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Sitting Out the NATO Summit May Be Lee Jae-myung’s Best Move

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Sitting Out the NATO Summit May Be Lee Jae-myung’s Best Move

In an era of volatile allies and summit performance art, strategic patience might just be South Korea’s best weapon.

Sitting Out the NATO Summit May Be Lee Jae-myung’s Best Move

South Korea’s President Lee Jae-myung waves as he and his wife depart Seoul Air Base to attend the summit of the Group of Seven in Kananaskis, Canada, June 16, 2025.

Credit: ROK Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism/ Lee jeong woo

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, barely weeks into his presidency following his June 3 election victory, is already facing heat at home and abroad. First, his highly anticipated meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump at the G-7 Summit in Canada fell through when Trump left early to focus on the Iran-Israel crisis. Now, reports confirm Lee will skip the NATO Summit in The Hague, scheduled for June 24-25.

Predictably, critics have pounced. Opposition lawmakers and some conservative analysts argue that missing a high-level summit at the onset of Lee’s presidency, especially an opportunity to meet Trump, risks marginalizing Seoul on the global stage. Some warn it could even send the “wrong signal” to adversaries like China and Russia.

But is this really a misstep? Or could Lee’s conspicuous absence actually be a case of strategic patience, a well-timed no-show that keeps South Korea out of geopolitical quicksand, buys valuable time, and avoids diplomatic ambushes?

The Middle East is on fire. The Israel-Iran conflict has escalated into a regional powder keg, pulling in proxies, straining supply chains, and spiking global oil prices. Trump’s abrupt exit from the G-7 to deal with the crisis reflected the severity of the situation. Since then, the United States has joined the fray by striking Iranian nuclear sites. 

For Lee, entering a high-profile NATO summit while this geopolitical storm brews is fraught with risk. The agenda, already dominated by Ukraine, could quickly pivot to Iran. And in this environment, meetings can become traps.

Trump, with his history of transactional diplomacy, could pressure South Korea into premature commitments – rhetorical or real – toward a U.S.-led effort that Seoul has no stake in. Without clarity on Washington’s game plan or even on how long this crisis will last, walking into a bilateral summit with Trump now is like jumping into a poker game without knowing the stakes.

History is replete with cautionary tales. Australia’s post-9/11 alignment with the American missions in Iraq and Afghanistan drew the country into protracted conflicts that proved politically unpopular and financially draining. Spain’s involvement in Iraq under Prime Minister Aznar was so deeply criticized domestically that it became a decisive factor in his party’s electoral loss.

Lee is far from alone in deciding it’s better to sit out the NATO Summit rather than risk being roped into a conflict in the Middle East. Japan’s Ishiba Shigeru and Australia’s Anthony Albanese — along with Lee, the leaders of three of the “Indo-Pacific Four” — have also decided not to attend.

In geopolitics, sometimes showing up unprepared is worse than not showing up at all.

Much of the criticism for Lee’s decision focuses on the missed opportunity for his first face-to-face meeting with Trump. Yes, an inaugural South Korea-U.S. summit is important. But it needs the right choreography to build trust, ensure alignment on issues, and lock in deliverables.

Rushing into a bilateral for the sake of optics is risky business, especially with a leader like Trump, who has a penchant for turning every meeting into performance art. Think of his summits in Singapore and Hanoi with Kim Jong Un — big headlines, little follow-through.

And there are plenty of issues that could take a hastily convened summit off the rails. Trade tensions are back on the table. Korean car exports are down 20 percent year-on-year. Trump, ever the tariff enthusiast, is reportedly considering reimposing reciprocal tariffs unless key trade partners renegotiate. South Korea needs a well-prepared negotiating team, not a hastily arranged handshake photo-op that could end up being a Trojan horse for one-sided demands.

There’s also the perennial burden-sharing issue. With Trump’s administration pressuring allies across the board to up their defense spending, a premature summit could corner South Korea into footing a higher bill for United States Forces Korea.

Lee’s state affairs council is still shaping the blueprint for his five-year national policy tasks. Most of his ministers are still undergoing confirmation hearings. Engaging Trump at this juncture would be like sending in the understudies before the play’s even cast.

Love him or loathe him, Trump is a geopolitical variable of his own. His foreign policy style is impulsive, transactional, and often devoid of institutional continuity. Meeting Trump on the sidelines of NATO could have been a diplomatic minefield for a newly inaugurated Korean president. Consider how Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s first summit with Trump turned into a public dressing-down. Optics matter. The wrong summit, at the wrong time, could diminish Lee’s authority both domestically and abroad.

There is also a longer-term political calculus. With Trump back in the White House, Seoul needs a multiyear strategy to manage his volatility. Burning bridges or giving away too much too soon would weaken South Korea’s hand in future talks. A little distance, for now, is not such a bad idea.

Lee campaigned on practical reform, domestic revitalization, and a “people-first” philosophy. Skipping a NATO summit to stay home and finalize his Cabinet appointments actually reinforces that brand. It signals a president focused on substance over ceremony.

It also buys time. Lee needs to consolidate domestic consensus before embarking on international engagements. Particularly with the National Assembly now controlled by his party, this is a window to pass meaningful reforms and set legislative tone – something no Korean president can afford to delay.

Moreover, skipping NATO defangs early criticism that Lee is too quick to align with Western strategic agendas. This is a delicate tightrope in a region where Beijing, Washington, and an increasingly assertive Moscow all expect deference.

Let’s not forget: not sending a president to attend a summit doesn’t mean being disengaged. South Korea can still send top envoys. Lee can hold bilateral calls. His team can quietly advance trade negotiations and security consultations. These can lay the groundwork for a stronger summit later – one that’s scripted, strategic, and deliverable-heavy.

Lee’s decision to skip The Hague might seem timid to some, but in diplomacy, timing is everything. When the geopolitical weather is unpredictable and the foreign policy establishment is still under construction, staying home isn’t retreat – it’s reconnaissance. When Lee eventually meets Trump or even steps onto the NATO stage at a future summit, there’s a better chance it will be on South Korea’s terms: with a confirmed government, a well-oiled policy machine, and a crystal-clear strategy.

The optics of Lee attending the NATO summit with a half-formed government, unclear policy directives, and domestic policy still on uncertain ground would have undercut his global credibility. This is a time to build strength at home, not chase headlines abroad. Because real power isn’t in showing up. It’s in knowing when to.