Crossroads Asia

Why Uzbekistan Continues to Push for Engaging With Afghanistan

Recent Features

Crossroads Asia | Diplomacy | Central Asia

Why Uzbekistan Continues to Push for Engaging With Afghanistan

Tashkent sees stability in Afghanistan as essential for the security and stability of the broader Central and South Asian region.

Why Uzbekistan Continues to Push for Engaging With Afghanistan
Credit: Facebook/ Shavkat Mirziyoyev

At the 150th Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union held on April 7 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev once again called on the international community to avoid isolating Afghanistan. He emphasized the importance of establishing constructive dialogue with the current government and recognizing Afghanistan as an integral part of Central Asia. “We believe it is crucial to prevent Afghanistan’s isolation on the global stage,” Mirziyoyev stated, adding that Uzbekistan counts on the support of parliaments in this effort.

This is not the first time Tashkent has acted to support the stability of the Afghan state. Following the Taliban’s takeover in 2021 and the withdrawal of U.S. forces, the leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) convened for a summit on September 17, 2021. At the summit, Mirziyoyev not only called for the unfreezing of Afghanistan’s state assets  – estimated at $9.5 billion and held in foreign banks – but also proposed holding regular high-level SCO-Afghanistan meetings to foster dialogue and cooperation.

A few days later, in his pre-recorded address to the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly, Mirziyoyev once again emphasized that Afghanistan is an integral part of Central Asia. He called on the U.N. to play a greater role in establishing peace and stability in the country, urging it to have a stronger influence and louder voice. He also renewed his proposal to establish a permanent U.N. Committee on Afghanistan to “to improve international cooperation.”

A year later, in July 2022, at Mirziyoyev’s initiative, Tashkent hosted the international conference “Afghanistan: Security and Economic Development,” bringing together special representatives on Afghanistan from over 20 countries and international organizations, as well as delegation representing Afghanistan’s interim government under the Taliban.

These efforts are not isolated incidents; rather, they reflect a consistent pattern in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy since Mirziyoyev came to power in 2016. Tashkent has repeatedly voiced support for peace in Afghanistan, hosted Afghan representatives, and facilitated dialogue with international and regional stakeholders to advance stability in the country.

Uzbekistan’s interest in a peaceful Afghanistan has multiple purposes. The current government in Tashkent does not believe in isolated peace but sees stability in Afghanistan as essential for the security and stability of the broader Central and South Asian region. 

Geopolitically, Uzbekistan views Afghanistan as a critical gateway to South Asia. Uzbekistan is a double-land-locked country, one of just two in the world. Tashkent has been a  vocal supporter of the Trans-Afghan Railway  – an ambitious project aimed at linking Uzbekistan to Pakistan’s Gwadar and Karachi ports via Mazar-i-Sharif and Kabul. In February 2021, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan signed a roadmap in Tashkent to build the 600-kilometer “Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar” railway line. Although construction was initially scheduled to begin in September 2021, it was delayed due to the political transition in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, Afghanistan’s Taliban government formally joined the project in December 2021. This was followed by a technical and economic feasibility study carried out within Afghan territory in 2022. The final phase of negotiations began in mid-2023. If completed, the corridor is expected to carry 20 million tons of cargo annually.

“Our railway passing through Afghanistan is the best, cheapest and safest way to South Asia,” said Mirziyoyev in 2023 during a conversation with local entrepreneurs.

Afghanistan also represents a sizable market for Uzbek goods, with a population of around 43 million people – roughly 10 percent of whom are ethnic Uzbeks. Under the leadership of Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan maintained a cautious distance from its ethnic kin abroad, including in Afghanistan. Karimov’s vision of Uzbek identity was strictly defined by territorial boundaries rather than diasporic ties. While this stance has not drastically shifted under Mirziyoyev, Tashkent has pursued deeper economic ties with its southern neighbor, capitalizing on kinship as well as proximity. 

Afghanistan is currently Uzbekistan’s fifth-largest export market. In 2023, bilateral trade between the two countries reached $866 million and this year, on March 1, Uzbekistan’s Minister of Investment, Industry and Trade Laziz Kudratov met with the Taliban’s Minister of Commerce Nuruddin Aziziy to outline concrete steps aimed at increasing bilateral trade to $3 billion. Tashkent also reports that currently 550 companies with Afghan investment are operating in Uzbekistan, of which 443 (80 percent) are fully funded by Afghan capital. Afghanistan is one of only three countries, alongside Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with which Uzbekistan maintains a positive trade balance.

In a notable move, Uzbekistan launched the Airitom Free Economic Zone on the Afghan border in 2023, designed to facilitate trade and cross-border business. It was the first free trade zone in Central Asia. Built at a cost of $70 million by Jahongir Artikkhodjaev – former mayor of Tashkent City and founder of AKFA Group – the zone is guided by a “business over politics” approach. It includes around 400 shops, a hotel, and a clinic that serves patients from both Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Afghan citizens can enter the zone visa-free for up to 15 days, and the project is expected to create up to 5,000 jobs, with 30 percent allocated to Afghan workers. Uzbek entrepreneurs who opened stores in the Airitom noted that the Afghan market is already saturated with Indian and Pakistani products, but they are eager to compete and carve out space for Uzbek-made goods.

Uzbekistan has no interest in an unstable or isolated Afghanistan, nor in entering into conflict with its southern neighbor. Its pursuit of diplomacy, even as Kabul proceeds with the construction of the Qosh Tepa Canal – an ambitious project diverting vital water from the Amu Darya, one of the two rivers sustaining Uzbekistan’s cotton fields and agricultural sector – demonstrates Tashkent’s commitment to maintaining peace, despite looming concerns over potential future water shortages. 

Regardless of who holds power in Kabul, Uzbekistan has consistently sought to maintain constructive relations. These efforts are not driven by economic interests alone. Like its Central Asian neighbors, Uzbekistan remains cautious of Islamic radicalism and hopes that fostering friendly ties with the Taliban will help keep extremist influences at bay. Although there has been a visible Islamic revival in Uzbekistan in recent years, the securitization of Islam remains significant. Decades of Soviet-imposed atheism, followed by state-promoted secularism since independence, have shaped a society more inclined toward secular governance. Among the educated elite and especially the youth, secular lifestyles prevail, making widespread support for Islamic governance unlikely, unless fueled by a populist movement. So far, the state maintains a tightly controlled, centralized Islamic education system and public practice under firm government oversight. But this domestic preference has not impeded Tashkent’s desire to forge productive relations with the Taliban government in Afghanistan.