January saw the Indian foreign policy establishment’s outreach and engagement with three key countries: Afghanistan, Indonesia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
In regard to the first, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikrant Misri met with Taliban Acting Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi in the UAE on January 8. The two sides took stock of India’s humanitarian and development role in Afghanistan. For India’s 76th Republic Day on January 26, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto was welcomed at the chief guest. His visit to New Delhi saw the two countries pledging to ramp up ties in areas such as defense, trade, maritime security, counterterrorism, space, and education. The very next day, Indian External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar embarked on a three-day visit to the UAE. The two countries expressed mutual interest in strengthening their bilateral Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
A common thread is the geographic and strategic location of the three countries in India’s extended neighborhood. In simple terms, “extended neighborhood” refers to those regions lying within the proximity of India’s near or immediate neighborhood in both the landed and maritime domains as well as more distant locales tied by developmental and economic interests and having strategic implications upon Indian interests and security. Broadly, the extended neighborhood comprises of the Indian Ocean region including the East African seaboard, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and West Asia, especially the Gulf and Iranian plateau. This renewed engagement comes at a time marked by a deterioration in New Delhi’s ties with immediate neighbors like Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, and Nepal, as well as Maldives to some extent.
This renewed focus on the extended neighborhood fits well in the Mandala theory of strategic advantage put forward by the ancient Indian subcontinent’s philosopher and strategist Chanakya, also known as Kautilya. The Mandala (circle in Sanskrit) perspective views the kingdom or country and its surrounding political landscape in concentric circles comprising of enemies and allies. The focus lies on the Vijigishu or the kingdom aspiring for expansion in territorial and influence terms. The kingdom lying in proximity to the Vijigishu is termed as the Ari or enemy while the enemy’s neighbor is referred to as Mitra or friend of the Vijigishu by virtue of having a shared neighbor and enemy. Hence, Kautilya dictates striking an alliance with the Mitra to overcome or deter the Ari from taking offensive actions.
The scenario of Vijigishu, Ari, and Mitra fit perfectly in the case of India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The aforementioned India-Taliban meeting took place against the backdrop of clashes along the contested Af-Pak Durand Line border in the last weeks of December. Both New Delhi and Kabul were quick to turn the crisis into opportunity with Indian condemnation of Pakistani airstrikes on Afghan soil and the Taliban seeking “strengthened political and economic relations with India as a key regional and economic player,” sending a message of deterrence to Islamabad (the common Ari) while also bolstering India’s presence in the region.
On the other side, Pakistan seems to have applied the same logic with India by reaching out to post-Hasina Bangladesh in the form of military, intelligence, and maritime relations. The developing equation between Islamabad and Dhaka is incomplete without considering China, the other Vijigishu in the Asian and now increasingly South Asian Mandala, which constitutes the major Ari in terms of strategic and overall competition.
The Sino-Indian Mandala competition also encompasses the Indian Ocean, which has witnessed the deepening of Beijing’s influence in island nations like Maldives and Sri Lanka. Together with its presence in strategic littoral locations such as Chittagong in Bangladesh and Gwadar in Pakistan, concerns have been raised over the Chinese maritime encirclement of India in line with the String of Pearls theory. This is where the current focus on India-Indonesian partnership comes in.
Straddlingthe important maritime chokepoints of Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda as well as being the largest ASEAN economic and territorial power, Indonesia has become an important partner of India in the extended neighborhood of Southeast Asia. This partnership has also taken on a strategic character through maritime connectivity projects such as the Andaman-Aceh Initiative and the two nations’ shared position on the South China Sea, with the aim of countering Beijing’s efforts at turning the latter into a “Chinese lake.” At the same time, both countries have a shared interest in a stable Myanmar, which has suffered from civil unrest and conflict since the 2021 coup. This is especially important for India, not only because of the latter conflict’s spillover into India’s Northeast, but also with the rise of a seemingly hostile Bangladesh as a common cause of concern (Ari) for both New Delhi and Naypyidaw.
Jaishankar’s visit to the UAE comes amid seismic geopolitical changes in West Asia, such as the announcement of a Gaza ceasefire deal marking a period of relative calm since the outbreak of hostilities in October 2023. This moment offers an opportunity to revive long-stalled dialogues on connectivity projects such as the India-Middle East-Europe-Economic Corridor, crucial for bolstering Indian presence and interests in the Gulf and wider neighborhood. The Indian convergence with Gulf states is happening at a time of deepening competition between the latter and Turkey over regional dominance. This also coincides with Ankara’s strategic alignment with Pakistan and Bangladesh, which has prompted concerns within Indian strategic circles. In this perspective, Turkey becomes a distant Ari not only in the extended neighborhood of West Asia but also in the near neighborhood.
Iran’s rivalry with Turkey has increased over arenas such as Syria, too. Tehran’s differences with the Gulf notwithstanding, its relations with India continues to see an upswing as was witnessed in the case of the Chabahar port, which also featured in the India-Taliban meeting as a platform for bolstering Afghan overseas trade. Moreover, the recent Iranian outreach to the regime in Kabul also aids India’s position in its extended neighborhood in a way not only by virtue of shared interests such as the Chabahar but also shared concerns like Pakistan.
Another important external partner in India’s extended neighborhood is Russia, with whom its ties have endured despite Western and U.S. pressure. This partnership stems from shared interests in the security, stability, and connectivity of regions such as Central Asia and Afghanistan, and has taken the form of initiatives such as the International North-South Transport Corridor, which is designed to facilitate Indian access to the Central Asian and Eurasian markets. Especially with regard to current Afghanistan, India has also been invited by Russia to be a part of an “Afghan Quad” which also includes Iran, Pakistan, and China. While New Delhi has viewed the offer with skepticism given the presence of Islamabad and Beijing, Indian participation would ensure that not only its interests within Afghanistan are maintained but also prevent the grouping from becoming subservient to the China-Pakistan axis.
While India’s deepening engagement with its extended neighborhood in the face of an increasingly hostile and constrained near neighborhood makes strategic sense in the Mandala perspective, but the fact remains that New Delhi’s ambitions of becoming a developed country and major power by 2047 hinge significantly on the presence of amicable and pacified neighbors. After all as the late Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee said: “You can change friends, not neighbors.”