Bangladesh’s interim government has banned all activities, including the online presence, of the Awami League (AL), led by former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, until the ongoing trials for crimes against humanity and genocide involving its leaders — these relate to the party’s deadly crackdown on the July uprising of 2024 — are concluded.
The decision, which came nine months after Hasina’s ouster from power by student-led mass protests, has been taken under the Anti-Terrorism Act, which was enacted by the AL back in 2009. The interim government banned the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL), the AL’s notorious student wing, under the same act on October 23 last year.
The ban on the AL marks a significant escalation in Bangladesh’s turbulent political landscape. It also raises questions about the efficacy and implications of banning political parties in a country with a history of such measures.
Civil society groups and political parties, particularly the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), the AL’s archrival since the 1971 Liberation War, as well as the recently formed National Citizens Party (NCP) and most right-wing groups, have been calling for banning the AL.
However, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has not adopted a firm stance on banning the party. In October 2024, BNP Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir told Prothom Alo, a Bangladeshi daily, “We have no objection to AL participating in elections, but criminals must face trial.” Last week, before the interim government announced the ban, BNP Standing Committee Member Abdul Moyeen Khan said that the decision to ban the AL lies with the Election Commission or the government, not the BNP. Following the ban announcement, however, Alamgir said that the “BNP is happy with the government’s decision.”
With the ban on the AL, a critical contradiction has emerged in the current political landscape, where the JI, a party that collaborated with West Pakistan during the 1971 genocide, led the call for the ban on the AL. This paradox is striking, given the JI’s historic role in opposing Bangladesh’s liberation. What further complicates matters is the alignment of JI activists with the NCP in recent protests against the AL, which have also featured prominent far-right political personalities.
The ban on the AL has major implications for Bangladesh. Its removal from the political arena leaves a vacuum in the ideological space once dominated by Bengali nationalism.
Since before the country’s independence, Bengali nationalism has been the AL’s ideological cornerstone and a unifying political tool to justify its regime and marginalize opposition voices, especially those promoting religious or ethnic identity politics. However, despite the AL’s instrumentalization of the ideology, Bengali nationalism remains crucial to countering the rising tide of far-right religious politics. In this context, the BNP, which traditionally promoted Bangladeshi nationalism, may attempt to integrate some elements of Bengali nationalism and secularism to broaden its appeal and prevent extremist allegations from taking hold in the absence of the AL.
Bangladesh’s political history has seen cycles of authoritarianism, military rule, and democratic struggles, with regimes banning parties to suppress the opposition or consolidate power.
After gaining independence in 1971, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s AL aimed to build a secular state by aligning with the principles of the new constitution. As part of this effort, the government banned religion-based political parties such as the JI. This ban was reversed in 1976 by President Ziaur Rahman, who sought broader political support for his regime, and by 1979, the JI was allowed to return to active politics.
Beyond the JI, Mujib banned all political parties and introduced one-party rule under BAKSAL in 1975, in order to consolidate power in his hands. The move failed and ended in his assassination and a military coup later that year.
Subsequent military regimes (1975-1990) restricted political activities. During the 1980s, General Ershad’s regime imposed restrictions on both the BNP and the AL, and relied on arrests and censorship to silence criticism. However, it rarely imposed formal bans.
After his fall in 1990, Ershad was jailed. But his Jatiya Party remained active, contesting elections and forging alliances with both the AL and BNP.
In 2013, the Bangladesh High Court canceled the JI’s registration, effectively barring it from elections due to its charter’s conflict with Bangladesh’s secular constitution. Despite this, the JI retained significant support, demonstrating that bans often fail to eradicate a party’s influence.
More recently, amid the July-August 2024 protests, the AL government banned the JI on August 1, 2024, under the ATA, accusing the Islamist party of inciting violence during the protests. This ban was revoked by the interim government just weeks later, citing insufficient evidence, highlighting the reversible nature of such measures.
Party bans have not been effective in Bangladesh. This stems from several factors. First, bans often target symptoms rather than root causes, such as ideological divides or socio-economic grievances, allowing the banned groups to re-emerge.
Second, the politicized use of legal tools like the ATA undermines their legitimacy, as seen in the AL’s own use of the law against rivals. That law has now been turned against the AL.
Third, Bangladesh’s polarized political culture, dominated by the AL and BNP, fosters resilience among supporters, who view bans as partisan attacks rather than legal necessities.
The ban on the AL has been criticized by international actors, including the United Nations, which warned in February 2025 that such moves could disenfranchise large voter segments and undermine multiparty democracy. The U.N.’s February 2025 report estimated up to 1,400 deaths during the 2024 anti-Hasina protests, providing the interim government’s rationale for the ban, but also highlighting the scale of unrest that bans may exacerbate rather than resolve.
While the ban marks a turning point, it is not the first time the AL has faced political extinction. History shows that this is a party shaped by struggle and survival.
Before Bangladesh’s independence, the party faced repeated crackdowns from the Pakistani government. In 1966, the Six-Point Demand led by Mujib made the AL a target of the military regime, but that did not stop the AL’s rise. In the 1970 general elections, the AL won a landslide victory for East Pakistan in the National Assembly. This result gave them a clear majority in the whole of Pakistan. However, the West Pakistani rulers refused to hand over power, leading to political breakdown and ultimately the Liberation War of 1971, where the AL played a central role in mobilizing public support and international sympathy.
However, after the 1975 collapse, it took 21 years for the AL to return to power. The party remained mostly in the opposition, facing harassment, and political exclusion in this period. Under the leadership of Hasina, the AL slowly regained ground. After years of protests and negotiations, the AL returned to power through democratic elections in 1996. This history undoubtedly shows the party’s deep roots, mass support, and ability to recover from political disasters.
But 2024 and 2025 have brought challenges the AL has never faced before. The recent ban comes in the wake of a mass uprising where security forces under the AL’s rule killed over 1,400 people. Among the victims were students, children, and civilians. The brutality, widely documented through videos, photos, and livestreams, went viral and remains accessible on platforms like YouTube, Facebook, and X. This digital record is different from past crises — people around the world have seen the violence in real time, and it’s unlikely to be forgotten or buried. The AL is now not only facing legal action but also a moral trial in the court of global public opinion.
Moreover, after returning to power in 2009, the AL used legal tools like the ATA and Cyber Security Act to target rivals, notably the BNP and JI, with mass arrests, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings documented by human rights groups. The 2014, 2018, and 2024 elections were marred by allegations of rigging, voter intimidation, and violence, sidelining the BNP and other opposition parties. The AL’s student wing, BCL, was notorious for attacking dissenters on campuses. Media outlets faced censorship, with journalists arrested or silenced, while civil society groups were harassed through restrictive laws. The party also ended up earning a reputation for widespread corruption involving uncountable sums of money.
This makes the current situation different from earlier setbacks. In the past, the AL was viewed as a victim of injustice or authoritarianism. Now, many see it as a source of violence and oppression. The availability of graphic evidence and the growing role of digital memory mean the party’s image has suffered long-term damage. While the AL historically bounced back from bans, exile, or coups, the challenge now is not just political, it is also reputational and generational.
At the same time, the current political landscape offers no space for well-intentioned AL members or past wrongdoers seeking reform. Neither the government nor the opposition has created room for such transformation.