In 2024, the Malaysian security services carried out more than 20 terrorism-related arrests in the country. These included two inter-state operations in June that involved the arrests of individuals in the states of Johor, Kelantan, Penang, Selangor, Kuala Lumpur, and Perak. The recent arrests in the country underscore an evolving risk: the continued use of social media and online platforms such as Facebook as crucial means of attracting, indoctrinating, and radicalizing individuals into violent extremist ideologies. Social media has played a key role in the radicalization of Malaysians ever since the height of Islamic State (IS) activity during 2014-2019. Understanding and addressing this trend is crucial for public safety and the prevention of terrorism-related activity in the country.
Role of Online Platforms During Height of IS
During the height of IS activity, between 2014 and 2019, social media was one of the key drivers of recruitment and radicalization in Malaysia. The vast majority of Malaysians who traveled to Iraq and Syria to join IS were recruited primarily on social media by key personalities who were prolific on platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. These included Muhammad Wanndy Mohd. Jedi, Akel Zainal, and Fudhail Omar. Social media was used for three primary purposes: to recruit, facilitate travel, and plot attacks.
Malaysian militants who operated in the Middle East during that period were often charismatic and active users of social media, using such platforms to post updates and photos of their daily lives and activities on the battlefield. These attracted many individuals to their cause. Communications would typically begin on open platforms such as Facebook and Twitter and gradually move to encrypted platforms such as Telegram and WhatsApp – what some security analysts refer to as the “funnel” process.
Wanndy, one of Malaysia’s most prolific militants, who operated in Iraq and Syria, was linked to at least a third of the more than 250 people arrested for IS-related activities in Malaysia during 2013-2016. He had used platforms such as Facebook and Telegram to recruit and facilitate the travel of Malaysians to Iraq and Syria, and to plot attacks virtually. Wanndy, who operated multiple social media accounts, would begin recruitment on open platforms such as Facebook. Once a significant amount of trust is built, communications would then shift to encrypted platforms such as Telegram. The 2016 Movida Bar attack, the first successful IS-related attack in Malaysia, was virtually planned and orchestrated by Wanndy via a Telegram group called Gagak Hitam (Black Crow).
Recent Trends
Malaysia suffered its second successful IS-related attack in May 2024, when a 21-year-old attacked a police station in Ulu Tiram, Johor, killing two police officers. After the attack, a wave of preventive arrests was carried out. According to this author’s research, almost all of the arrests in 2024 involved individuals who had a social media footprint. Reported data suggests that 54 percent of the cases charged in court (seven out of 13 cases) involved possession of IS-related material, pledging allegiance or providing support to the group on a social media platform. Facebook was found to be the most popular platform, linked to 46 percent (six out of 13) of the cases. Other platforms found to have been used by the arrested individuals include Telegram, Instagram, and TikTok.
The continued prevalence of Facebook mirrors past trends. Malaysian militants who were operating in Iraq and Syria between 2013 and 2019 primarily used Facebook and Twitter to connect with sympathizers and supporters, before continuing their conversations on Telegram. One possible reason for this is the user-interface of both platforms, which allows users to post articles, links, and videos, and facilitates easier chatting and communication, as opposed to Instagram and TikTok, which are more focused on the propagation of visual media such as photos and videos.
Individuals found using these social media platforms were generally older adults. Three individuals were in the 30-39 age category, three were in the 40-49 age category and one was above 55. The latter was a 57-year-old unemployed woman who was found to have shown support for IS on Instagram and was in possession of several digital IS-related materials on her mobile phone and pen drive. The prevalence of Facebook as the main social media platform may also be linked to the fact that it is generally used by an older demographic.
One case involved the use of TikTok, a platform that is popular among Malaysians. A 39-year-old housewife was found to have provided support to IS using the platform and was in possession of IS-related materials on her laptop and mobile phone. From information reported in the media, none of the cases had graduated to the preparation and planning stage of any attack or act of violence. The one exception was the case of a 28-year-old factory operator, who was found to have been in possession of explosive substances in preparation for carrying out an attack. He had been previously charged and sentenced to prison in 2017 for the possession of photos and videos related to terrorism. His was one of the 62 percent (eight out of 13) court cases that involved recidivists – individuals who had been arrested and charged previously with terrorism offenses.
