For both Japan and South Korea, political stability seems like a distant goal. In Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and junior partner Komeito hold a minority of seats in the parliament, putting their government in the precarious position of needing to sway commitments from various opposition parties to pass bills and formulate budgets. Meanwhile, South Korea is facing one of its most complex debacles since the beginning of parliamentary democracy in the country, with President Yoon Suk-yeol awaiting the Constitutional Court’s ruling on his impeachment. In addition, Yoon has been indicted and arrested over insurrection charges stemming from his shocking declaration of martial law.
Japan and South Korea are at their most fragile political states in decades just as their ally, the United States, has begun the second administration of Donald Trump. Trump’s return to the White House has already introduced severe disruptions to a changing global order. He fundamentally changed the traditional notion of “the West” in geopolitics as he abandoned Europe and its allies to initiate a direct deal with Russia over Ukraine. The question beckons as to whether – or rather when – he might do the same with the United States’ Indo-Pacific allies.
Shifting Japan-U.S. relations
Signs of differences between Tokyo and Washington were already starting to brew during the end of Biden’s term, when the outgoing president blocked Nippon Steel’s takeover of U.S. Steel. Then Japan’s pundits were wringing their hands as Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru was unable to arrange a pre-inauguration meeting with Trump, despite repeated efforts.
But the early stages of the Trump administration looked more promising. Japan’s Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi attended the Trump 2.0 swearing in, becoming the first Japanese foreign minister to attend a U.S. presidential inauguration. The very next day, he had a meeting with new U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
Ishiba’s own in-person meeting with Trump finally came with a formal summit on February 7. Their meeting in Washington was declared as the beginning of a “new golden age” in bilateral ties. Ishiba seems to have utilized this opportunity to test the waters if Tokyo has any room left to maneuver, especially with the second coming of “America First.”
Even though Trump is largely critical of Biden’s previous decisions, it was highly unlikely that he would have supported the Nippon Steel takeover of U.S. Steel, given that his agenda is pinned on protecting U.S. industries. As it stands, Trump at his transactional best is holding all the cards close to his chest by ruling out the purchase of the U.S. steelmaker but hinting at the possibility of Nippon Steel holding a minority stake.
Japan would have been pleased that there was no talk of tariffs during the Ishiba-Trump summit meeting, is now facing a dilemma with the upcoming tariffs on steel and aluminum imports announced by the Trump administration on February 10. It remains to be seen whether Japan, which needs to ensure continued U.S. commitment to their alliance, will be provided any exemption from the tariff measures. Under the previous presidency of Joe Biden, Japan was allotted an annual duty-free quota of steel exports.
The tariffs could negatively impact Japan’s economy, as it exported over $2 billion of steel to the United States in 2024. This means the spillover effect of tariffs and probable economic toll could lead to a slowdown in Japan’s preparations to upgrade its defense forces. Ishiba and Trump during their summit had already underscored a “peace through strength” approach toward countering China in the Indo-Pacific region. Any economic setback could prove detrimental to Japan-U.S. efforts to firm up regional security measures amid the growing insecurity stemming from China’s increasing territorial claims and evolving military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. Japan is already reeling under financial strain of funding a planned increase in defense spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2027; any additional demand from Washington to increase defense spending could strain the alliance.
It is significant to also highlight that despite the “new golden age” declared during the Ishiba-Trump summit and the hardliner stance on China in their joint statement, Japan has been displaying a shift in its approach toward China. Immediately after the formation of his minority government, Ishiba met Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the APEC Summit in Lima, Peru on November 15, 2024. A series of reciprocal visa exemption and relaxation measures were also issued by China and Japan in the subsequent months of November-December 2024.
This particular decision resulted in growing bipartisan criticism of the Ishiba administration’s perceived “China leaning” approach. There was dissent within Ishiba’s own LDP, while lawmakers from the main opposition Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) also pointed out the apparently excessive consideration given to China as strange.
If Japan does not receive an exemption from the U.S. steel tariffs and Japanese investments continue to face heightened scrutiny, Tokyo could broach further dialogues with Beijing to offset its potential losses with Washington. With Japan holding an upper house election in July 2025, it remains to be seen how the internal rumblings within the LDP will impact the survival of the coalition minority government – and whether Trump and the China factor play a role.
Political Instability in South Korea Impacting Policy Coordination With the U.S.
