. gubernatorial races from 2022 to 2024 and discussions of dynamics behind these measures, such as drivers, correlations with federal actions, bilateral events, and among states, sheds light on the changing state of U.S. state government perspectives toward China.
In 2023, 280 (83.8 percent) out of 334 China-related measures (including 292 unique and 42 companion measures) were introduced in 50 U.S. state legislatures between January and March. Despite some stabilization in bilateral relations starting in May, state legislators continued to propose measures unfavorable to the PRC.
As of January 8, 2025, 67 (20.1 percent) of these measures have been enacted (50) or adopted (17). One bill was partially enacted and partially vetoed. Two bills were enjoined. Three bills were vetoed. The majority – 250 (74.9 percent) (including 27 that passed one chamber but failed in the other) – have failed.
A significant majority – 238 (71.3 percent) – were sponsored exclusively by Republicans, while 23 (6.9 percent) had “lean-Republican” sponsorship. Democrats were the sole sponsors of 29 measures (8.7 percent), while 8 (2.4 percent) had “lean-Democrat” sponsorship. Only 14 (4.2 percent) received bipartisan sponsorship, with 12 of them addressing security issues.
Among 100 measures that received passage votes in the originating chamber, 66 (66 percent) received bipartisan support (45 of which addressed security-related issues), 27 (27 percent) received lean-Republican support, four (4 percent) received only Republican support, and three (3 percent) received lean-Democrat support.
Among 59 measures that also received passage votes in the opposite chamber, 34 (57.6 percent) received bipartisan support (26 of which addressed security-related issues), 15 (25.4 percent) received lean-Republican support, 6 (10.2 percent) received only Republican support, and 4 (6.8 percent) received lean-Democrat support.
A significant majority – 288 (86.2 percent) – were substantive. 33 measures (9.9 percent) were symbolic and 13 (3.9 percent) were hybrid.
324 (97 percent) of the measures exhibited an unfavorable sentiment toward China, while only 10 (3 percent) were favorable. None were neutral in their stance.
198 (59.3 percent) mentioned China explicitly, including 108 (32.3 percent) that exclusively focused on China and 90 (26.9 percent) that included China among other foreign governments, adversaries, or countries of concern. 125 (37.4 percent) did not mention China directly but would impact interests of the PRC and/or Chinese communities if enforced. Among them, 67 (20.1 percent) referenced foreign adversaries, countries of concern, and/or restricted entities, while 58 (17.4 percent) broadly mentioned foreign governments, entities, and/or individuals.
Notably, eight bills initially addressing foreign governments, entities, and/or individuals were amended to focus on either China among other foreign governments/adversaries/countries of concern or foreign adversaries/countries of concern/restricted entities; five bills that initially named China alongside other foreign governments or adversaries were amended to remove explicit references to China; while four bills that initially targeted China exclusively were amended to include China among other foreign governments or adversaries.
The following sections highlight key trends from subjects, issues, and topics addressed by these legislative proposals.
Primary Subjects, Issue Area(s), and Topics Addressed
Of 334 China-related measures introduced in 2023, security was the primary subject addressed by 264 (79 percent) measures, followed by foreign influence and interference (32, 9.6 percent), human rights (15, 4.5 percent), public health and the environment (13, 3.9 percent), and subnational engagement and cultural recognition (10, 3 percent).
The following sections will elaborate on enacted bills, adopted resolutions, as well as notable pending and failed measures in each subject category.
Security
Of 264 security-related measures introduced in 2023, the greatest volume exclusively focused on physical security-related issues (130, 49.2 percent) (including, in particular, foreign land purchase/property acquisition), followed by information security (90, 34.1 percent) and economic security (31, 11.7 percent). 199 (75.4 percent) were sponsored solely by Republicans. Among 100 measures that received passage votes in the originating chamber, 66 (66 percent) received bipartisan support. Among 59 measures that also received passage votes in the opposite chamber, 34 (57.6 percent) received bipartisan support.
Texas considered the most security measures overall (24), followed by Michigan (16), Missouri (16), Mississippi (15), and New Jersey (13). 41 bills have been enacted, and seven resolutions have been adopted, while three bills have been vetoed.
Physical Security
Foreign land ownership/property acquisition was the primary topic addressed in physical security-related measures, with 116 introduced across 36 states, 95 (81.9 percent) of which were sponsored solely by Republicans. Missouri proposed the most measures (12), followed by Michigan (8), Mississippi (8), Texas (7), and Arizona (6). 15 bills have been enacted in 13 states, including Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia. In the originating chamber, they received a mix of lean-Republican (7), bipartisan (6), and lean-Democrat (2) support. In the opposite chamber, they received bipartisan (6), lean-Republican (5), Republican (3), and lean-Democrat (1) support. Four bills received bipartisan support in both chambers.