Recent trends show that despite the fall of the physical IS caliphate in the Middle East and the killing of key charismatic Malaysian militant leaders in Iraq and Syria, the role of social media remains important. IS ideology continues to find traction within certain pockets of Malaysian society. Social media platforms are currently still being used to share and propagate information relating to terror groups such as IS, to show support for terror groups and as a means of connecting with like-minded individuals. Some individuals who may have met each other in person previously may use social media platforms to continue their conversations and vice-versa.
Apart from open platforms like Facebook, encrypted platforms also pose a radicalization and operational threat. In April 2024, Fursan al-Tarjuma, a pro-IS media outlet on Rocket.Chat, noted the addition of a Malay media channel called At-Tamkin Malay media foundation. The channel shared several posters that condemned democracy and issued threats against disbelievers and apostates. Another pro-IS media group called Al-Aan Foundation that was founded in February 2024 called for Malaysians to undertake hijrah (migration) to join IS and carry out attacks against foreign embassies in Malaysia. A further comment in March 2024 on a pro-IS website called for attacks against the Chinese in Muslim and Western countries, specifically mentioning Malaysia and Singapore.
Platforms such as Telegram and WhatsApp, and smaller ones such Element, Tam Tam, Threema, and Hoop, are being used by IS members to form closed groups to plan attacks and facilitate radicalization. For example, in 2018, a 51-year-old woman who planned to launch an attack in Malaysia was alleged to have recruited other individuals on Facebook and WhatsApp using the name “Kumpulan Makan-Makan Kak Nor” (Kak Nor’s Food Group) to avoid detection.
Countermeasures
As of 2024, Malaysia had an internet penetration rate of 97.4 percent, with approximately 33.59 million internet users in the country. Some 83.1 percent (28.68 million) of its population were social media users. The commendably high level of digital literacy among Malaysians has been a positive catalyst for economic growth. But it may also be contributing to the persistent trend of online radicalization. Apart from extremist content, social media platforms such as TikTok have been exploited by certain political parties in Malaysia to spread divisive racial and religious rhetoric with the intention of stoking ethno-religious sentiments in society. A recent study by Nicolas Stockhammer and Colin Clarke highlights the increasing role of TikTok in the radicalization of individuals, particularly the younger generation of extremists belonging to the Gen Z or even Gen Alpha categories.
In order to mitigate the threat of online radicalization (and radicalization in general), several steps need to be taken. First, public awareness on topics such as violent extremism and hate speech needs to be improved. Incorporating these topics into the educational syllabus may be a viable option. In this regard, cooperation between the Ministry of Education, the security services, religious authorities and other stakeholders is imperative. The efforts of the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has conducted outreach programs aimed at students, public servants, and the general public on religious and violent extremism, must be commended and continued.
The public must be taught to detect harmful content from an early age so that they are able to form a psychological barrier against these ideologies. A structured and anonymous reporting mechanism that could be in the form of a public hotline could also be an avenue for the security services to detect suspicious behavior early and take necessary precautionary and preventive measures.
Cooperation between the relevant government agencies such as the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission, the Royal Malaysia Police (RMP), the Ministry of Communications, and the relevant social media companies is vital in order to curb the misuse of social media platforms for extremist activity. A working relationship between the security services and the social media companies, particularly when it comes to the sharing of information and intelligence is crucial in aiding investigations and mitigating radicalization and terrorist activity in the country.
The RMP has done impressive work in containing the terrorist threat in the country. Continued monitoring and surveillance of extremist activity online is vital and the government must ensure that sufficient resources are channeled to the relevant agencies to maintain and improve their capabilities where necessary. Cooperation between regional security agencies is another key factor in plugging any gaps in intelligence and ensuring attacks are thwarted in due time.
Conclusion
While the current trends and arrest numbers pale in comparison to the statistics from the 2014-2019 period when IS was at its height, the continued use of social media to propagate extremist ideology is concerning. Given the prevalent use of the internet by Malaysians, the threat of online radicalization cannot be taken lightly. Social media and the internet continue to be a pivotal part of the terrorist modus operandi, more so, in an age where terrorism threats have shifted to self-radicalized individuals. A holistic mix of hard and soft, preventive and proactive measures must be put in place to mitigate the threat.