In a bid to inculcate “governance by law” in the military apparatus, China’s Central Military Commission (CMC), the top decision-making body on defense and security, has promulgated newly revised laws for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Together known as the “Common Regulations,” the three revised regulations – addressing the PLA’s “internal affairs,” “discipline,” and “military formations” or “drills” – dictate everything, from the military’s broad mandate to soldiers’ day-to-day life. While the regulations are slated to come into force on April 1, 2025, official commentary is already emphasizing their importance to creating a military with “conscious discipline.”
The PLA and the CMC have witnessed utter turmoil in the past two years. From the purges of two former defense ministers, Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, to the suspension of key CMC member Miao Hua (the former director of the Political Work Department), the crackdown on corruption and inefficiency in the military apparatus has continued. And the office of the current defense minister, Dong Jun, continues to remain downgraded, as evident from the fact that he was the only high-ranking official at the Defense Ministry’s New Year Reception in January this year. Traditionally, CMC and State Council members have always attended and supported the minister in his endeavors. More churn in the form of the disbanding of the PLA Strategic Support Force, as well as the suspension or rotation of former Rocket Force and other theater-grade commanders, has cast shadows on the state of discipline and political loyalty in the PLA.
As the PLA prepares to turn into a “world-class fighting force” by 2049, there are questions surrounding its ability to fight and win wars, deploy technologically advanced weapons and network systems, and cultivate talent. In this context, the revised regulations likely reflect the new priorities of military reform and the challenges the PLA faces in its neighborhood, including both the continental and maritime theaters.
In the past, revisions to the “Common Regulations” have served as exercises in establishing leaders’ legacies. Jiang Zemin is known to have revised the Common Regulations three times, to better inculcate the “objective reality” of the new situations and internal challenges of discipline facing the PLA. Major articulations of his “Three Represents” theory were also added to these revised regulations. Subsequently, Hu Jintao is reported to have amended these regulations once in 2011, to include the idea that the PLA must prepare to fight and win “local wars.”
Under Xi Jinping, the trial implementation of majorly revised regulations came into force in May 2018, to reflect the realities of his wide-sweeping military reforms. Now, official Common Regulations for Xi’s “New Era” seem to have finally come about. As highlighted in the announcement on the promulgation, the newly revised regulations are guided by “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” and “Xi Jinping’s Thought on Strengthening the Military.”
Broadly, official reporting revealed that the revisions to the Internal Affairs Regulations focus on improved norms in military oaths, internal and external relations of officers, military appearance and discipline, and etiquette, and expand on provisions pertaining to combat preparedness and military training. Revisions to the Discipline Regulations differentiate between peacetime, wartime, and major non-war military operations, while also refining disciplinary procedures and punishment and accountability frameworks. Finally, the revised Regulations on Military Formations introduce new laws on handling advanced firearms, and better managing official ceremonies and military events.
As a code of conduct for the PLA, the revised regulations are further expected to emphasize combat effectiveness as the military’s top priority, stress the importance of governing the military per the law, balance “strict governance with care for personnel,” and play a crucial role in “driving high-quality military development.”
Xi’s theory on “governing the military according to law” is perhaps the most important pillar of the revisions. Xi has pioneered the concept since the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of China in November 2012, and its two main tenets are the “Eight Adherences” and the “Three Fundamental Shifts” in military governance. While the former pertains to ensuring the party-state’s absolute leadership over the military and enforcing strict discipline and legal conformity in the PLA, the latter refers to replacing ad-hoc and administrative military processes with legally grounded, systematic procedures of conduct.
As highlighted in a commentary appearing in the PLA’s official mouthpiece, the PLA Daily, on February 22, “the vitality of regulations lies in their execution.” Just like various units of the PLA study Xi’s major speeches, or conclusions of the CMC Political Work Conference, they also undertake study sessions for PLA regulations. In this light, we are likely to see commanders, officers, and soldiers studying the regulations clause-by-clause, while also incorporating them into their national defense education curriculum.
Second, China’s leadership is likely to promote effective implementation of the regulations, and the endeavor would potentially be led by CMC members Liu Zhenli (chief of staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department) and Zhang Shengmin (secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission). So far, Liu and Zhang seem safe from the ongoing crackdown on corruption and inefficiency. At a time when the political flux in the PLA has reached the highest levels with Miao’s suspension, it is expected that there will be greater pressure to ensure discipline and efficacy, especially through focused implementation of basic laws and fundamental guidelines such as the Common Regulations.