Kristi Noem of South Dakota was among the governors most active on the topic. In February 2023, Noem identified establishing the “Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States – South Dakota” during the 2023 legislative session as a priority in the state’s “blueprint to fight communist China.” The bill, SB 185, was defeated in the Senate with 19 Republicans joining all Democrats in opposition, after some lawmakers expressed concerns about its overbreadth, lack of clarity, potential federal preemption, negative impact on foreign investment, and inclusion of provisions that would be difficult to enforce, despite agreeing with the intent behind it.
Discussions in other states highlighted some notable perspectives among GOP legislators on the issue. Kansas Attorney General Kris Kobach (R) claimed, “The only law that can stop Chinese interests from controlling Kansas land is one that stops all foreign nationals and corporations from acquiring Kansas land.” Georgia State Representative Clay Pirkle (R) stated in a December 2023 interview with Stateline, “While I would prefer a unified message from Congress to address this issue, that’s beyond my scope. What I can do is formulate a state-level response.” Louisiana State Senator Stewart Cathey (R) reportedly said while presenting foreign land ownership bill HB 125 at the floor: “I can tell you the threat from China is real. They want to kill us. They want to take over America. They want to see Louisiana destroyed.”
Other than prohibiting CCP members and former PRC officials from owning property, Oklahoma’s Republican-sponsored SB 955, which failed, also proposed requiring such figures to register with the governor, secretary of state, senate president, house speaker, and Oklahoma’s congressional delegation before entering the state.
Infrastructure was the second most addressed physical security-related topic. Arizona’s SB 1658, which prohibits critical infrastructure agreements with companies controlled by China, Iran, North Korea, or Russia unless cleared by CFIUS, was vetoed by Governor Katie Hobbs (D) after passing the Senate with only Republican support and passing the House with five out of 27 Democrats in favor. Hobbs criticized the bill for potentially discriminating against dual citizens, jeopardizing foreign investment, and overstepping federal authority, noting the state already coordinates with federal officials on security concerns.
Information Security
Among the 90 information-security related measures introduced, 19 bills have been enacted in 16 states.
TikTok and/or ByteDance was the dominant topic addressed, with 37 measures aimed at banning the app introduced across 22 states. Five have been enacted – in Kentucky (SB 20), Florida (H 379), Louisiana (HB 361), Texas (SB 1893), and Idaho (H 274). Montana’s SB 419, the first statewide ban signed into law, was enjoined in November 2023, two months before it was set to take effect.
Nine bills aimed to address TikTok and/or ByteDance as well as WeChat and/or Tencent. Virginia’s SB 1459, which prohibits applications and websites developed by ByteDance or Tencent from state networks, as well as Oregon’s HB 3127, which prohibits products from Ant Group, ByteDance, Huawei, Kaspersky Lab, Tencent, and ZTE on state IT assets, were the only two enacted.
Arizona’s Republican-sponsored HB 2416, which did not mention TikTok but included China among 12 countries of concern, aims to prohibit “covered applications” and communications equipment deemed a national security risk from state devices while requiring state entities to implement network restrictions. It passed both chambers with only Republican support and was vetoed by Governor Katie Hobbs, citing redundancy with an earlier executive order addressing the same issues.
These legislative proposals came amid executive directives and attorney general lawsuits likewise targeting TikTok. From December 2022 to April 2023, 37 states, including Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, implemented executive orders or memos prohibiting the app from state devices and networks citing cybersecurity concerns. Since December 2022, the attorney generals of Indiana (December 2022), Arkansas (March 2023), and Utah (October 2023) have filed lawsuits against TikTok alleging deception about data-sharing with the Chinese government. (Some other states like Nebraska, Kansas, and Iowa also sued TikTok, but primarily on other grounds such as deceptive marketing and addictive design.)
Prohibiting acquisition of unmanned aircraft manufactured by covered foreign entities was the second primary topic most addressed, with 11 measures introduced in seven states. Among those enacted were Arkansas’ HB 1653, Mississippi’s SB 2853 (exclusively targeting the PRC), and Nevada’s SB 11. Their passage came not long after Florida became the first state to propose and enforce a similar ban, which has sparked pushback from local agencies arguing DJI drones posed no real security threat for their purposes and that the approved replacements were inferior and more costly.
Maine’s LD 877, passed unanimously in May 2024, prohibits state contracts with companies or using technology deemed national security risks. Its title changed from “An Act to Prohibit State Contracts with Companies Owned or Operated by the Government of the People’s Republic of China” to “An Act to Increase Cybersecurity in Maine,” removing the explicit China reference.
Sponsor State Senator Lisa Keim (R) justified the initial focus on China by citing its tech companies’ market dominance. She stressed: “Federal policy directs information security at the federal level, and states must also determine their own security standards.” In an interview with The Maine Wire, Keim said: “I am recognizing the increasing threat that China is to the U.S. and at the local level… We’re not accustomed to thinking about our foreign adversaries and national security. But national security is now a matter of state interest because we are being targeted on the state level.”
