In the wake of the devastating earthquake that struck central Myanmar on March 28, multiple parties to the country’s civil war declared unilateral, conditional ceasefires. While commendable, these ceasefires have been marred by violations by the very groups who announced them. Despite these failings, they may still mark a narrow opening for conflict de-escalation.
Conditional Convergences
A day after the March 28 earthquake, the parallel National Unity Government (NUG) announced a “two-week pause in offensive military operations, except for defensive actions, in earthquake-affected areas.” This was extended for a week up to April 20, coinciding with the traditional Thingyan new year holiday.
On April 1, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA), comprising the Arakan Army (AA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), declared a month-long “unilateral humanitarian pause.” It stated that effective immediately in areas where fighting is ongoing between the 3BHA and the military, the groups “will not initiate offensive operations – except in cases of self-defense.”
Late to move was the State Administration Council (SAC) junta, which announced a ceasefire on April 2. It contained caveats, including warning ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and “other armed groups” not to engage in recruitment or mobilization. Unlike the ceasefires declared by the NUG and the 3BHA, the SAC’s declaration had no geographic references, though it risibly said it was made “with empathy and understanding towards the people across the country.” And on the same day, the Kachin Independence Organization issued a 20-day ceasefire to halt offensive operations except in self-defense.
Some groups like the Karen National Union (KNU) assumed a wait-and-see approach while the Chin National Front (CNF) urged the regime to cease attacks and pledged to cooperate in rehabilitation.
Empty gestures
Based on subsequent developments, the ceasefire declarations can be chalked up as empty gestures as both the SAC and its opponents have violated the letter and spirit of their vaunted declarations.
The SAC’s ceasefire declaration was dead on arrival. The military continued its indiscriminate bombing campaigns targeting various locations across the country even as it appealed for international assistance. The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Refugees said on April 11 that the regime had conducted more than 120 attacks since the quake, with over half occurring after the April 2 ceasefire announcement. The Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar (ISP-Myanmar) tallied at least 160 aerial strikes and 38 armed clashes between March 28 and April 9, nearly half of which took place after the declaration.
Attacks included the dropping of 500-pound bombs on a school in Sagaing Region’s Kawlin township that killed three, the bombing of a monastery in nearby Depayin that killed two refugees and three novices, and an airstrike on a crowded village food stall and internet café in adjacent Wuntho township that killed at least 26 people. And during the first three days of the traditional Thingyan new year, a symbolism-laden period during which attacks should be avoided even without ceasefires, the regime conducted bombings across eight townships that killed at least eight. The regime also reinforced certain locations, such as Taung Hkam, where it is fighting the TNLA, and bombed parts of KNU territory. The SAC’s spokesperson, in turn, accused various resistance groups of ceasefire violations while pro-regime platforms posted photos of what they said were resistance attacks on relief efforts.
The military’s violations are widely seen as a continuation of its long-established practice of exploiting ceasefires for tactical advantages to resupply or reinforce combat positions. Its April 2 ceasefire announcement said the military had declared 22 ceasefires between mid-December 2018 and the end of 2023. Yet how those fared leaves little space to build confidence in the current one, which is also being repeatedly violated. And for much of the public, the 2021 coup is seen as a betrayal of previous political accommodations that cemented widespread perception of the military as a bad-faith actor.
The fact that the SAC initially rejected ceasefire calls only to announce one just before its leader Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing went to Bangkok to attend the 6th BIMSTEC summit adds weight to charges of opportunism. Some observers believe the regime relented and declared a ceasefire following behind-the-scenes censure from China after regime forces shot at a Chinese relief convoy transiting through TNLA territory on April 1. And even as the country reeled from the earthquake, the junta has doubled down on holding its long-planned election by December, a poll its opponents consider a sham, though seen by others as a possible exit strategy. The regime has also been accused of weaponizing humanitarian assistance and profiting from the outpouring of international sympathy, with the NUG and allies demanding that aid bypass the SAC.
Resistance Violations
Resistance forces too breached their declared commitments to capture at least three locations, showing that they, too, can be opportunistic.
On April 2, the AA seized the Nyaung Kyo camp in Bago Region – one day after announcing its ceasefire. It then purportedly did not pursue fleeing regime troops, citing the ceasefire. Then on April 7, the Kachin Independence Army and a number of People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) under NUG command captured Indaw in Sagaing, while Chin State’s second-largest town, Falam, fell to the Chin Brotherhood (CB). While the AA-backed CB did not declare any ceasefires, it had recently mended fences with the NUG-aligned CNF, which expressed “pride and joy” in the town’s capture and urged resistance groups to continue fighting. The KNU also seized at least two regime camps near the Thai border, while fighting erupted near two key junta-controlled towns along the Asian Highway.
One thing to note is that all three locations were subject to long campaigns predating the earthquake, but the final pushes came only after the ceasefires or requests were made. Thus, these places are the very places where ceasefires are most applicable. Reflecting the information and narrative warfare aspects of Myanmar’s civil war, sympathetic media platforms surreptitiously did not mention the resistance groups’ ceasefires in their rapt coverage of the captures. Meanwhile, pro-resistance netizens cheered underneath the social media reports, praising the groups for their “decisiveness” or conveniently framing the events in strategic terms to hide the fact that the groups had breached their commitments.
