In October 2024, the United Kingdom government announced that it would finally relinquish the sovereignty of the Chagos Islands (the British Indian Ocean Territory) and give it back to Mauritius. Since then, however, the matter has dragged on, drowning in ifs and buts. A lot has been written about the unjust way in which the population of the archipelago had been expelled. A lot is being written about the strategic loss that vacating the islands may create for the U.K. and for the U.S., which leases the largest island (a status quo that would continue under the deal). A lot may yet be written about Mauritius’ potential gains, if a deal is ever reached and followed through.
If the archipelago is indeed awarded to Mauritius, one of the main beneficiaries of this shift may turn out to be India.
At first, it must be stressed that I am no expert on the history of the Chagos Islands and it is not for me to judge if the sovereignty of the archipelago should belong to Mauritius or to someone else (other than the U.K.) – someone else other than the Chagossians, that is. Some Chagossians are currently contesting the decision and pointing out that they should have a right to decide the future status of their land through a referendum. Having noted this as an important historical and ethical point, I want to stress that this text is not focused on the rights and wrongs raised in the current debates, but specifically on potential geopolitical benefits for New Delhi – in the case the islands do become a part of Mauritius.
Over 60 percent of the population of Mauritius is of Indian descent. Many Indian companies have over the years relocated to the island nation, to avoid Indian taxation, and continue to invest back in their home country as foreign companies. Thus, on paper, Mauritius is the largest source of FDI for India – even though this is really returning Indian capital. Much more importantly, India has offered Mauritius various forms of assistance in return for which, it may be assumed, New Delhi has built considerable influence on the island nation.
A number of projects have been undertaken in Mauritius with Indian financial and technical assistance, such as the Metro Express Project, a rail line connecting Port Louis and nearby towns. The vessels used by Mauritius’ coast guard, as well as the helicopters used by its police, were partially gifted and partially sold by India (as a small country, Mauritius does not have a military as such, and thus no navy; however, it does have a National Coast Guard which is a part of the police forces). In return, both of these forces are commanded by Indian, not Mauritian, officers. The coast guard of Mauritius is currently led by Captain Vipin Gupta, an officer of the Indian Navy, while Misra Shashank, an air commodore of the Indian Air Force, commands the Mauritian police helicopter squadron.
Moreover, in 2021, it was reported that India may be building a base on North Agalega Island, a Mauritian territory. The Mauritius government denies that characterization. What is confirmed is that, following a 2015 agreement between the two governments, an infrastructure project is proceeding on the island, thanks to Indian financial assistance, and that it includes enhancing an airstrip and building a new coast guard post, among others. Officially, the infrastructure constructed there is to serve Mauritian, rather than Indian forces.
This, however, does not change the fact that New Delhi most likely draws some benefits from its defense cooperation with Port Louis. With Indian officers stationed in the island nation, with Indian forces being able to visit Mauritian infrastructure, with joint exercises being held between the forces of the countries, the absolute minimum gain for India would be acquiring more naval intelligence. Yet it is very likely that the gains are much more substantial.
Now, let us imagine that the Chagos Islands are awarded to Mauritius. Can we imagine that the Mauritius government would simply let go of all strategic advantages of this location and would use the territory only for civilian purposes? And if the Port Louis government would use a part of the territory for some defense purposes, wouldn’t India, given its position on Mauritius, also benefit in some way?
The future status of Diego Garcia is one of the key questions regarding a transfer of sovereignty. It is the only inhabited isle on the archipelago, and home to a U.S. base. The base itself is the original reason of the current controversy – it was for the sake of its establishment that the British expelled the Chagossians. Leaving aside the undoubted immorality of that past act, it is little wonder that for strategic reasons, the U.S. government is not to keen to lose this asset. Under the Mauritius-U.K. agreement, the Chagossians would be allowed to return to all other islands but not Diego Garcia, which would remain under U.S. control.
For India to somehow appear as part of this picture, two conditions would have to be fulfilled: the Chagos Islands would have to be awarded to Mauritius, and this would have to be done completely, including Diego Garcia. Without Diego Garcia, new defense infrastructure would have to be installed elsewhere on the Chagos Islands, for Mauritius to use, and for India to benefit from. It is beyond my capacity to judge whether such a complex compromise is possible at all if at the same time the Chagossians are to return home. But supposing that both of the above conditions are fulfilled, what will India’s gain be? Put simply: keeping eyes on China.
Over the years, China’s forces have become more active in the Indian Ocean. In 2021, China opened a base in Djibouti; speculations remain about the possibility of the Chinese establishing a base in Pakistan, and Chinese naval vessels, including submarines, have been seen more often. New Delhi naturally views all of this with rising concern.
Apart from watching the seas from its own territory, which includes several strategically placed archipelagos (the Laccadive Islands as well as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands), India is attempting to watch China’s moves from other angles too. Indian forces hold exercises in the Indian Ocean with the Quad countries and with France, as well as joint patrols with French forces. Several years ago, India offered to work with the Seychelles on a joint military facility, which the Seychelles government eventually rejected. India’s presence in Mauritius is probably one aspect of such attempts – and thus adding the Chagos Islands to Mauritius would make Mauritius even more important from the perspective of India’s need to watch the Chinese navy through many eyes.
I would venture to speculate that Mauritius could become a country from which India would be able to collect intelligence on the movement of Chinese vessels throughout the Indian Ocean. In the grander scheme and in the longer run, for New Delhi, the island nation could become one of the many links in a whole chain of such naval monitoring points.