Keim initially stated that she spoke to U.S. Senators Angus King and Susan Collins, members of the Senate Intelligence Committee, about LD 877, noting: “[T]hey said… it’s essential that we protect ourselves at the state level and this is a start but we need to go further.” Keim contacted The Maine Wire after publication to clarify that she did not talk to King and Collins about LD 877 but about “national security and China in general.”
Economic Security
Among the 31 economic security-related measures introduced, four have been enacted. South Dakota’s SB 189 prohibits state contracts with companies controlled by China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela. It passed the Senate with all Republicans and 50 percent Democrats in favor and passed the House unanimously. Idaho’s H 294, which passed both chambers with lean Republican support, prohibits state contracts with PRC companies, effective July 2023. Arkansas’ HB 1789 prohibits state contracts with companies majority-owned by the Chinese government. It passed the House with support from all Republicans and two out of 12 Democrats and passed the Senate unanimously.
Indiana’s SB 268 prohibits the state public retirement system from investing in PRC companies after June 2023. It passed both chambers unanimously and was supported by Indiana Attorney General Todd Rokita (R). Bill sponsor and State Senate majority leader Chris Garten told The Center Square: “We have to acknowledge that any investment in China is an issue of national security and a monetary endorsement of human rights violations.”
He continued: “We, as a state and as a nation, are in direct and daily conflict with the Communist Chinese Party, and yet we, the State of Indiana, remain invested in Chinese Communist Party interests. I cannot reconcile those two facts in my mind.”
Foreign Influence and Interference, Human Rights, Subnational Engagement and Cultural Recognition
On foreign influence and interference, Arkansas’s HR 1067, which urges higher education institutions to relocate Chinese language programs from China to Taiwan, was the only resolution adopted. Among the six bills enacted was Utah’s HB 161, which prohibits local education agencies that provide foreign language instruction from accepting funding from restricted foreign entities and makes appropriations to support dual language immersion programs. It passed both chambers unanimously and was signed into law in March 2023.
On human rights, in June 2022, then-Arizona Governor Doug Ducey signed into law HB 2488 prohibiting state contracts with companies using Uyghur forced labor. Primary sponsor State Representative Justin Wilmeth (R) described it as a way for Arizona to “make a statement and stand against Communism and tyranny.” In 2023, while California’s HR 25, condemning human rights violations against Uyghurs in Xinjiang and supporting the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, sponsored by State Representative Jesse Gabriel (D) with 60 other Democrats and 18 Republicans, was the only resolution unanimously adopted (in a phone call dated March 25, 2024, Gabriel’s staff described HR 25 as the successor to HR 21, condemning the human rights violations against the Uyghur people in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and supporting the call to action for clothing brands to cut ties with suppliers implicated in Uyghur forced labor, which did not move forward in the 2024 legislative session), eight other state legislatures – Arkansas, Michigan, Illinois, North Carolina, Indiana, New Hampshire, Utah, Michigan – have considered similar measures to address the issue.
On subnational engagement and cultural recognition, the only bill enacted was Washington’s SB 5000, designating each subsequent January as Americans of Chinese Descent month, effective May 2023, making WA the first state to honor Chinese American heritage with a month-long celebration.
Public Health and Environment
Among 13 public health and environment-related measures introduced in 2023, nine are symbolic and seven relate to fentanyl. In June 2023, then-Louisiana Governor John Bel Edwards (D) signed the unanimously passed HB 586. It allows civil liability claims against foreign entities involved in fentanyl trafficking connected to the state since January 2015, effective August 2023. It creates a presumption of fault for traffickers, allows use of statistical data to help plaintiffs meet burden of proof, and sets a 30-year statute of limitations for claims.
In an accompanying resolution, lead House sponsor and Republican candidate for state Attorney General John Stefanski clarified that the law primarily targets China and Mexico, with the aim of “bringing them to their knees and hitting where it hurts.” Robert Broussard, a local attorney who reportedly “vowed that he would write this bill and make China accountable,” expressed his intent to sue China, Mexican cartels, and the person responsible for his daughter’s death from fentanyl exposure.
The next piece will provide overviews of legislative activities in five active states – Texas, Michigan, Hawai‘i, Florida, and Missouri.
Acknowledgements
This research was conducted with support from the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Templeton Fellowship. I am grateful to Prof. Jacques deLisle, Dr. Kyle Jaros, Dr. Sara Newland, Dr. Matthew Erie, Dr. Christopher Carothers, Prof. Ryan Scoville, Connor Fiddler, and an anonymous reviewer for their feedback during the research process and/or on earlier drafts. All errors are my own.