Given the military’s repeat violations and the Hobbesian nature of Myanmar’s post-coup conflict, armed groups that previously engaged in ceasefires like the AA and the MNDAA mirrored the regime by using those pauses to resupply and prepare for their next pushes. The AA reneged on its last ceasefire in November 2023, a few months after Cyclone Mocha devastated Rakhine State in Myanmar’s west. The MNDAA declared unilateral pauses during its battle for Lashio in northern Shan State last year, yet continued attacks nonetheless.
The Need For De-escalation
Based on how things are, the current ceasefires appear doomed to fail. ISP-Myanmar notes that the SAC “shows no inclination” to de-escalate and that outside of the NUG, most armed actors may not view the quake as a “pivotal point” to de-escalate. One commentator wrote that despite the massive destruction, there was still an insufficient level of collective trauma to overcome the warmongering and maximalist stance of “lobbyists” far removed from the conflict. Other posts calling for the ceasefires to be expanded into something substantial were met with ridicule and the authors were accused of being junta apologists. Some pro-resistance voices are already talking of the next stage of conflict and urging civilians to steel themselves.
Yet the need for de-escalation becomes strikingly evident when taking a clear look at Myanmar’s fragmented conflict landscape, faltering economy, and dire humanitarian situation. For all of the NUG’s posturing, the parallel government has limited oversight over most PDF units and little bearing on powerful EAOs whose purported commitments to federal democracy and human rights have become increasingly doubtful as they have expanded their territorial control. The longer the conflict continues unabated, the harder it will be to pick up the pieces, and the more likely become a Somalia-style societal collapse and chronic instability.
Added to this, Myanmar’s economy was already in freefall before the quake. Junta mismanagement, conscription drives, scorched earth tactics, and attacks on infrastructure, the collapse of border trade, previous natural disasters, expanding conflict economies, and massive displacement has crippled the once-promising economy. The deleterious economic effects are leaching into the country’s severely under-funded humanitarian situation, with millions displaced and many more in acute food insecurity. The cities of Mandalay and Sagaing host sizeable communities of internally displaced civilians who had fled internecine fighting from across the Anyar heartland, and they now face grim prospects.
It is also becoming apparent that outside of political or armed circles, only those online or abroad are the ones still loudly cheering for destructive battles and demanding that “there is no negotiation for blood debts.” Previous efforts by various interlocutors to call for peace or to mediate between the warring parties are often met with derision as maximalists viewed that ceasefires robbed them of a chance to see the military get a good thrashing. The military’s re-entry into Lashio under a Chinese-brokered ceasefire with the MNDAA is being widely condemned online as an affront to dead protesters and resistance fighters, and is being held up as an argument against de-escalation.
There is no love lost for the junta, but the lived experiences of civilians on the ground who have to navigate the messy realities of conflict are increasingly divergent from the triumphalist “imminent victory” narratives constantly proffered on social media and propaganda platforms. And in the face of global economic uncertainty, funding cuts, and competing crises, pro-resistance voices’ assurances that international donors will rush in with substantive redevelopment aid the minute the junta falls are sounding more of a cruel joke than a consolation.
While hyper-partisan netizens continue to shout them down, anti-war sentiments and crisis fatigue are becoming harder to ignore. ISP-Myanmar’s assessment identified activists in diaspora communities and on social media advocating for and fueling unrestrained combat, and that the regime’s internet clampdowns are stifling moderate voices and those living inside the country who seek an end to conflict.
Making the Ceasefires Count
Ceasefires by their very nature are fragile. Yet they are a necessary step in any attempt to end conflict. The ones currently declared mark a rare step by multiple conflict actors in Myanmar that were unimaginable just a month ago. The NUG announced the ceasefire despite considerable criticism from maximalist voices and bellicose proclamations by militant influencers who say the earthquake offers a golden opportunity to depose the regime. This is a brave and laudable move regardless of events on the ground.
As for the military, no matter how vile and repugnant its conduct has been, it is currently receptive to international interactions that widen the room for bargaining. With the earthquake mostly affecting regime territories, neighboring countries such as China, India, and ASEAN member states now have some additional leverage that can be used for conflict management.
The situation behooves international stakeholders and intermediaries to play a more active role in bringing parties to the negotiating table to engage in inclusive and substantive dialogue. And looking at the amount of political capital and shuttle diplomacy that is going into negotiating an end to conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and Sudan – with their own mass civilian deaths, heinous atrocities, and widespread destruction, and whose latest chapters of conflict erupted after Myanmar’s current civil war – it is difficult to say the world has done what it can for Myanmar.
As such, the current juncture allows for a reset to the whole situation and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s efforts, no matter how fraught or thankless they may be, represent a fresh chance to do something beyond shoulder shrugging. There may be no good options, but de-escalation and dialogue are definitely the least bad on offer.
And for the record, de-escalation and dialogue should not mean an abandonment of accountability. The military will have to be held accountable for its actions, as do everybody else who has committed abuses. There are also very legitimate concerns that ceasefires will only freeze the conflict and impose a negative peace that does not address the military’s praetorian role in politics, universally seen as the key root of Myanmar’s decades of conflict.
The March 28 earthquake literally moved the ground at Myanmar’s geographical heart. The earth, considered the solid or unyielding element in Burmese mythology, gave way. If this does not signify that if inflexible things can shift, so too can intractable divides, then nothing else will.
Thousands of civilians have died and many more have had their lives upended by Myanmar’s civil war. Voices far away and online may be cheering for war, but people on the ground at least deserve a try at making the ceasefires expand, no matter how unlikely the prospects are.