For South Korea, the inauguration of a U.S. president intent on shaking up the foundations of U.S. foreign policy adds to an already chaotic domestic situation. South Korea is facing a crossroads in its democracy, with two presidents impeached in the month of December after a brief declaration of martial law. With already a deep political polarization in the nation regarding Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment – which is currently being considered by the Constitutional Court – the caretaker administration of the People Power Party (PPP) is visibly running pillar to post. The situation in Seoul had become so complicated that the South Korean ambassador to the U.S., Cho Hyun-dong, was the only government representative to attend Trump’s inaugural on behalf of the current administration.
South Korea did send a bipartisan delegation of the National Assembly as well as business leaders to fill the absence. But it is concerning to many in South Korea that acting President Choi Sang-mok has not even been able to secure a phone call with Trump, much less an in-person meeting. Instead, he had to stoop to a conversation with Trump’s treasury secretary to discuss critical issues such as the U.S. steel tariffs. The Trump administration may have decided it’s not worth the time to develop a relationship with Choi, when he will be out of the office in a matter of months: either because Yoon is restored to office, or because a new president is chosen in a snap election, depending on the Constitutional Court’s decision.
There are looming questions over how South Korea can manage policy coordination with the Trump administration in the midst of this political uncertainty – all with the ever-present existential threat of North Korea, which is becoming even more emboldened with its involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war.
Even though South Korea is experiencing a leadership vacuum, the current PPP administration is attempting to keep up the momentum the South Korea-U.S. alliance gained under Yoon. Although Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul did not attend Trump’s inauguration, he was able to have a telephone call with Rubio three days later. Cho then met with Rubio on February 15, on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference. Their first in-person meeting helped ease fears that Seoul may be sidelined in Washington’s foreign policy priorities. In the post-meeting statement, the two countries reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining defense and economic ties, as well as pressing for the complete denuclearization of North Korea. That latter point had been thrown into doubt when Trump referred to North Korea as a “nuclear power,” raising concerns in Seoul about Pyongyang being officially declared a nuclear-armed state.
In his first term, Trump made history by becoming the first sitting U.S. president to meet with North Korea’s leader – something he did not once, but three times, once even crossing the DMZ to stand on North Korean soil. But neither side came away with much to show from the dialogues, which came to an abrupt end in 2019. Trump may or may not pull a rabbit out of his hat in his second term to persuade Kim Jong Un to give peace another chance. However, even though Trump may be interested in restarting talks with North Korea, he acknowledged that it might be harder this time.
On North Korea policy as well, South Korea’s political chaos has put progress on hold. Any attempts at rekindling the North Korea question, much less responding to the changing global order, will primarily depend on whether Yoon’s impeachment is upheld – and then whether the opposition Democratic Party (DP) or the PPP wins the resulting snap election.
Strategic Uncertainty in Japan-South Korea-U.S. Ties
At the moment, these two Indo-Pacific allies of the United States are staring down strategic uncertainty under Trump. Howard Lutnick, Trump’s commerce secretary, had accused Japan and South Korea of having “taken advantage of” the United States’ “good nature.” This is not the view of just one individual but reflects the policy approach of the Trump administration as a whole, particularly regarding its tariff and trade agenda. The announced 25 percent tariff on steel and aluminum imports only justifies the apprehensions Japan and South Korea had.
This policy approach may trickle down into the global security agenda as well. With Trump’s prevailing mentality to exit NATO, it is not hard to anticipate the new Trump administration once again imposing conditions on the continued U.S. military presence in both Japan and South Korea. Such a development could ruin the emerging Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral mechanism, and NATO’s developing partnerships with Seoul and Tokyo may be disrupted too.
The trilateral meeting held on February 15 between the foreign ministers of Japan, South Korea, and the United States provided an opportunity to reaffirm ties. However, the potential frictions were evident, as both Cho and Iwaya took care to point out their countries’ concerns over Trump’s tariff measures.
The Trump administration’s decision to undercut any sort of a united approach with its allies in Europe by only choosing to negotiate bilaterally with Russia, and then Trump’s rhetoric blaming Ukraine for the war, has only increased doubts among the U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific.
A dark cloud of uncertainty is looming over the heads of the governments in Japan and South Korea in the context of Trump’s second term. The beginning of the Trump presidency has already put the alliance partners on a backfoot. In addition, the complicated political situations within Japan and South Korea are making policy coordination with the United States all the more difficult.
The return of Trump’s “America First” approach signals the United States’ preference for transactional relationships that could challenge existing partnerships, potentially compelling even Tokyo and Seoul to reassess their own alliance with Washington in order to adapt to an increasingly volatile Indo-Pacific landscape.