Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Cambodia on April 17 to 18 was marked by an unprecedented protocol gesture: King Norodom Sihamoni greeted Xi directly at the airport – a signal of the elevated status Cambodia accords to China. Yet beyond symbolism, the visit revealed the evolving nature of their “ironclad friendship.” With no new aid or loan announcements, and a focus instead on trade, investment, and sectoral cooperation, the relationship is entering a new phase – one defined by less dependence and more by deepening economic and strategic integration.
While some observers may read the timing through the lens of the China-U.S. trade war or U.S. President Donald Trump’s transactional foreign policy, the visit reflected more than a short-term reaction. It is not all about Trump and geopolitics per se. It affirmed Cambodia’s long-term strategic calculation: that China remains its most stable and willing partner, and that the bilateral relationship, though asymmetrical, offers room to maneuver on terms Phnom Penh increasingly helps define.
The adoption of the “all-weather Cambodia-China community of shared future in the new era” placed Cambodia among a select group of China’s most trusted partners, echoing the language previously reserved for Beijing’s ties with Pakistan, Russia, and Hungary. It signaled an intention to institutionalize long-term cooperation across all domains, regardless of global volatility. Despite speculation that Cambodia might pivot toward the West, Prime Minister Hun Manet used the occasion to demonstrate the continuity with the foreign policy of his father and predecessor, Hun Sen, while reaffirming the Cambodian People’s Party’s view that ties with Beijing remain indispensable to Cambodia’s development and regime stability.
Economically, Xi’s visit marked a notable shift. Unlike past visits, which often featured concessional financing or large aid packages, this time Xi offered neither. The absence of such financial packages perhaps reflects a broader shift both in China’s recalibration of its signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and in Cambodia’s expectations. But this is not necessarily bad for Phnom Penh, as the country is steering toward a more resilient and less aid-dependent economy.
Both sides framed this phase of cooperation as a more “equal” partnership, led by trade and investment growth rather than merely financial assistance. The 37 signed agreements covered areas such as advanced manufacturing, agricultural supply chains, artificial intelligence (AI) cooperation, and industrial upgrading, with flagship initiatives like the Industrial and Technological Corridor and the Fish and Rice Corridor meant to align China’s BRI with Cambodia’s national Pentagonal Strategy.
The two governments also agreed to formulate a new action plan for building their “community with a shared future,” reinforcing that the upgraded partnership is not merely rhetorical but increasingly institutionalized. Their reaffirmed commitment to advancing the Cambodia-China Free Trade Agreement further signals that structural economic integration, not episodic aid, will define the next chapter of bilateral engagement.
For Cambodia, this rebalancing is partly strategic. With reduced Western trade preferences and growing U.S. tariff pressures, Phnom Penh is consolidating access to China’s market and private capital. But the framing matters: what was once a donor-recipient relationship is now presented as a joint development model – one rooted in industrial integration, shared infrastructure, and long-term production capacity.
Notably, five of the signed agreements relate to the controversial Funan Techo Canal. While financing details remain vague, this marks China’s most visible backing of the canal to date, easing earlier doubts about Beijing’s silence. The agreement outlines a joint venture: 51 percent Cambodian ownership and 49 percent by Chinese firms. This suggests not only Chinese support but also Phnom Penh’s effort to assert ownership over key strategic infrastructure.
Security cooperation also featured prominently. Just days before Xi’s arrival, Cambodia deported 180 Taiwanese criminals accused of telecom fraud directly to mainland China – a move swiftly welcomed by Beijing and seen as reinforcing Cambodia’s alignment with the One China Principle. Xi praised Cambodia’s efforts to tackle online scams and urged deeper law enforcement coordination. Both sides agreed to strengthen cybercrime cooperation, expand military-to-military exchanges, and hold more regular defense dialogues under a new framework of “2+2” (foreign and defense ministers) meetings. While these initiatives are framed as supporting regional stability, they also reinforce mutual regime interests, particularly in resisting what both governments describe as “external interference” or “color revolution” threats, whether internal or external.
The regional implications are clear. By formalizing the “all-weather” partnership and launching new development corridors, Beijing is positioning Cambodia not just as a close partner, but as a pilot case for deeper strategic alignment – what it calls a “priority” in Southeast Asia. Other ASEAN countries may see this as a signal of how far Beijing is willing to go with trusted partners at a time when the United States steps back under Trump 2.0 – offering them privileged economic access, infrastructure, and political support, if they accept a tighter embrace.
Cambodia, for its part, continues to frame its China policy through the lens of “strategic autonomy and respect for sovereignty.” While the tilt toward Beijing is clear, Phnom Penh still cultivates other partnerships, including recent high-level engagements with the United States, Japan, and scheduled visits from U.S. Indo-Pacific Command officials. But Xi’s visit affirmed that the Cambodia-China relationship is not simply intact, but evolving toward greater interdependence, broader scope, and deeper insulation from external shocks.
Under Prime Minister Hun Manet, a foreign policy recalibration is quietly underway, one that seeks to build a more self-reliant and resilient Cambodian economy. Whether this model serves Cambodia’s long-term flexibility remains an open question. But for now, Phnom Penh is not hedging in the traditional sense. It is refining the terms of loyalty – seeking agency within alignment. This includes not only a more calibrated China policy, but also adjustments in the way Cambodia engages with traditional partners like Vietnam and other regional players.